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Chapter 1
Welfare and Mobility: Migrants’ 




International migration can be understood not only as movements across the physi-
cal borders of nation states but also as mobilities across different social-welfare 
systems. These latter can be defined as multi-dimensional social protection mecha-
nisms  – constituted by a variety of different interlinkages between state, family, 
market and the third sector – which provide solutions for protecting their members 
against social risks. As migrants throughout the world make important contributions 
to their families’ social welfare, migration often implies changes in the ways in 
which individual’s and families’ needs for economic and social-welfare protection 
are met. Employing both a transnational and a translocal perspective, this book aims 
to illuminate the role of social-welfare considerations in individual and family 
mobility (and immobility) through the lens of migrants’ lived experiences and, thus, 
from their point of view. Through a variety of qualitative approaches, which include 
in-depth interviews, participant observation and multi-sited ethnography, the chap-
ters collected in this volume shift the focus from the dominant – for this field of 
research – level of the state to the level of the migrants and their migratory trajecto-
ries, motivations and directions. Thus, instead of asking how the welfare state is 
challenged by immigration (cf. Bommes and Geddes 2000; Brochmann and 
Hagelund 2012; Olwig et al. 2011), this book explores how migrants’ actual and 
desired mobility is shaped by their welfare repertoires (Righard 2008) or welfare 
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resource environments (Levitt et al. 2017) and how their mobility or immobility, in 
turn, re-configures their welfare protection strategies.
This book goes beyond the Eurocentric understanding of the welfare state, which 
emphasises nation-state membership as the primary condition for entitlement to 
social protection. In order to overcome this bias, the chapters in the volume consider 
both institutionalised and non-institutionalised social-protection mechanisms and 
address different domains of social welfare, including unemployment and social 
protection, healthcare and education, child and elderly care and old-age pensions, 
etc. Concerning the sources of social welfare, we distinguish four main welfare 
providers or actors – namely the state, the family, the market and the third sector. 
Similarly, instead of treating migration as a one-time movement from place A to 
place B, this book defines it as a form of mobility, i.e. as an actual or imagined 
movement across space – not necessarily across a nation-state border – and as a 
practice with meanings attached (Adey 2017). The book’s chapters address different 
types of mobility, among which immigration, emigration, circular migration, return 
migration and rural-to-urban migration within the same country.
The volume contributes to the existing literature on transnational mobility and 
social protection by bringing in empirical evidence from across the globe which 
illustrates the multitude of mechanisms in which welfare concerns shape individual 
and family decisions about mobility (and, sometimes, immobility) and vice versa. 
By introducing empirical findings and authors from across a variety of both Western 
and non-Western contexts, the book invites the reader to reflect on the role of global 
social inequalities in shaping migrants’ motivations, aspirations and trajectories.
1.2  Welfare and Migration as a Research Field
The welfare and migration nexus is an established research field which, in the past 
few decades, has produced a rich body of literature. The main bulk of it, however, 
has traditionally resorted to the use of quantitative data and favoured the nation- 
state perspective with states being either the units of analysis or the key policy 
actors in the field. In his seminal work, which subsequently shaped the dominant 
line of inquiry in research on migration and welfare, Borjas (1999) found that the 
immigrants in the US who received welfare support were more heavily concentrated 
in more-generous welfare states compared to the US-born or to immigrants who did 
not receive welfare. This finding formed the basis for the ‘welfare magnet hypoth-
esis’ which posited that interstate differences in welfare benefits act as magnets on 
the immigrant population. Since then, the welfare magnet hypothesis has undergone 
a great deal of scientific scrutiny. Thus, Giulietti et  al. (2011) have analysed the 
effect of unemployment-benefit spending on immigration within and to Europe and 
found no effect of it on the patterns of internal migration of EU nationals and only 
a moderate effect on the immigration of third-country nationals, which partly con-
firmed Borjas’ claims. In addition to the issue of self-selection among low-skilled 
versus high-skilled immigrants, the question of whether immigrants benefit more 
O. Ryndyk et al.
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from the national welfare than natives has been examined. Though sometimes con-
tradictory, findings from the US, Sweden and Germany tend to agree that, when 
compared to natives, immigrants resort to welfare provision more frequently and for 
longer periods of time (Borjas and Hilton 1996; Gustafsson 2011; Hansen and 
Lofstrom 2003). In the UK, however, Blanchflower and Lawton (2009) found that, 
prior to the global financial crisis of 2008, the newly arrived immigrants from the 
EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe were more likely than natives or 
third-country nationals to be employed, signalling their positive contribution to the 
public finance. Other studies explored the patterns of welfare participation among 
different group of migrants. A recent study commissioned by the Migration Advisory 
Committee in the UK reported that, over their lifetime, immigrants from EU mem-
ber states make an overall positive contribution, whereas immigrants from outside 
the EU make an overall negative contribution to public finance (Oxford Economics 
2018). In Germany, the descendants of immigrants were found to be more likely to 
resort to public-welfare provision than first-generation migrants (Riphahn et  al. 
2010) while, in Spain, findings show that migrants with long-term residence were 
more likely to resort to public-welfare provision than migrants with shorter lengths 
of residence (Rodrígues-Planas 2012).
The sheer growth in the volume of quantitative studies examining the welfare–
migration links can be explained by Western governments’ rising concerns over 
increasing immigration as a threat to the sustainability of welfare states. Such con-
cerns are rooted in what is known as the (ethnic) ‘threat hypothesis’ (Putnam 2007), 
a theory that assumes that growing ethnic or cultural diversity, which migration 
certainly contributes to, may undermine intergroup solidarity and trust which, in 
turn, are believed to be essential for the sustainability of the welfare state (Freeman 
2009; Geddes 2005). Following the repercussions of the 2008 global financial crisis 
and the austerity measures introduced in its aftermath in a number of Western coun-
tries, migration in general and migrants’ access to public welfare protection in the 
host country in particular, are again a hotly debated topic (Barrass and Shields 2017; 
Kalogeraki 2013; Powell 2017). From the mainstream media portraying migrants 
arriving en masse (Nordland 2015) to governmental bodies procuring evaluations 
on ‘welfare tourism’ (Ekhaugen et al. 2016) or ‘the fiscal impact of immigration’ 
(Oxford Economics 2018), migrants are being villainised, their ‘genuine’ motiva-
tions scrutinised and their rights to move and/or seek protection questioned. Since 
the macro-level perspective caters best for answering the dominant questions as 
uttered in the media and politics, it is thus no surprise that the consolidated field of 
research on the welfare–migration nexus has overwhelmingly favoured macro- and, 
to some extent, meso-level perspectives.
On the contrary, the micro-level aspects of the welfare–migration nexus, pertain-
ing to migrants’ decisions about migration, their needs for social protection and the 
(transnational) organisation thereof, have been largely overlooked. A more-recent 
scholarship on migration and welfare has employed a transnational paradigm, influ-
enced by the seminal works on transnational migration by Glick Schiller et  al. 
(1992) and Basch et al. (1994). More precisely, Basch and her colleagues define 
transnationalism as ‘the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain 
1 Welfare and Mobility: Migrants’ Experiences of Social Welfare Protection...
4
multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settle-
ment’, emphasising that ‘many immigrants today build social fields that cross geo-
graphic, cultural, and political borders’ (1994, 7). The transnational turn in migration 
studies also highlighted the need to avoid methodological nationalism, defined by 
Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002, 302) as ‘the assumption that the nation/state/
society is the natural social and political form of the modern world’. Accordingly, 
Righard (2008) points to the inherent dilemma between migrants’ transnational 
mobile livelihoods and the national immobile protection frames to which they are 
subjected, while Levitt et al. (2017) conceptualise transnational social protection as 
‘social protection parcels’ that are simultaneously ‘stitched together’ out of welfare 
provisions from both sending and receiving states, as well as the family, the market 
and the third sector. The literature on the micro-foundations of migrants’ welfare 
concerns and decisions to migrate is growing but remains relatively fragmented. For 
example, scholars have studied separately the provision of care (Lutz 2008) and 
health services (Bada 2014) to migrants, the role and meanings of dual citizenship 
(Harpaz and Mateos 2019), migrants’ agency for access to transnational social pro-
tection (Speroni 2018) and reciprocity between sending remittances and caregiving 
arrangements (Saksela-Bergholm 2019) from the perspective of transnational social 
protection. However, this body of literature still suffers from the lack of an inte-
grated dialogue ‘that sees health, education, secure retirement, and social security 
as increasingly constructed within and beyond the nation-state’ (Levitt et al. 2017, 
4). This book therefore aims to bridge this gap by focusing on welfare and mobility 
provisions from a transnational space approach.
1.3  Moving Beyond the Nation-State-Centred Approach
Esping-Andersen (1990) used the degree to which states assume the role of ensuring 
its citizens against social risks as a criterion to distinguish between different welfare- 
state regimes. Whereas in most European countries – and notably, though not only, 
in the Nordic countries –the state tends to offer some form of universal social- 
insurance schemes, market-based solutions are more common in liberal welfare 
states such as the US and other Anglo-Saxon countries. In many other countries, 
ranging from former communist states in Central and Eastern Europe to developing 
economies in Africa, Asia and Latin America, where neither the state nor the market 
succeeded in ensuring against social risks, family continues to play a vital role in 
individual social-welfare protection. In addition, actors from the third sector, such 
as charitable and faith-based organisations, are also important providers of social- 
welfare protection in both developed and developing countries. This book adopts a 
broader understanding of social-welfare protection, acknowledging the role of not 
only institutionalised (e.g. publicly funded/market-based schemes or third-sector 
organisations) but also the non-institutionalised sources of welfare, such as family 
and friends. It is addressed in relation to both the different actors catering for 
migrants’ social-welfare needs (family, state, market and the third sector) and the 
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different domains of welfare provision (e.g. unemployment and social protection, 
healthcare and education, child and elderly care and old-age pensions).
1.3.1  Key Issues
Employing both a transnational and a translocal perspective, the main aim of this 
book is to illuminate the role played by individual and family social-welfare consid-
erations in migrants’ decisions about mobility (and immobility) and how such deci-
sions, in turn, shape their own and their family’s social welfare. It does so by 
focusing on the interplay between the different welfare-provision actors – the fam-
ily, the state, the market and the third sector – in various socio-economic and geo-
graphic settings, for different domains of social welfare and in the context of a 
number of types of mobility.
Family is, without a doubt, an important source of social welfare and, thus, can 
shape individual aspirations for and actual practices of geographical mobility in a 
multitude of different ways. Zooming in on the role of family, the life-course and 
life-events perspectives are particularly useful in studying mobility choices and tra-
jectories. The different chapters of this book ask how intergenerational care arrange-
ments within families and individual life-course decisions (e.g. reproductive 
choices, retirement strategies) as well as the individual entanglements with existing 
gender power hierarchies, influence migrants’ aspirations for and actual practices of 
geographical mobility. For instance, parents’ concerns over their children’s future 
education, combined with the family’s challenging economic situation, can force 
them, in the first place, to seek employment abroad and, later, as demonstrated in 
Chap. 5, motivate them to settle permanently in the country of immigration. 
However, strong intergenerational family care expectations, deeply embedded in the 
national gender-making discourses, as shown in Chaps. 3 and 7, can sustain circular 
migration and, eventually, trigger return migration. Some specific cultural and eco-
nomic family structures, such as the one-child family policy in China (see Chaps. 2 
and 4), have the potential both to facilitate outmigration – for example, by encour-
aging the only child to move abroad for studies – and, later, to restrain it, by com-
municating moral expectations for the child to go back home to take care of his or 
her ageing parents in China.
State-provided or employment-related social-welfare provisions also affect indi-
vidual and family mobility. For example, in countries with virtually non-existent or 
only rudimentary public-welfare provision accompanied by meagre employment 
opportunities – as in the case of Timor-Leste (see Chap. 12) – some may often find 
themselves forced to leave and seek work overseas to ensure a better future for 
themselves and their families left behind. While mobility may provide opportunities 
for socioeconomic betterment, the idea of sedentariness, deeply engrained in the 
logic of European welfare states, may constrain it, punishing mobility and encour-
aging immobility, as demonstrated in Chap. 10. In some cases, mobility which, in 
the first place, was caused by deficiencies in state- or market-provided 
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social-welfare protection, may actually lead to the further accumulation of social 
risks, as illustrated by secondary movements of Spanish-Ecuadorian citizens in the 
EU (Chap. 11). Similarly, other groups of migrants, such as the retired expatriate 
wives returning to Sweden after many years spent abroad (Chap. 9), may unexpect-
edly realise that their absence from the national labour market has undermined their 
rights to state-funded old-age social protection. Yet, those in possession of globally 
demanded or well-paid professions, such as the healthcare workers described in 
Chap. 8, have the ability to offset their potential loss of state-funded social protec-
tion caused by their emigration and, thus, choose a more mobile career.
In practice, however, it is often difficult to isolate the contributions made by dif-
ferent welfare-provision actors to individual migration decision-making. Hence, 
many chapters in this book engage with more than just one element of the welfare 
resource environment, encouraging the reader to reflect on the ways in which they 
are interwoven. For instance, illustrating how particular family circumstances can 
make public social protection crucial for the welfare of specifically vulnerable 
groups of migrants, Chap. 6 argues that the access to state- and city-provided social- 
welfare programmes becomes decisive for the integration and settlement of single 
Filipina mothers in Japan. Looking at the other direction of state–family interaction, 
Chap. 13 discusses how the lack of public old-age social protection in Sudan, rein-
forced by the strong familialistic discourses over children’s responsibility for their 
parents’ future welfare, influences the decisions of Sudanese migrants about their 
initial emigration to Europe and, later, their secondary movements within Europe.
1.3.2  Key Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives
By zooming in on migrants’ own experiences, the contributions in this volume 
abandon the state-centred perspective of welfare and migration that dominates this 
research field and, instead, bring to light complex social protection strategies 
embedded not only in institutional but also in social and cultural settings. The trans-
national and translocal space approach used by the authors follows in the footsteps 
of other pioneering work on transnational social protection (e.g., Levitt et al. 2017; 
Righard 2008). Whereas Righard (2008) focuses on the shortcomings of restrictive 
national social-protection policies vis-à-vis the needs of mobile populations, Levitt 
et al. (2017) advocate for the need for a transnational social-protection framework 
for studying international migration and social protection. While our book draws on 
the key concepts developed by these studies, namely the ‘welfare resource environ-
ment’ (Levitt et al. 2017) and the ‘welfare repertoire’ (Righard 2008), it puts the 
emphasis on the actual and desired mobility of migrants shaped by their – quite 
diverse – welfare considerations (rather than on institutional settings). Thus, a com-
mon thread which goes through the different chapters in this book are the migrants’ 
reflections on and experiences of geographical mobility seen in the light of their 
social-welfare protection. With the level of analysis being on individuals and house-
holds, and not nation states, the chapters explore how migrants’ welfare-resource 
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environments or welfare repertoires encourage or restrict their geographical mobil-
ity. By employing the transnational and translocal space perspective, the book 
brings together different accounts of the nexus between welfare provisions and 
mobility into the conversation and, as such, contributes to an integrated account of 
the global social protection of migrant populations.
Furthermore, this book abandons the traditional and, arguably, outdated under-
standing of migration as a one-time movement from one country to another with the 
ultimate goal of settling permanently there. To this end, the book intends to main-
stream a much broader understanding of migration, which it does by employing the 
concept of mobility. Thus, it aims to illustrate the complexities not only of migrants’ 
actual itineraries – often involving previous experiences of mobility to other places – 
but also the rationalities of such choices as well as reflections about the prospects of 
further mobility in the near or the more-distant future. Hence, several chapters 
included in this volume address the different forms of geographical mobility – such 
as immigration to and emigration from welfare states, re-migration, circular and 
return migration, rural to urban migration – and asks whether and how welfare con-
cerns were part of migrants’ decisions about mobility.
1.3.3  Study Contexts
The contributors to this book are anchored in the traditions of Social Anthropology, 
Sociology and Human Geography, with a keen interest in enabling the reader to 
partake in the world described in the chapters through grounded and rich empirical 
material. In order to challenge the Eurocentric understating of the welfare–migra-
tion nexus, the editors deliberately sought submissions based on original ethno-
graphic fieldwork and conducted in different parts of the world – not just in the 
Western contexts which are more common in this field of research. Thus, the chap-
ters tell the stories of migrants who either originate in or have migrated to places in 
Europe (Austria, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom) and outside 
the continent (Australia, Brazil, China, Ecuador, Japan, the Philippines, Sudan and 
Timor-Leste). Together, they provide a myriad of reflections on and experiences of 
the various state, family, market and third-sector welfare provisions which shape 
migrants’ modes and patterns of mobility (and vice versa). The main reason behind 
this diversity of study contexts, often featuring states with lower levels of institu-
tionalised social welfare, is to challenge the Western monopoly on the concept of 
welfare. In so doing, we emphasise the need for a more inclusive and comprehen-
sive operationalisation of the welfare–migration nexus, which would reflect better 
its complexities in terms of the domains, sources and experiences of migrants or 
their families.
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1.4  Content of the Book
The 12 other chapters collected in this book cover a wide variety of topics, perspec-
tives and geographical contexts. They address different types of geographical 
mobility, among which immigration, emigration, circular migration, return migra-
tion and rural-to-urban migration. They engage with different domains of welfare – 
such as unemployment and social protection, healthcare and education, child and 
elderly care and old-age pensions – and with different sources of it – the state with 
its formal institutions, the family, the market and the third-sector actors. 
Consequently, the task of arranging the chapters thematically or contextually would 
face a number of problems. Firstly, defining clusters or groups would inevitably 
result in blurred, stretched and questionable borderlines between topics, perspec-
tives and the intersecting issues. Secondly, it would be counterproductive to this 
book’s goal to offer readers an integrated reading of the welfare–migration nexus 
from a micro perspective. Finally, concerned with the imperatives of the topics, 
concepts and typologies, both the editors and the readers would run the risk of over-
looking the perspectives of those who are at the centre of this welfare–migration 
nexus – individual migrants and members of their families. It is for these reasons 
that we have decided to restrain from dividing this book into thematic parts, letting 
its chapters stand on their own and leaving it up to the reader to choose a chapter at 
a time based on its topic or geographical context. At the same time, the common 
threads permeating them will help the reader to understand the ways in which these 
chapters are interconnected.
One such common thread which runs through several of the book’s chapters is 
the role of the intergenerational contract in the mobility (or immobility) of the 
migrants and members of their families. It is often manifested in relation to child-
care, gender roles and education. For example, Yan Zhao and Yu Huang (Chap. 2) 
discuss how the intergenerational contract and the family-based care regime in 
modern China shape the internal mobility of Chinese elderly parents. On the one 
hand, they find that being a supportive parent to the younger generation seems to be 
a more important factor than filial piety in influencing the elder generation’s deci-
sion to migrate in order to help their adult children with childcare for the grandchil-
dren. On the other hand, due to their double positionality of being both givers and 
recipients of care, the grandparents face a stay-or-return dilemma, for they fear that 
their stay may result in an economic burden for their children. Svitlana Odynets, in 
Chap. 3, demonstrates how Ukrainian female migration to Italy has challenged the 
hierarchical relationships of generations and gender in Ukraine, where the tradi-
tional family ideals intersect with gender contracts inherited from the Soviet period. 
She concludes that the persistence of the traditional image of Berehynia  – the 
mother who takes care of her children and family – perpetuates the care mobility 
between Ukraine and Italy. It has recently become manifest in the emergence of a 
chain migration pattern wherein aged Ukrainian women in Italy begin taking longer 
holidays in Ukraine while their own daughters, other female family members or 
friends temporary replace them at work in Italy. In Chap. 4, Alexander Gamst 
O. Ryndyk et al.
9
Page explores how Chinese students in Norway reflect on their aspirations for 
greater social and geographical mobility on the one hand and the social-care expec-
tations of their ageing parents and the overall more-traditional Chinese society on 
the other. He argues that moral obligations towards one’s parents in China may 
partly explain the somewhat fluid migration trajectories of this one-child-policy 
generation of Chinese students, as embedding oneself too deeply in a new commu-
nity may pose the dilemma of whether to uproot oneself at a later stage or to aban-
don one’s parents. Magdalena Ślusarczyk and Agnieszka Małek show, in Chap. 
5, how Polish migrants’ view of Norwegian education as a currency, which will give 
their children access to further studies and better jobs in the future, gradually trans-
form their temporary stay in Norway into a permanent one.
Some chapters in this book look more explicitly into the ways in which state-, 
family- and employment-related social protection mechanisms intervene with 
migrants’ decisions about mobility. For example, Jocelyn O.  Celero (Chap. 6) 
demonstrates how the availability of different social-protection schemes to single 
parents in Japan enables Filipina mothers of Japanese-born children to safeguard 
and improve their socio-economic situation when they, first, transit from marriage 
to divorce and single parenthood and, later, climb from part- to full-time employ-
ment and, in some cases, even home ownership. She argues that these mothers do 
not passively rely on social-welfare protection schemes but, on the contrary, actively 
seek, make use of and later abandon certain schemes to destigmatise their position 
and status in Japanese society. She concludes that their aspirations to settle in Japan 
or return to the Philippines in the future are contingent more on their children’s age, 
their investments and their visions of desirable retirement than on the immediate 
social protection available to them. In Chap. 7, Mădălina Rogoz and Martina 
Sekulová use the case of Slovak and Romanian female care-workers in Austria and 
show how the geographical proximity between Austria and the migrants’ home 
countries on the one hand and the persistence of conservative cultural expectations 
towards mothers and women in the home society on the other, result in these care- 
workers’ frequent travels back and forth between their workplace in Austria and 
home in Slovakia or Romania. They argue that the inadequacy of state-provided 
care services for children and the elderly and the persistence of conservative gender 
norms in their home countries sustain these care circulation patterns which only 
occasionally become disrupted by major life-course or family events which the 
authors call ‘tipping points.’ Mojca Vah Jevšnik explores, in Chap. 8, Slovenian 
healthcare workers’ welfare-related considerations underpinning their decision to 
emigrate from Slovenia. She argues that the generosity of social benefits in destina-
tion countries is not a decisive factor for healthcare workers emigrating from 
Slovenia. Instead, their globally demanded profession is their most valuable finan-
cial safety net. Given that healthcare workers are themselves providers of welfare, 
the chapter also discusses the workers’ ethical considerations about leaving patients 
behind. In Chap. 9, Catrin Lundström examines how Swedish expatriate wives 
become systematically excluded from national social-welfare provision and how 
they relate to the national political ideals of gender equality and the dual-earner 
family model upon their return to Sweden.
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Finally, the role of citizenship as a factor enabling or hindering mobility echoes 
strongly throughout the book’s chapters. For example, Anna Wojtyńska and 
Unnur Dís Skaptadóttir discuss, in Chap. 10, how Polish migrants’ entitlements to 
unemployment and other work-related benefits as holders of EU citizenship in post- 
crisis Iceland, combined with the imperfect EU regulations in the domain of social 
protection, discourage their return migration to Poland and lead to geographical and 
social immobility. On the contrary, Polina Palash and Virginie Baby-Collin 
(Chap. 11) illuminate the ways in which EU citizenship enables naturalised Spanish- 
Ecuadorian migrants to manage their social protection across multiple countries 
over their life span as they circulate between Spain and the UK. They argue that 
such mobility, however, does not necessarily guarantee them an accumulation of 
social rights and, instead, often leads to an accumulation of social risks. In Chap. 12, 
Claire C. Millar looks at the role of the emigration of Timorese migrants – holders 
of Portuguese citizenship – to England for their understanding of social welfare for 
the economic development of their home country. Arguing that Timorese migrants 
utilise the labour market’s economic protections and state-based welfare in support 
of their own, family-based protection frames, she elucidates the culturally differen-
tiated ways in which migrants and their families piece together unique welfare solu-
tions. Finally, in Chap. 13, drawing on the life stories of transnational Sudanese 
families whose members reside in Sudan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, 
Ester Serra Mingot asks what role migrants’ considerations for securing old-age 
pensions play in their decisions to move to and stay in certain places. Focusing on 
naturalised Dutch Sudanese migrants’ secondary movements from the Netherlands 
to the UK, she argues that migrants’ decisions to move are less motivated by the 
differences in the objective ‘welfare generosity’ between the two countries but, 
rather, more by their opportunities to secure their own and their families’ social 
protection in a manner deemed more rewarding from the family’s point of view 
which, in its turn, is rooted in the practices of intergenerational reciprocity.
1.5  Instead of a Conclusion
This book contributes to the exiting literature on transnational mobility and social 
protection by bringing in empirical evidence from across the globe which illustrates 
the multitude of mechanisms in which welfare concerns shape individual and family 
decisions about mobility (and, sometimes, immobility) and vice versa. By focusing 
on individuals, households and families rather than on nation states, the book’s con-
tributors distance themselves from the macro- and nation-state level of analysis in 
the field of migration and welfare research. Inspired by the recently emerging and 
rapidly ground-gaining theorisations of mobility and social protection, the authors 
of this book do not simply follow in the footsteps of the pioneers (Levitt et al. 2017; 
Righard 2008). They take a step further by developing their own theoretical lenses – 
such as, for example, a theorisation of major life events as ‘tipping points’ in 
migrants’ trajectories (see Chap. 7).
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Given the broad scope of topics, geographical contexts and theoretical perspec-
tives covered in this book, issues such as gender, culture, intergenerational relations 
and citizenship become common threads that permeate and stitch together the 12 
other chapters of this book. As a gendered process in which culture plays an impor-
tant mediating role, migration is both a response to and a cause of household wel-
fare insecurity in many countries around the world. At the same time, culture is not 
something static, predetermined or incapable of adaptation. On the contrary, when 
viewed in the context of social welfare, culture shapes and is simultaneously shaped 
by existing social protection structures. The intergenerational processes of care pro-
duction and reproduction inevitably bind gender and culture together. Thus, the life- 
course and life-event perspectives prove to be essential analytical tools for applying 
the micro level of analysis to mobility and social protection. Hence, several of the 
book’s chapters illustrate how geographical mobility is shaped by individual and 
family needs for social protection over the course of migrants’ lives. Moreover, in 
some cases, families’ welfare-mobility projects might stretch over several 
generations.
Despite the emphasis on migrants’ subjective rationalities, the book’s chapters 
often highlight the political nature of many dilemmas faced by migrants and mem-
bers of their families and expose the national welfare systems’ inherent sedentary 
bias. Thus, acknowledging the role of contextual factors (i.e. social welfare and 
migration regimes and bilateral/international social-protection agreements), a num-
ber of the chapters demonstrate that citizenship plays a crucial role in steering 
human mobility. Leaving aside its symbolic and emotional meanings, the formal 
possession of the citizenship of particular countries (or, in China’s context, the right 
to city residence Hukou, see Chap. 2) becomes a key factor enabling or disabling 
onward, secondary and return mobility. The issue of citizenship as one element of 
migrants’ welfare-resource environment brings the reader closer to the concept of 
agency and resourcefulness in the welfare–migration nexus. Individual agency can 
help to explain the variations in migrants’ ability to piece together their own and 
their families’ social-welfare security despite the seemingly uniform restrictions 
imposed by institutionalised welfare policies. The future theoretical endeavours 
could more explicitly incorporate the concept of agency in the studies of transna-
tional mobility and social protection.
This book is designed for a broad range of audiences, from established scholars 
and policy-makers to graduate students of Sociology, Political Science, Anthropology 
and Human Geography who are familiar with academic texts and interested in trans-
national mobility and social protection. We hope that the readers will find the con-
tributions to this book insightful and valuable for their understanding of migrants’ 
experiences of social-welfare protection in a globalised world.
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Chapter 2
The Mobility of the Elderly and Family- 




This chapter discusses the mobility of Chinese migrant elders in relation to the 
family-based care regime in China. Chinese older people migrate mainly for ‘family 
reasons’, most notably to take care of the younger generations who have migrated 
and/or to satisfy their own old-age care needs (Li and Gan 2017; Li and Huang 
2018). A recent survey on older migrants in the metropolises of Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen shows that 35.2% of the respondents migrated for the 
purpose of helping with childcare for the third generation (their grandchildren), 
19.3% to take care of the second generation (their adult children) who have migrated 
and 23.1% for their own old-age care needs (Li and Huang 2018). An important 
context for this ‘family-reasoned’ migration is that family is still the most important 
and reliable care provider in China. There is an intergenerational mutual reliance or 
unwritten contract in care arrangements within the family. While the second genera-
tion relies on their parents for childcare, the older generation is dependent on the 
second one for care in their old age (Eklund 2018; Zhao and Huang 2018; Zhong 
and Li 2017). This chapter focuses on older grandparents who have migrated to take 
care of their grandchildren and explores both how the trajectory of their mobility is 
shaped by the intergenerational contract on care and how migration may possibly 
change this intergenerational contract.
The elderly migrants whom we study are commonly called in Chinese sui qian 
lao ren or ‘accompanying older migrants’. The word ‘accompanying’ indicates that 
they migrate because of their children’s migration. Internal migration in China was 
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strictly controlled during the era of state-planned economy and large-scale internal 
migration did not start until the early 1980s, shortly after China’s economic reform 
began in 1978. Because the development of the market economy required the free 
mobility of labour, it triggered most notably – but not exclusively – a mass rural–
urban migration of cheap labour (Chan and Zhang 1999; Li 2004). As for the 
accompanying older migrants, the initial migrants were their adult children who 
often migrated to big cities for better jobs or a career. Therefore, the migration of 
these elders can be regarded as a continuation of the large-scale internal labour 
migration process.
The analysis offered in this chapter is based on qualitative data from 16 in-depth 
interviews with ten older migrant grandparents living in one residential area in 
Shenzhen, a major city and economic centre near Hong Kong. In order to explore 
the links between the mobility of these migrant elders and the care needs and 
arrangements within the family, we analyse in particular their decisions to move and 
their future plans regarding the dilemma of whether to stay in Shenzhen or 
return home.
Since care arrangements within the family constitute an intergenerational ‘con-
tract’, it is essential to discuss the mobility of migrant elders in relation to the inter-
generational relationship. Our discussion on this aspect will be embedded in recent 
theoretical debates on Chinese descending familism or neo-familism (Obendiek 
2017; Yan 2016, 2017; Zhao and Huang 2018) which describe the significant 
changes that have taken place in Chinese family life and new perceptions of tradi-
tional ideals and norms regarding family relations in China – in particular the notion 
of filial piety and the changing power relations between the first (the elderly par-
ents) and the second generations. This chapter contributes not only to knowledge 
about the migration of older people in China but also to discussions on continuities 
and changes in current Chinese family life in the context of migration and the effect 
of the One-Child Policy. Furthermore, it proposes to add a welfare perspective to 
our understanding of continuing internal migration in China and highlights the con-
nections between the migration of the elderly and China’s family-based care regime 
into which the care arrangements within the family are incorporated.
2.2  The Chinese Family-Based Care Regime in the Context 
of Social Transformations
The Chinese family-based childcare and elderly-care practices are closely related to 
the Confucian norms of filial piety – the core and basic norm which regulates inter-
generational ties and family relations. Traditionally, there are two interrelated cen-
tral aspects of filial piety that children must obey: respect and absolute obedience to 
parents and filial support and care of them in their old age (Zhong and Li 2017). 
Filial support and care means that children have an obligation to provide for, serve 
and care for their elderly parents and arrange their funerals after their deaths. Filial 
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piety is also fundamental to and shapes grandparenting norms in China (Ko and 
Hank 2014; Silverstein et al. 2006). Because a married child is expected to fulfil 
their duty of filial piety by living with their elderly parents, grandparents are likely 
to live with their grandchildren, which makes them a natural source of childcare 
(Chen et al. 2000; Ko and Hank 2014; Yasuda et al. 2011). Traditional grandparental 
roles under the Confucian family culture tend to be related to fostering intergenera-
tional bonds and extending family heritage (Cong and Silverstein 2012).
Despite concerns about the erosion of filial piety by modernisation and rapid 
social changes (Yeh et al. 2013), scholars commonly agree that filial piety still plays 
a major role in contemporary family lives in China (e.g. Cheung and Kwan 2009; 
Lin and Yi 2011), albeit in new and revised forms or even with radical changes (e.g. 
Eklund 2018; Santos and Harrell 2017; Yan 2003, 2016). One central change con-
cerns the decline of parental power, with the result that filial piety today no longer 
requires the submission and unconditional obedience of the younger generation 
(Yan 2003; Zhong and Li 2017; Chen et al. 2011). In his theorisation on descending 
familism, Yan (2016) points to a new model of intergenerational solidarity that 
builds on an intimacy between the older and younger generations and a new, more 
flexible, family structure in which the focus and meaning of life flow downward to 
the third generation – i.e. the grandchildren. In particular, Yan considers the emer-
gence of intergenerational intimacy, in the form of increased communication and 
understanding as well as the sharing of emotions, as the major breakout from the 
traditional Chinese family culture, where this kind of intimacy was suppressed to 
maintain hierarchy and parental authority (Yan 2016).
This change in the perception of filial piety also influences how family members 
perceive their obligations and roles regarding child and elderly care. Zhong and Li 
(2017), for example, argue for an investment perspective through which to under-
stand intergenerational relationships. Without the element of unconditional obedi-
ence in the perception of filial piety, the older generation no longer takes filial care 
by their children for granted. Consequently, they actively seek to secure their future 
old-age care by investing in the younger generation, not only financially through 
helping them to purchasing a home but also emotionally, by caring and strengthen-
ing the intergenerational bonds (see also Wang 2010; Xiao 2014; Zhang 2005). 
Understood from this perspective, grandparents providing childcare can also be a 
strategic and emotional investment by the older generation in exchange for more 
secure old-age care and emotional support from the younger generation in the future.
Although our earlier study on migrating grandparents (Zhao and Huang 2018) to 
some extent confirms this investment and exchange perspective, we argue that the 
intergenerational care arrangements within the family are not merely cultural prac-
tices based on certain norms of family relations. Rather, they are part of wider insti-
tutional arrangements on care and welfare, shaped by social and related family and 
labour policies. For example, the heavy reliance on grandparents for childcare is 
also due to insufficient institutional support in contemporary China: statutory mater-
nity leave in China is 98 days, up to a maximum of 4 months (ILO 2012), while the 
average age for enrolling a child in kindergarten is approximately 3  years. 
Grandparents often have to fill this childcare gap. Meanwhile, the relatively early 
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retirement age in China (50 or 55 for women and 60 for men) enables grandparents 
to be the main labour force for childcare. Grandparents providing childcare has thus 
been institutionalised through policies and institutional arrangements. Meanwhile, 
the overall policy of elderly care follows the principle of being ‘based on individual 
families, backed up by the communities, and supplemented by different institutions’ 
(State Council of PR China 2017). Family members, primarily children, are still 
expected to play a major role in providing care for their senior parents. Therefore, 
intergenerational care arrangements are an adaptive family strategy based on a func-
tional solidarity within a welfare and care regime. More importantly, when elderly 
grandparents migrate to help with childcare, the migration itself is part of the family 
welfare strategy and functional solidarity.
We therefore find it necessary to add a welfare perspective to the cultural per-
spective on family norms in order to understand the mobility of the migrant parents. 
One concept which we consider to be relevant here is the ‘welfare resource environ-
ment’ (Levitt et al. 2017), which helps to map and analyse individuals’ access to 
social protection and welfare in a transnational space created by global migration. 
Though the migration we look at is domestic, it shapes a similar translocal space in 
which the older migrants navigate the care needs and resources to find the best solu-
tion for both their family members and themselves. Consequently, we analyse how 
the elderly position themselves with a view to balancing the different care needs and 
required resources and how we can understand the mobility of these older people 
through these positionalities.
2.3  Research Context and Methods
The empirical base for this chapter consists of 16 qualitative semi-structured inter-
views, carried out in two rounds, with ten elderly migrant grandparents living in one 
residential community in Shenzhen. Because of its special geographical location 
bordering Hong Kong, Shenzhen became China’s first special economic zone in 
1980 – soon after Deng’s ‘economic reform and opening-up policy’ – and has since 
then developed from a town centred on the fishing industry, with a population of 
332,900 (Zhang and Qi 2006) into one of China’s most important economic centres, 
a modern city with a total registered population of around 12.5 million at the end of 
2017 (World Population 2018). Shenzhen is thus a city of migrants, its population 
reflecting the pattern of China’s mass internal migration that started during the 
1980s (Ye 2013), including a high proportion of older migrants, the majority of 
whom moved to follow their adult children (Li and Huang 2018). Shenzhen’s gov-
ernment has adopted a series of incentive policies to attract young talent to go there 
and settle down. These policies include economic rewards and relatively easy pro-
cedures for moving Household Registration (in Chinese, Hukou) – a system which 
has been used to regulate people’s access to social protection and welfare (Wu 
2013), including public health and care – and more favourable conditions for pur-
chasing housing. Consequently, Shenzhen has become an attractive city for young 
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migrants, particularly those who are well-educated and are seeking better career 
opportunities or/and a more Westernised lifestyle. The children of our participants 
belong to this category. They all have a university degree (two have Master’s 
degrees), moved to Shenzhen because of job opportunities and have their Hukou in 
Shenzhen.
Until very recently, there have been strict restrictions on elderly migrants moving 
Hukou in Shenzhen – at the time of the first round of interviews, no participants had 
their Hukou there. Since each province or municipality has its own separate social 
and medical insurance programmes, without a Hukou in Shenzhen, the participants 
have very limited access to the local welfare benefits and social services. For exam-
ple, if they fell ill, they would have to travel back to their home towns for medical 
services if they are to get reimbursed for the cost of treatment. However, right after 
the first round of our interviews in late 2015, Shenzhen had started to ease the 
requirements for migrant older parents to move their Hukou (Shenzhen Government 
2016). Among the participants in the second round of our interviews, two had 
already moved their Hukou to Shenzhen and one was in the process of applying. 
However, this does not solve their problem of how to access pension and medical 
insurance in Shenzhen. According to the regulations, to obtain access, the older 
migrant must not only have a local Hukou but must also have never received a pen-
sion elsewhere in the country (Shenzhen Social Insurance Fund Administration 2018).
The community we chose to recruit participants from also has a high proportion 
of residents with a recent migration background, reflected in the high number of 
households who rent as opposed to owning their home. New migrants often rent due 
to high house prices in Shenzhen. Even though the first generation is often willing 
to support them financially, the assets that the migrants and their families accumu-
late elsewhere are often not enough for a down-payment in Shenzhen. This com-
munity also has housing units with different price levels, which enabled us to recruit 
participants with varied socio-economic backgrounds. We used the local social 
work station as the initial door-opener and thereafter the snowball technique to 
recruit participants who met the following two criteria. Firstly, they had to be in 
their 60s or thereabouts and to have mainly migrated to help with childcare. We 
therefore focused on migrants who were relatively healthy and not heavily in need 
of care themselves. Secondly, they must have lived continuously in Shenzhen for 
more than 6 months. In addition to socio-economic background (both their own and 
that of their children), we considered other social variables in the recruitment to 
ensure that both male and female, rural and urban, single-child and non-single-child 
parents and both maternal and paternal grandparents are represented in our sample. 
All ten participants recruited to our study – six females and four males – had moved 
to Shenzhen from other provinces. They were between the ages of 58 and 69 and 
had lived in Shenzhen between 3 and 10 years at the time of their first interview. An 
overview of the participants’ socio-demographic background can be found in 
Table 2.1.
The second author conducted the interviews in two rounds, the first in late 2015 
and early 2016, when she interviewed eight participants. In this round of interviews, 
we focused on how the decision to move was made and how the participants 
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experienced the changes in their life after migration. The second round took place 
exactly 2 years later – the plan being to follow up the same eight participants. The 
background for this new round of interviews was that we registered a dilemma from 
the first-round interviews that most of the participants face concerning the question 
of whether to stay in Shenzhen or return home. In the second round interviews, we 
intended to explore this dilemma further and address the question of the mobility of 
these elderly migrants. We managed to interview six of the eight participants – of 
the other two, one had returned due to illness and the other did not respond to our 
inquiry. To compensate for the missing data, we recruited two new participants. In 
other words, among the ten participants, six were interviewed twice, two were inter-
viewed once in the first round of data collection and the remaining two were inter-
viewed once in the second round. Each interview lasted around 1 h and took place 
at the participants’ homes.















 1 Grandma 
Sun
65 Urban Henan Senior 
middle 
school
10 Shenzhen 1 son
 2 Grandma 
Yi
69 Urban Shandong Primary 
school
10 Widowed 1 son
 3 Grandpa 
He
67 Urban Zhejiang University 5 Shenzhen 1 
daughter
 4 Grandma 
Zhu
58 Rural Heilongjiang Primary 
school
3 Hometown 1son/1 
daughter
 5 Grandpa 
Wang
61 Urban Jiangxi Senior 
middle
7 Shenzhen 1 son
 6 Grandma 
Jin
63 Urban Shandong Junior 
middle 
school
9 Hometown 1 son
 7 Grandma 
Li
68 Rural Hunan Illiterate 6 Hometown 2 sons
 8 Grandpa 
Fan
64 Rural Hebei Junior 
middle 
school
4 Shenzhen 1 
daughter
 9 Grandma 
Wu
63 Urban Hunan Junior 
middle 
school
6 Hometown 1 son
10 Grandpa 
Zhou
67 Urban Heilongjiang Senior 
middle 
school
5 Shenzhen 1 son
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2.4  The Decision to Move
All the participants said that their move to Shenzhen was initiated by their children, 
upon the birth of a grandchild. However, they responded differently to the request. 
Three participants, Grandma Sun, Grandma Yi and Grandpa Zhou, responded posi-
tively and decided immediately to move permanently to follow their children. As 
parents of a single child, they all expected to move to follow their only child, even 
before their children asked them. For them, moving was just a matter of time. By 
contrast, the remaining seven were reluctant to move – mostly because going to 
Shenzhen would represent a major upheaval in their lives – and they all said that 
they were used to the places where they had spent their entire lives. They therefore 
stated that moving to Shenzhen was a choice of no choice. In this part of the analy-
sis, we look at these two groups separately. We start with the older (grand) parents 
who had expected to move.
2.4.1  To Move Permanently: Fear of Becoming 
the ‘Empty-Nest’ Elderly
As mentioned above, three participants had intended to move, even before the 
initiation by the second generation. This intention was based on their own old-age 
care needs. For example, Grandma Sun says:
My son worked in a big company in Shenzhen. He was always very busy and had little time 
to rest. After he had decided to settle down in Shenzhen, we also started considering moving 
to follow him, so that we could take care of him. If we chose to stay in our hometown, we 
would be ‘empty-nest elders’ (kong cao lao ren), which is awful. There were lots of reports 
on empty-nest elders in the media. I felt panic each time I heard or read about them. Then 
my son also needed us to come when his wife was pregnant. Someone needed to take care 
of his baby. So we decided to come! My son also said the family should be together… At 
that time, I was already retired, but his father was about to retire the year after. So we 
decided that I would come first, and then he would come as soon as he retired. … I thought 
Shenzhen was a good place for old-age care, because the hospitals and doctors here are 
much better than those in my hometown. So when we decided to come, it was based on 
consideration for our future.
Even though the direct cause of Grandma Sun’s migration was the birth of her 
grandchild, the intention to move had existed ever since her son decided to settle 
down in Shenzhen. For her, moving to be near their only child is a natural choice – 
one which is quite representative among the three participants. Grandma Yi, a 
widow and mother of a single son, also talked about her fear of becoming an ‘empty- 
nest elder’, a term which is widely used in China to refer to older people with no 
children or whose children have left home and very often moved away – a category 
considered as a highly vulnerable group in discussions of the big challenges which 
China faces concerning the issue of elder care. Therefore, in their decision-making, 
their own future care needs and their expectations of filial care from the second 
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generation are major considerations. At the same time, these expectations are also 
intertwined with their wish to support the second generation. For example, the 
above quote demonstrates parental love – the participant’s worry about her son who 
‘was always busy and had little time to rest’ and thus her wish to take care of him 
and, later, his child.
For Grandma Sun, migration seems to be a win–win situation: by migrating and 
living close to their son (they live in a separate apartment in the same neighbour-
hood), the two generations can take care of each other, which is also the case for 
Grandpa Zhou. In fact, these two cases share several similarities. In both, the couple 
decided to migrate together. In addition, they are the only two families who can 
afford to have their ‘own’ apartment after migration – which is, as we discuss later, 
considered an ideal living condition by our participants. Both said that the second 
apartment is funded by a cross-generational arrangement: the older generation pro-
vides the down-payment, while the younger generation pays the loan. Grandpa 
Zhou said, ‘After we decided to move, we sold our apartment and car at home, and 
used the money as a down-payment for the second apartment in Shenzhen. We 
agreed to buy it in our son’s name. Everything will be his after we die anyway’. 
Therefore, for Grandma Sun and Grandpa Zhou, the decision to move permanently 
was not merely based on the fact that they have only one child to rely on but also 
that it is economically feasible for them to spend their old age in Shenzhen. This, 
however, was not the case for Grandma Yi.
While both Grandma Sun and Grandpa Zhou showed great parental love in 
expressing their support of the second generation, Grandma Yi emphasised the duty 
of filial piety and was rather pragmatic in her account of her decision to move per-
manently. When explaining why her provision of childcare is necessary, she com-
pared herself to a nanny and considered herself a better caregiver, both in terms of 
the family’s economy and in terms of trustworthiness. As to the relationship between 
her own need for old-age care and her provision of childcare, she said: ‘When I get 
really old, I expect filial care from my son. Like now, I help him take care of his 
child, then later, he will take care of me’. The explicit exchange perspective is 
closely related to her status as a widow and the mother of a single child, which 
makes her even more vulnerable in the family-based elderly-care system. So she 
had to emphasise the duty of filial piety and her economic and practical contribution 
to the second generation in order to secure her future old-age care. Therefore, the 
different discourses which the participants deploy (parental love vs filial piety) also 
mirror their different strategies for securing care in their old age based on the avail-
able resources.
Interestingly, although all the participants had the intention of moving to follow 
their children, none had brought it up with their children. Instead, they all waited for 
the second generation to take the initiative. If moving to follow an only child is a 
natural choice for the three participants, the birth of a grandchild seems to be a natu-
ral timing for the migration. Meanwhile, it also shows that moving to fulfil a role as 
a care-providing grandparent seems to be the new norm regarding the intergenera-
tional care arrangements, something we expound on in our discussion of the cases 
of elders who were less willing to move.
Y. Zhao and Y. Huang
23
2.4.2  Grandparents ‘on Duty’: Temporary Migration 
and a Choice of No-Choice
Research shows that elderly people are less likely to migrate and will often expe-
rience more difficulties adapting to their new environment after migration (Li et al. 
2017). The majority of our participants were reluctant to move and expressed great 
attachment to the place where they had lived for their entire lives and where they 
had a wide network, a familiar lifestyle and habitual routines. For them, moving to 
Shenzhen was a hard decision. When justifying their decision, they all emphasised 
the needs of the second generation, with a perception of their roles as supporting 
parents and grandparents. As an illustration, Grandpa Wang said:
I only have one son, so I do not have a choice. My daughter-in-law became pregnant shortly 
after they got married. My son wanted us to come and take care of her and later the baby. 
The parents of my daughter-in-law could not come, because they were taking care of their 
son’s baby. We also discussed hiring a nanny, at our expense, but my son worried about 
safety issues. After all, you do not feel totally assured letting a stranger take care of your 
baby. Finally, we decided to come. Already around that time, we had decided that we would 
leave once the baby got older. Otherwise, I have nothing to do here. I had no other expecta-
tions. I came to finish my mission. It was like switching duties, off-duty [retirement] in my 
hometown, and then on-duty in Shenzhen.
Grandpa Wang describes their migration to Shenzhen as grandparents going ‘on 
duty’. It is seen as temporary migration because, as soon as the duty or ‘the mission’ 
is fulfilled, he and his wife would return. Additionally, he described the decision- 
making process, where he did consider other alternatives for childcare but found out 
that actually he had no other choice than to move. This description of ‘fulfilling the 
duty of childcare’ and migration as a choice of no-choice is very representative of 
this group of participants. For example, Grandmas Jin and Li also used similar 
expressions like ‘grandma on duty’ (nainai shanggang in Chinese) or ‘I came to do 
voluntary work’ (yiwu laodong, also meaning unpaid work).
Migration as a choice of no-choice thus concerns the issue of how to meet the 
need for childcare with the given resources within the family – the extended family 
involving not only generations, but also the in-laws. Most of our participants, 
including those who were happy to move, mentioned the alternative of hiring a 
nanny, yet they all considered themselves to be a better provider of childcare than a 
nanny, in the sense that they are more trustworthy and devoted because of their 
blood ties to their grandchildren, described as their ‘own flesh and blood’ (qin 
gurou). By contrast, a nanny is considered as a stranger or outsider (wairen). In 
addition, there is the issue of finances. Several participants, like Grandmas Zhu, Jin 
and Li, indicated that helping with childcare is also a way of relieving the economic 
burden for the second generation, as is also reflected in the quote from Grandpa 
Wang. When considering hiring a nanny, he stated that this would be at their 
expense – i.e. as the older generation. Among our respondents, not all the families 
can afford to hire a nanny. Even among those who can, they consider this to be an 
2 The Mobility of the Elderly and Family-Based Care: A Case Study of Chinese…
24
unnecessary expense and would rather save their money for other things, like hous-
ing and the children’s education.
The quote from Grandpa Wang also touches upon another question: Which set of 
grandparents should be responsible for the care of the grandchildren? Since Chinese 
families traditionally follow the patrilineal structure, it has often been the parents of 
the husband who live with the young couple and thus become the natural caregivers 
of the third generation. However, the One-Child Policy has greatly challenged this 
practice (Eklund 2018). Even though two participants referred to patrilineality to 
account for their decision to move for the purpose of childcare, we find that the 
question regarding which set of grandparents should come to take care of the third 
generation is much more complex than the principle of patrilineality alone. For 
example, Grandpa Wang did not refer to patrilineality to account for his decision to 
move, even though it was his son whom he and his wife were to help. Instead, the 
emphasis is on the ‘only’ son, implying ‘If we do not help him, who else shall we 
help?’ As to their in-laws, they have several children, so they had to choose. Indeed 
patrilineality may be an unwritten rule here but, as we interpret Grandpa Wang, 
what he meant was, as parents of one sole child, you do not have to choose – you 
know who you are going to help and to whom you are to fulfil your obligations as 
supporting parents.
We also find that deciding which set of grandparents should take the responsibil-
ity for childcare is sometimes arranged between families-in-law. Grandma Jin 
moved to Shenzhen alone. Implicitly, she considered her migration as a sacrifice 
which the first generation makes for the second generation, because the migration 
entailed a long-term separation between the two members of the elderly couple. 
During the interview, Grandma Jin expressed great concern for her husband and 
looked forward to moving back and being reunited with him. When asked whether 
her son’s family-in-law, who happened to live in Shenzhen, ever helped with child-
care, she sighed and said:
They run a restaurant and are quite busy. They are also older than me. The tradition here is 
that the paternal parents should take care of the grandchildren. But I think, I have time, so I 
should help my son as much as I can. After all, we did not give them any financial support 
when they bought their apartment.
Grandma Jin tried to provide a good explanation for why her son’s parents-in-
law could be exempt from the responsibility of childcare, an explanation that is 
more commonly acceptable, such as a lack of time, a greater age and the tradition of 
patrilineage. However, the reasons why she chose to come is the last two sentences: 
the importance of being a supportive parent and their failure to provide financial 
support for the second generation’s housing. Therefore, providing childcare 
becomes a necessary compensation. Grandma Jin’s case once again confirms the 
importance of being supportive parents, for paternal and maternal parents alike. 
Childcare is only one form of parental support, which the two families-in-law can 
negotiate in relation to other forms of support, based on the different resources 
which each family possesses (e.g. money) or is able to deploy (e.g. time and energy).
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2.5  The Return-or-Stay Dilemma
In the first round of interviews, most participants, especially those who were origi-
nally reluctant to move, expressed a strong desire to return to their home town or 
village. This was often expressed through narratives about the challenges and diffi-
culties they had experienced after migration, which often concerned their relation-
ship with the second generation (tensions/conflicts caused by different lifestyles and 
opinions on child-raising and the loss of parental power and autonomy), social 
adaptation (loneliness, and lack of a social network and belonging), accommodation 
situation (small, cramped apartments and lack of their own space), and rights to 
public social services and benefits related to Hukou (e.g. they have to travel back to 
their own homes for medical reimbursement) (see Zhao and Huang 2018). In addi-
tion, they all emphasised that childcare is demanding, never-ending work, further 
contributing to their lack of a social life. The interviewees who came to Shenzhen 
alone also expressed great concern about their spouses who had remained at home. 
Nevertheless, they all stayed because, while living in Shenzhen, they became even 
more convinced of how dependent the second generation is on their help with child-
care and housework. Although the people who had already moved permanently did 
not experience the same stay-or-return dilemma as their counterparts, they men-
tioned the same challenges and difficulties, to varying degrees. From time to time, 
they also compared Shenzhen with their home towns and became quite nostalgic. 
We have therefore decided to include their perspectives when exploring the stay-or- 
return dilemma to understand the mobility of older migrants. In particular, we 
explore the dilemma in relation to the intergenerational care arrangements within 
the family, in which the participants are positioned as both (re)sources and recipi-
ents of care.
2.5.1  Grandparents as an Important Care (Re)Source 
for the Nuclear Family
As already mentioned, when they decided to move, most participants thought 
that they would return home as soon as the new-born baby was a little older, although 
nobody could say exactly when. In fact, several participants were still assisting with 
childcare, even though their grandchildren had reached school age. Grandma Jin has 
been in Shenzhen for 11 years, the longest among the participants. She said:
Today’s young generations are too busy! While they concentrate on their careers, it is us 
elders who come to help. This is so common! Look at this neighbourhood – it’s the same in 
every family. Before Yangyang (grandson, age 10) was born, I told them I would go home 
when he was a little bit older, like when he does not need me to take him to school or pick 
him up. But I cannot imagine how they would manage without me. Before, I needed to drop 
off and pick up Yangyang at kindergarten and later school, because his parents did not have 
time. Now he is big enough to walk alone. Still, someone needs to be at home when he gets 
home from school. His parents normally come home around 8 in the evening, sometimes 
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even later. Then who can make food for him? … Now, my daughter-in-law is pregnant 
again, so I don’t know when I can go back [sigh].
This quote expresses two representative aspects. First, there is always a need to 
care for the third generation. Second, grandparents caring for school-aged children 
is quite common. Grandpa Zhou said dropping off and picking up children at kin-
dergarten is often the task of grandparents. Once he attended a family event at his 
grandson’s kindergarten and around half of the adult participants were grandpar-
ents. Grandpa Wang also said that, in addition to normal school, he also used to 
accompany his grandchild to private tutoring and hobbies. Both Grandma Sun and 
Grandpa Wang reported that they normally cook two meals a day, one specifically 
for the second generation, who come home late. Several participants say that they 
have remained in Shenzhen to also take care of the second generation. Like Grandpa 
He said: ‘In name, we are here to take of care of the grandchild; in reality we are 
here to make their [the second generation’s] life easier’.
We also notice a paradox in our participants’ narratives about their children. On 
the one hand, they complained a lot about the second generation being so busy that 
they barely had time for their elderly parents. Therefore, the latter feel lonely and 
have no emotional support. On the other hand, they feel proud of their children, who 
have careers in a metropolis like Shenzhen, thanks to which they are likely to climb 
upwards through the social stratification system. The children’s migration and set-
tlement in Shenzhen is thus regarded as an achievement, as it is for the whole fam-
ily. Consequently, the participants expressed their willingness to support their 
children. Despite their complaints about how demanding childcare is, several par-
ticipants told us: ‘As long as they need me/us, I/we will be here to help’. This will-
ingness can also be understood as a continuation of Chinese parents’ heavy 
investment in their children’s (often their only child’s) education for the purpose of 
lifting the family’s economic status, as Vanessa Fong described it in Only Hope 
(Fong 2004). The self-sacrifice implied in these narratives also features one aspect 
of Yan’s ‘neo-familism’: the notion of ‘sacrificing the small self for the realization 
of the greater self, with a concrete, affective and materialistic goal’ (Yan 2017) 
which, in the context of our study, is the success of the second generation.
The participants also talked about themselves as an irreplaceable care resource in 
respect of their emotional bond with the third generation. In particular, the paternal 
grandmothers expressed doubt as to whether their daughters-in-law, whom they 
consider to be too occupied with their career, are capable of being a good care-giver 
for the children. Grandma Li, who has two sons, said:
I have another son at home. So I think I will go back [for old-age care]. The problem is who 
will take care of my grandson? Last time, I went back for a wedding, he was crying for me 
all the time. So I had to come back the same day!
Grandma Li seems to have no doubt about where she will be for her own old-age 
care. When considering her return, she even thought about taking her grandson back 
to her home town. She said, ‘I thought it was a good solution. Both we [the grand-
parents] and his uncle can take care of him, right? But his father said that the educa-
tion in Shenzhen is much better’. Thus, the third generation’s education also 
becomes part of the dilemma of whether to stay or to return home. Remaining in 
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Shenzhen can also be regarded as part of the educational investment in the third 
generation, which has become ‘an intergenerational joint mission’ (Goh 2009, 6).
2.5.2  Balancing Care Needs and Resources Within the Family
Several participants, all female, moved to Shenzhen without their husbands. For 
them, their return-or-stay dilemma is intertwined with a strong desire to reunite with 
their husbands  – some expressed guilt at not being there to take care of him. 
Grandma Wu said: ‘He was so used to me taking care of him, and had never even 
made food before. Now he has to do everything himself’. Grandma Jin also said:
My husband does not have good health. I feel bad each time I think about leaving him alone 
at home. I notice I am getting old too, and I often feel tired. I really miss my husband and 
would like to go home!
Here, Grandma Jin’s wish for reunification also indicates the emotional need of the 
old couple to support each other.
Sometimes, other family members’ care needs also play a role in the partici-
pants’ struggling with the stay-or-return question. For example, both Grandma Zhu 
and Li have two children. Their husbands chose to stay home to help the other child 
with childcare. Grandma Zhu said:
We have been separated for five years now. As parents, we look at the children’s needs. If 
they still need us, we will certainly continue to help them. Then I’ll have to stay in Shenzhen, 
and he’ll stay at home [sigh]. It’s not easy for young people in Shenzhen. Look at the apart-
ment – it is too small. There is no room for another person. In addition, one more person 
means more expenses. They talked about buying an apartment, but prices are rising all the 
time. Too much pressure! It is really difficult. So I think I will return one day.
This quote shows that, when grappling with the return-or-stay dilemma, the par-
ticipant navigates different care-related needs within the family, such as caring for 
grandchildren both in Shenzhen and in the hometown, the second generation’s need 
for support with childcare, their own needs for care and, not least, the emotional 
need to be with their spouse. These needs entail different trajectories for older 
migrants, even though their own needs for care were only implied between the lines. 
However, the participants navigate not only the care needs within the family but also 
the available care resources. In addition, they calculate the costs in order to find the 
best solution to meet these needs. This is not only demonstrated in the above-cited 
quote, but also in an earlier quote from Grandma Li, who even considered taking her 
grandson with her when she returned to her home town. The high cost of living in 
Shenzhen is also commonly referred to as a factor in favour of return, which contra-
dicts their earlier narratives about themselves as an irreplaceable provider of child-
care. Moreover, the common narrative on the high cost of living also demonstrates 
the older generation’s understanding of the younger generation regarding their life 
situations in Shenzhen (e.g. ‘it is not easy for young people in Shenzhen’). Implicitly, 
it also entails the older generation’s fear of being a burden, which will be expounded 
upon next.
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2.5.3  Dependency on Filial Care and Fear of Being a Burden
While both Grandma Zhu and Grandma Li, the two participants who have more 
than one child, seem quite sure where they will spend their old age, the single-child 
participants are less certain. Their uncertainty surrounding their future old-age care 
is also intertwined with their dilemma as to whether to stay or return home. On the 
one hand, they only have one child to rely on; on the other hand, their experiences 
of living in Shenzhen seem to have convinced them that staying in Shenzhen is not 
realistic, or the best solution, not least because of the high cost of living and expen-
sive housing. However, we do have one exception: Grandpa Wang, the participant 
who changed the most between the two rounds of interviews. In the first interview, 
he expressed a strong wish to return home as soon as he and his wife had ‘completed 
their mission’ as caring grandparents. In the second interview, he was much more 
open and positive about the idea of staying.
It was true that I wanted to return. But my wife said, family should stay together. Only when 
we stay together are we a family. Besides, my son does not want us to return. … City life is 
not so bad after all. And very convenient! Now we are much more familiar with the city, so 
we feel much more relaxed. My son wants to take care of us. He really is a filial son. We 
only have him but luckily he never lets us down. We are very proud of him. In fact, if they 
do not consider us troublesome, of course we would stay. This is the best. But sometimes I 
am worried that we would become a burden for him instead of helping him. But he said 
‘Don’t worry, mum and dad! Soon we will be able to buy a second apartment. I will buy one 
in the same neighbourhood for the convenience of taking care of you’.
Comparing the two interviews, we find that his change in attitude might be an 
outcome of a change in his social life. While he spoke much about the loneliness 
and difficulties of adapting to city life in the first interview, in the second he talked 
a lot about his ‘migrant elder’ friends and social activities. This is the background 
to his utterance ‘city life is not so bad after all.’ Although he was the only one in this 
group who had somehow changed his mind, the passage quoted above also includes 
other important information, which is also representative.
Earlier, we pointed out that most participants, including Grandpa Wang, did not 
emphasise filial piety and care when accounting for their decisions to move. 
However, as can be seen in this quote, this does not mean that they do not have this 
expectation. The reason for not stressing filial piety and care is based on their under-
standing of the second generation’s life situation and challenges, as we illustrated 
earlier and is closely related to the fear of being a burden, as expressed by Grandpa 
Wang. Earlier studies on intergenerational relationships state that today’s elders no 
longer take filial piety from the younger generation for granted (Zhong and Li 2017) 
and, even when they are middle-aged they have fears about their old-age care that 
derive partially from doubts about the filiality of their children (Fong 2004). 
However, our study shows that these doubts are not necessarily about the second 
generation’s willingness to fulfil their filial duties but more a question of their 
capacity to do so. In other words, it is not that these older parents do not expect filial 
care but that they dare to expect it after seeing all the pressures the second 
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generation already face regarding their careers and the expectations of investing 
heavily in the third generation (Goh 2009).
Like most participants, Grandpa Wang complained about the cramped living 
conditions in the first interview. He said: ‘Each time I went to the toilet, I felt uneasy 
and nervous, because I was always thinking someone might be waiting outside’. 
However, once his child had a concrete plan to buy another apartment to accom-
modate the older generation, it seemed to give him hope, making him more optimis-
tic about the idea of staying. Based on our cross-case analysis, we consider the 
families’ housing and economic situation to be an important factor influencing the 
older parents’ mobility. For example, the fact that Grandma Sun and Grandpa Zhou 
could migrate permanently is closely related to their economic ability, as they are 
able to buy their own apartment. All the participants, except widowed Grandma Yi, 
consider living separately from, yet close to, the second generation as the ideal liv-
ing situation if they were to move permanently with their spouses. We believe that 
the importance attached to living separately is related to their intention to maintain 
at least some autonomy, which we have argued is even more reduced in connection 
with migration (Zhao and Huang 2018). Their reduced autonomy is also reflected in 
their great uncertainty about their future and lack of decision. For example, Grandma 
Jin, when asked whether she had thought about being reunited with her husband in 
Shenzhen, answered:
It’s no use me thinking about this or that. It is up to the young generation, and how they 
make arrangements for us. We are not the ones who make money and decide. Like we say, 
we wanted to stay together, then they say, no, we cannot afford to have you both here. Then 
what to do? Right? So I think I’ll just let them decide. … As a matter of fact, we seldom 
discuss it.
The powerlessness which Grandma Jin expresses demonstrates the older genera-
tion’s dependency on the second generation’s filial care, particularly for those who 
only have one child. Meanwhile, this quote once again illustrates the older genera-
tion’s uncertainty about how much filial care they can realistically expect – another 
paradox which shapes the elders’ return-or-stay dilemma.
2.6  Conclusions
Based on our analysis, we conclude that being a supportive parent to the younger 
generation seems to be a more important norm than filial piety in regulating the 
intergenerational relationship that informs the older generation’s decision to migrate 
to follow their children and their trajectory after migration. Although the expecta-
tion of filial care does exist, it seems to have little effect on the mobility of the older 
grandparents, because the participants are uncertain about how much filial care they 
dare to expect, given the limited time, energy and economic capacity of the second 
generation. As shown in our analysis, when talking about their dilemmas and future 
plans for old-age care, most participants tend to be practical and realistic, focusing 
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on the actual care needs and what is the best solution in light of the resources avail-
able within the family rather than the cultural norms. In this context, family means 
the extended family, which may be spread across different geographical locations 
and include not only the different generations but also in-laws and siblings.
Inspired by the concept of the ‘welfare resource environment’ (Levitt et al. 2017) 
in transnational migration studies, we propose the conceptualisation of a translocal 
care space comprising transversal generational, sibling and in-law relations to 
understand the mobility of older migrants in relation to the care needs and arrange-
ments within the family. Consequently, the mobility of the elderly can be under-
stood as being directed by how these older migrants position themselves within the 
translocal care space. For example, our analysis demonstrates that, with the new 
norm of supporting parents, our participants tend to position themselves more as 
care (re)sources than care recipients, which also indicates that they prioritise the 
younger generation’s care needs above their own. Meanwhile, the stay-or-return 
dilemma can be understood in relation to the older generation’s dual positionality of 
being both care (re)sources and recipients, creating a paradox: while positioning 
themselves as the necessary care support for the younger generation, they also fear 
that their staying might constitute an economic burden for their children.
Based on these findings, we propose a reconceptualisation of the migration of 
older parents as a form of welfare migration, as opposed to family migration, in 
order to highlight its functionality and the logic that ultimately concerns questions 
of welfare. The elderly migrants’ stay-or-return dilemma also indicates that the 
migration of the younger generation has greatly challenged the reciprocity in the 
intergenerational arrangements on care and thus the sustainability of the family- 
based care model, particularly concerning elderly care. In this context, parents with 
only one child are even more vulnerable.
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Chapter 3
Keeping It in the Family: Rotating Chains 




Olena1 left for Italy at the age of 51 in 2007 with the goal of saving up to buy a flat 
for her daughter’s family. Before migration, she worked at a big Ukrainian state 
company and had a high-level managerial position although she did not receive her 
salary for months. At first, Olena crossed the Italian border as a tourist. As her visa 
expired after 10 days, she began to search for her first Italian job as an undocu-
mented migrant. Fortunately, a neighbour from Ukraine, whom Olena met by coin-
cidence in the street, knew one Italian family which was looking for a badante 
(Italian for ‘caretaker’) for their 90-year-old mother. Olena accepted the offer. She 
visited her family in Ukraine for the first time 2 years after her initial migration, 
once she had received an Italian residence permit. After 6  years in Italy, Olena 
finally bought a flat for her daughter’s family and paid for all the necessary renova-
tions there. She is now still working in Italy to buy a flat for herself in Ukraine. 
However, a few years ago, like some of her other female friends, Olena shifted to 
working in Italy for periods of 3 months at a time. She now takes turns with another 
Ukrainian woman who, like her, also wanted to visit home in Ukraine more often. 
She explains that she does it ‘for herself’ at the expense of higher earnings. When 
Olena goes to Ukraine, she has a period of rest in which to renovate her psychologi-
cal and physical condition. However, she also takes care of her female relatives’ 
children while their mothers work abroad for short periods of time – a new trend 
facilitated by the lifting of the Schengen visa requirements for Ukrainian citizens in 
June 2017. Once, Olena looked after her daughter’s children while the daughter 
took off to work in Poland together with her husband. Another time she looked after 
1 All migrants’ names and other private information have been anonymised.
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her daughter-in-law’s children so that the woman could go with her husband 
(Olena’s son) to the Czech Republic and work there. In the interview, Olena stressed 
that it is important not only to earn money abroad but also to help the young families 
to be together, especially when one of the partners (in this case, men) works abroad. 
Otherwise, as Olena feels, migration would break up families.
Olena’s personal story illustrates a new pattern which has recently started taking 
shape in the transnational space between Ukraine and Italy, countries where persis-
tent deficiencies in the public social-care system perpetuate a traditional gender 
order in which women, not men, continue to bear the main responsibility for chil-
dren and elderly care even when they are working and their male partners are not. 
As Ukrainian female migrants in Italy are getting older (Markov et al. 2009), more 
and more of them are opting to ‘share’ their job in Italy with another migrant 
woman. They not only manage to organise care across the borders through various 
forms of communication and interactions from a distance (Baldock 2000) – as at the 
beginning of their migration – but they also create new patterns of short-term trans-
national mobility within their established long-term migration and expand opportu-
nities for other members of their social networks.
The embedding of social practices in multiple places are widely discussed in 
migration studies on gender and transnationalism (Baldassar 2007; Hondagneu- 
Sotelo and Avila 1997; Parreñas 2001). While many studies (Engbersen et al. 2013; 
Friberg 2012; Zimmermann 1995) often focused more on the patterns of permanent 
settlement and integration in the destination country, such practices of permanent 
circulation between two countries were considered mostly as ‘incomplete migra-
tion’ (Okólski 2001). As the transnational approach became more established (Faist 
2000; Glick Schiller et  al. 1992; Portes 1996), studies emerged showing how 
migrants settle themselves successfully in mobility (Morokvasić 2004), developing 
their ‘transnational capability’ (Ali Ali et al. 2001) and using their mobility as the 
key social resource in a transnational space. This pattern is not new for Central 
European female migrants working in Western countries. Bauer and Österle (2016) 
discuss how middle-aged or older women from Romania and Slovakia commute for 
care work to Austria and are confronted with care obligations in their countries 
origin. As Mirjana Morokvasić (2004) shows in her studies on Polish migrant 
women in Germany, they have also developed a rotational system for living in trans-
national space. Morokvasić describes how leaving the country becomes a strategy 
for staying at home (Morokvasić 2004, 11), which is made possible mostly through 
newly achieved economic and social capital gained in a transnational space. She 
stresses that the fall of the Berlin Wall for Eastern European women became a new 
opportunity not only to be ‘free to leave’ but, more importantly, to be ‘free to leave 
and come back’ (2004, 1).
However, the essential difference between the abovementioned contexts and 
Ukrainian women’s mobility to and from Italy is that the latter extends beyond EU 
borders. This significantly undermines their freedom of movement and, conse-
quently, requires another level of reorganisation of their migration experience. The 
possibility of travelling back is especially important in the case of Ukrainian women 
migrating to Italy. These women started their migration mostly with the aim – often 
successfully achieved – of supporting their children financially and paying for their 
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university education as well as buying them an apartment (Fedyuk 2011, 2016; 
Havrylyshyn 2014; Näre 2012; Vianello 2014). However, it has now become clear 
that they did not return permanently to Ukraine after their goal had been realised. 
Sabrina Marchetti (2013), discussing self-managed rotations between Ukrainian, 
Russian, Georgian and Polish migrant women in Italy, underlines that this kind of 
circularity is neither a preliminary stage to permanent migration nor a consequence 
of special state programmes but, rather, individual migrant decisions taken with the 
assistance of migrant personal networks, established relationships with employers 
and the social and economic capital gained earlier in their migration (Marchetti 
2013, 349, 359). What is missing in the article as well as in other studies about 
short-term transnational mobility within long- established female migration is an 
analysis of the interrelations between gender, family structures and intra-family 
care arrangements in connection with the welfare state of both countries.
Therefore, the main objective of this chapter is to trace why and in which ways 
mature Ukrainian female migrants, with 10–15 years in Italy as domestic workers, 
invent new ways of knitting together their ‘workplace’ and their ‘home’, physically 
separated between the two countries, instead of settling in Italy permanently or 
returning to Ukraine for good. This paper also emphasises how they create new 
economic opportunities for their female relatives, helping them to commodify their 
reproductive work and accumulate new economic and social capital in this transna-
tional care space.
I start by focusing on the recent changes in the welfare states of Ukraine and 
Italy, then present the key concepts of my analysis, showing how the logic of the 
rotational system is, to some extent, predicted by public narratives on the distribu-
tion of gender roles in post-Soviet Ukraine. Later I briefly discuss the main costs 
and benefits for migrant families left behind before, finally, presenting my main 
empirical cases, where the interviewed women explain why they choose to com-
mute between the two countries more often. I look into their narrative, taking into 
account the role of migration culture and the inter-generational contract in 
Ukraine.
3.2  The Main Features of Ukrainian and Italian Welfare 
States in the Past Decades
To some extent, Italy and Ukraine are parts of the same puzzle in terms of the dis-
tribution of care responsibilities within society. Italy, as are other Southern European 
countries, is characterised by a rapidly ageing population and an insufficient social 
welfare system and has long faced an increasing demand for care for the elderly 
(Tomassini and Lamura 2009). In the Italian familialistic welfare state (Esping- 
Andersen 1996), the main public expectations and system of care service lay on the 
shoulders of women, although more and more women participate in the labour mar-
ket outside the home. Earlier, this demand was met by unmarried women who 
migrated from southern Italy to the northern parts of the country. However, over the 
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past three decades this lacuna has been solved by importing care in the form of 
immigrant women from the Philippines, Morocco and Eastern and Central European 
countries. Ambrosini (2011, 36) points out that such practices have led to the emer-
gence of an informal welfare state in which Italian families are the main actors hir-
ing new, unregistered migrants and managing their underground work. Significantly, 
Italy granted the largest number of regularisations in the EU through six amnesties 
in 22 years (Ambrosini 2011), amnesties which, in fact, enabled the appearance of 
one of the largest and fastest developing Ukrainian migrant communities in the 
EU. Today, according to official statistics, about 235,000 Ukrainians live in Italy – 
the fourth largest non-EU immigrant community after Moroccan, Albanian and 
Chinese citizens (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali 2018) – of whom, 
in 2018, 72.3% held long-term residence permits and 80% were women. This is the 
highest share of women among all migrant communities in the country (Ministero 
del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali 2018).
Ukrainian women began migrating to Italy in the second half of the 1990s, under 
the conditions of protracted economic stagnation, pervasive unemployment and 
delayed payments of wages due to Ukraine’s transition from a socialist planned 
economy to a market economy. In the 1990s, millions of Ukrainian women and men 
either lost their jobs or continued to work almost without pay for many months. 
However, the situation for women was even worse than that of men. Solari (2017) 
argues that unemployment at that time should be regarded primarily as a gendered 
issue. With the worsening economy, gender inequality on the labour market of for-
mer Soviet countries increased even further, evidenced by the fact that in Russia, for 
example, women were paid 30% less than men for the same work (Ashwin 2005). 
Additionally, with the rapidly falling standard of living and the increasing competi-
tion imposed by the ‘free market’ ideology, many people experienced a sharp psy-
chological crisis – a decrease in social status and a depreciation of the competencies 
they had acquired in the Soviet system. Therefore, facing unemployment or irregu-
lar wages and confronted with an increasingly ineffective social welfare system in 
their home country, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian women found migration to 
Italy to be an attractive option that allowed them to provide a better standard of liv-
ing for their families and to pay for the education of their children left behind in the 
country of origin.
The majority of Ukrainian women arrived in Italy in the late 1990s and 2000s on 
short-term tourist visas and they found themselves in a very vulnerable position. 
The travelling cost them around US$ 1500–25002 which they paid to unofficial 
agents and middle-men in exchange for a passport, tourist visa and transport to Italy. 
Sometimes they also paid for obtaining their first job in Italy, without any official 
work contract. Over the next 20 years, they have gone from living underground in 
Italy without any social guarantees, to receiving their legal status and developing 
established social networks. They have even managed to create the new rotational 
2 In comparison, the minimal wage in the year 2000 in Ukraine was US$ 19. The money for migra-
tion was mostly loaned by relatives and friends who already worked in Italy at that time.
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system which allows them to travel to Ukraine more often and to stay much longer 
than previously. To enable this model within extended families, two major changes 
in the regularisation system took place. Firstly, in 2007, Italy introduced the National 
Agreement for Domestic and Care Work, which allowed employers to make one 
contract with two employees instead of only with one. It began to be used by some 
Italian families, mainly under pressure from female migrants who, after 10–15 years 
working in Italy, wanted to have a more relaxed work schedule. As Marchetti (2013) 
stresses, both migrant women and employers are satisfied with this pattern. However, 
it has not become the main pattern and most Italian families still prefer traditional 
contracts with only one employee (Marchetti 2013, 352). Secondly, in 2017 the 
Schengen visa regime between EU countries and Ukraine was lifted. Ukrainians 
now have the right to travel freely to EU countries and stay there without a visa for 
up to 90 days in any given 180-day period. However, they do not have the right to 
work in the EU – except in Poland, where foreigners have the right to start to work 
without a national visa. In fact, the visa-free regime is not the main factor that has 
made the rotational system in Italian families possible; or the ‘rotational’ contract to 
work, both of the women involved need to have legal long-term work permits in 
Italy. Usually, this type of contract is preferred by women who, as Marchetti (2013) 
points out, gained sufficient economic and social capital during their long-term 
migration in Italy. In other words, having a rotational contract is a privilege earned 
and not a widely accessible work pattern for all Ukrainian female migrants working 
in Italy.
3.3  The Rotational Care System
By and large, the circulation of care is at the centre of women’s migration when 
female migrants from countries with weak welfare systems (Constable 1997; 
Parreñas 2001) sell their reproductive work to families in developed countries, fill-
ing the care gap which is created back at home with the help of their female relatives 
who remained behind. One could expect that migrant women would see Italy, where 
they have worked for many years, as the country the most important to them but this 
is not the case. On the contrary, judging from the analysis of recent trends in this 
migration, Ukrainian migrant women reinforce their symbolic involvement and 
physical presence in Ukraine and level it up to balance their role. For the purposes 
of discussing their involvement in the social context within and across the national 
borders of both countries, this chapter mobilises the concept of the rotational care 
system when women begin to substitute for each other in both reproductive and 
productive work along the borders.
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To analyse the rotational care system involving two or more Ukrainian women3 
working in shifts for the same Italian family I use Arlie Hochschild’s concept of 
сare chains, defined as a ‘series of personal links between people across the globe 
based on the paid or unpaid work of caring’ (Hochschild 2000, 131). Helma Lutz 
and Ewa Palenga-Mölenback (2012) apply the concept to social reproductive work 
between Ukraine, Poland and Germany. They point out that, when Polish women 
migrate to Germany, the gap in care responsibilities in Poland is filled by Ukrainian 
women. However, Ukraine finds itself at the end of the female migrant care chain, 
as the corresponding care gap left by Ukrainian women migrating to other countries 
is not filled by women from abroad (Lutz and Palenga-Möllenbeck 2012) but, 
instead, by their female relatives.
Secondly, I argue that these patterns of care circulating in transnational space 
between Ukraine and Italy can be seen from an anthropological point of view as a 
wider inter-generational phenomenon – i.e. the result of complex dynamics in the 
relationships between different generations of women in Ukraine, as well as of 
changes in public discourses that were apparent in Ukraine both before and after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union (Fedyuk 2011; Odynets 2016; Solari 2017; 
Zhurzhenko 2008).
3.4  Data and Methods
This chapter is based on the results of my ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Italy 
and Ukraine over several phases – in 2012–2013 and 2015 and via Skype in 2019. 
A total of 45 semi-structured interviews were conducted with Ukrainian women in 
four Italian cities – Florence, Rome, Padua and Venice. Additionally, in the same 
period I conducted 20 interviews with family members left behind and with migrants 
who had returned to Ukraine. The typical settings for the interviews were churches, 
migrants’ homes, schools and the parks where Ukrainians meet up in Italy. The 
informants came from all parts of Ukraine, were aged from 21 to 67 years and had 
different social, educational and marital statuses, either with or without children.
This chapter focuses on four migrant stories that demonstrate a new emerging 
pattern of rotational migration among women with a long work experience in Italy. 
Among my informants were 51-year-old Olena, who migrated to Italy in 2007 to 
save up for a flat for her daughter’s family, Valentina, 56 years old, who left for Italy 
in 2008 to earn money to improve her living conditions, Olha, 65, who migrated to 
earn money for her daughter’s university education and Nina who, at 32 years old, 
came to Italy without any immediate financial need. Nowadays, the first two women 
take turns with other Ukrainian women who have also worked in Italy over many 
years, while the two others take shifts with women from their own extended families.




3.5  Ambivalence and Contradiction in the Gender Contract 
in Post-Soviet Ukraine
The main gender contract in the Soviet Union concerned the working mother, who 
performed a dual function as both a builder of the communist future through her 
work outside the home and the mother of new generations of workers (Temkina and 
Rotkirch 2002). The state ‘helped’ women to perform their task of caring for their 
children through a wide-ranging socialist support system of kindergartens, free pub-
lic healthcare and education (Zdravomyslova 2010). After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, millions of women found themselves saddled with the same dual burden but 
with strongly reduced state support (Zdravomyslova 2010). Temkina and Rotkirch 
(2002) claim that the contract of the working mother did not disappear; instead of 
state support, women became reliant on the mobilisation of their social networks 
and relatives. In this manner, the neoliberal project of shrinking state services and 
benefits has resulted in the ‘privatization of motherhood and the transfer of respon-
sibility for reproductive work, once shared with the state, to individual women’ 
(LaFont 2001, quoted in Solari 2017, 34).
The other significant rift appeared in the discursive space. Together with the 
neoliberal changes in the economy, processes of national revival became highly vis-
ible in public debates in the 1990s. A particular place was set aside for the return of 
the ‘traditional Ukrainian family’ in opposition to the Soviet family model with the 
‘working mother’ (Fedyuk 2011; Zhurzhenko 2004). According to these new ideas, 
women were expected to return to the home (Rubchak 2001; Zhurzhenko 2004), as 
men were considered the main and sole breadwinners in the family. This idea was 
metaphorically embodied through the cult figure of Berehynia (from the Ukrainian 
berehty – to preserve; Berehynia literally means a protectress) – ‘the great goddess, 
domestic madonna, hearth mother and today as the nation’s mother’ (Rubchak 
2001, 150). From the early 1990s, Berehynia embodied ‘native femininity’ (Kis 
2005, 105), the ‘proper woman’ called to preserve the Ukrainian family as well as 
the whole nation. Rubchak (2001) shows how the myth of Ukrainian matriarchy 
takes a variety of forms in the different historical periods in Ukraine and how easily 
it was activated in post-Soviet Ukraine, ‘seducing contemporary Ukrainian women 
into a false sense of their centrality’ (Rubchak 2001, 150). The Berehynia image 
still plays an important role in migrants’ self-representations and self-reflections.
All these economic and discursive transformations mostly hit the generation of 
middle-aged women, those born in the 1950s and 1960s and raised during the com-
munist rule (Solari 2017). Zhurzhenko (2001) shows that, right after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, these women, being in the heyday of their 
economically active years, suffered a much stronger economic, social and personal 
marginalisation than any other social group in Ukraine. Raised according to the 
values of the Soviet gender contract, they placed much value on being employed. 
Their sudden unemployment, which hit them shortly after 1991, strongly affected 
them, as they saw their social status and psychological stability decrease (Ashwin 
2000). They did not see themselves as being able to adjust to the new rules of the 
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game under ‘free market’ conditions (Solari 2017; Zhurzhenko 2008). 
Simultaneously, the family pattern whereby the family lived together with the 
grandmothers became less popular, despite the social instability discussed above. 
The symbolical childcare role of the grandmother, which was very important in the 
Soviet period and the early 1990s was no longer so necessary both because many 
young mothers, also unemployed, stayed home and took care of their children them-
selves and because the idea of living together with the grandmother started to lose 
its attractiveness for many families in post-Soviet Ukraine. The quote below, by 
52-year-old Maria, clearly illustrates the conditions under which many Ukrainian 
women in the 1990s had to make the decision to emigrate to Italy:
I was in a very bad economic situation when I worked in the radio factory and it closed 
down. In Ukraine, everything was bad, everything was closing. And no money, it was dif-
ficult to provide clothes and even food for our children. When I was laid off, I couldn’t find 
a new job, it was suffocating. Later my daughter had a child. I was with them for a while, 
because she was a student. And we kept this up for ten months. Then we sent my grandson 
to kindergarten, still without money. When my daughter started her second year at univer-
sity, I left for Italy and, since then, I have been sending presents and money to Ukraine 
every month.
Today, among Ukrainian migrant women in Italy, the most numerous are middle- 
aged women who often have grown-up children and grandchildren in Ukraine and 
who Jennifer Utrata calls ‘the real partners of young mothers in post-Soviet space’ 
(Utrata 2008). By the end of 1990s, the average Ukrainian family found itself stuck 
between new discursive ideals embodied in the national rhetoric and an extremely 
difficult economic and social situation  – with the strong figure of the dual-role 
grandmother, the vague professional identity of young women/mothers and the 
somewhat marginalised figure of the father/man, which I discuss in the sec-
tion below.
3.6  Responsibilities in a Migrant Family: All the Way around
Many men also emigrated from Ukraine to provide for their families; however, their 
migration is accepted in the public discourse as a ‘normal’ breadwinning activity. 
Sometimes both partners migrate abroad to earn money for their children, leaving 
their elderly relatives behind. Moreover, in some families the decisions about migra-
tion and how to perform care obligations are made in a mutual agreement between 
the partners. However, in this section I focus on the men who remain at home in 
Ukraine without assuming care obligations, whereas their wives work in Italy, 
because these cases comprise the majority in my fieldwork. For example, 56-year- 
old Valentyna’s experience illustrates a quite typical distribution of care in a migrant 
family for many Ukrainians. She left for Italy in 2008 at the age of 45. The reason 
for her migration was to earn money to buy her brother out from their jointly owned 
house, as he had sued their mother to split the house and get his share of the money. 
Valentyna left two children, three and 9 years old, with their father (her husband) 
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under the mutual agreement that he would take care of the children. She quickly 
understood that her partner had betrayed her with another woman and was not look-
ing after the children. She took the children away and left them with her parents. 
Later, when her parents died, her daughter started to care for her younger brother. 
Two years ago, having received all the required permits, Valentyna started to work 
in Italy for shorter periods of 4 months, taking turns with another Ukrainian woman 
who had been working in Italy for 15 years and who also needed to visit her family 
in Ukraine more often. Now Valentyna has a goal – to earn money for her son’s 
education. She also said that, when she returns home for 3 or 4 months, conflicts 
sometimes arise with her daughter about the distribution of responsibilities and the 
power in the family:
We had a misunderstanding with my daughter, I didn’t pay her enough attention. She 
wanted to have me, not my money. I explained to her that if I hadn’t gone, there would have 
been no money for us. And my son asked me as well: ‘Mom, when will you come home and 
start working here?’ I explained to him that I cannot earn here even half the amount I get in 
Italy. Much has been lost and I would like to hear from our president – how long do we need 
to work in Italy to be able to return home, to Ukraine, finally? This is very difficult, many 
families are destroyed.
Despite the expectations of some feminist scholars (Lutz and Palenga-Möllenback 
2012) that, as female migrants become the main breadwinners for their families, 
ideas about gender order will change, the previous gender order inherited by Ukraine 
from the Soviet era did not relieve the double burden placed on women. Women still 
embody caregiving – both physically and discursively – and are still seen as respon-
sible for all care drain and care gain, even when they have become the main eco-
nomic providers for their families. Such expectations are often internalised by the 
women, as is evident from their narratives and choices related to migration. Thus, 
migrant women are being blamed for the many divorces and breakups of family 
relationships, in spite of the reasons and circumstances under which they decided to 
migrate. However, in many cases female migration could de facto represent grounds 
for divorce or a desperate solution in the situation where men declare their unwill-
ingness/inability to provide for their families. One of the reasons for this, as illus-
trated by this quote from Lesia (50  years old), could be the allegedly radical 
transformation of women’s capabilities and behaviour after they move abroad 
for work:
When I went abroad for the first time, I became very independent in problem-solving and 
earning money, and my husband told me that either I should go back to being the one I used 
to be, or he would not need me.
Women very often stress their husbands’ unwillingness to discuss the migration as 
a solution for raising the family income and argue that men often prefer to eliminate 
themselves from family negotiations, as 47-year-old Lesia states:
My husband was left with the children…I went against his will, because I don’t know how 
other men reacted – he didn’t want me to go, and he also felt this inability to support the 
family, and felt this, our family crisis. Later he told me one day that we should not count on 
him. He didn’t let me go voluntarily, but he also did not stop me.
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It is revealing that, in the Ukrainian public discourse, migrant women are expected 
to be responsible for the husbands they leave behind, for their moral and physical 
well-being and for the integrity of their family. In numerous interviews during my 
fieldwork, women expressed their feelings of responsibility (and of guilt) for their 
husbands who started to drink or experienced personal degradation after their wives’ 
migration. Iryna (54) shows below how, to solve this problem, women organised 
care for the husbands with the help of their adult children (as a rule, daughters):
When I go home, nothing changes, my husband doesn’t touch anything. He has a saucepan 
and a plate for his own use. And he says he feels bad when I come home. His colleagues 
come, they drink and sleep in the house, and I am a nuisance in my own home. I plan to 
return to Ukraine forever in a year. My husband understands that the house is mine too. But 
he feels better when nobody disturbs him. My daughter goes there to control her father; she 
knows that when he gets his pension he starts a drinking bout, and there can be intoxication. 
This situation lasts a week, then everything stabilises.
Strikingly, over the last three decades, no new public discussion has emerged in 
Ukraine about the necessity of distributing care obligations to other members of 
society – e.g. fathers or brothers – encouraging them to take over the home tasks of 
the wives and mothers who have emigrated. Anthropological studies about how 
Ukrainian fathers and husbands deal with their wives’ transnational migration and 
which personal transformations they are going through are virtually non-existent – 
only the narratives of women are present in current research. One of the reasons for 
this could be men’s unwillingness to talk with other people (i.e. with academic 
researchers) about their experiences. I can confirm this through my own long expe-
rience of trying to recruit men for interviews. I tried to reach them even through 
their close friends or neighbours but without any success. Summing up, all care 
responsibilities within migrant families lie on the shoulders of mothers, daughters, 
other female relatives and sometimes their female friends. It forces them to create 
their own networks of co-responsibility and cooperation and take turns between 
paid work and care in order to optimise the emotional and physical costs and bene-
fits of family life.
3.7  New Forms of Family Mobility Capital
As in Olena’s case, Olha takes turns in working for an Italian family in order to 
manage her responsibilities towards the family left behind. Olha, who left for Italy 
11 years ago to earn money for her daughter’s university education, is now 65 years 
old. After working in Italy for just 2 years, she had earned a sufficient sum of money 
to achieve her goal. She then returned to Ukraine to live with her husband. Shortly 
after, the Italian family where she had worked before, called and asked her to come 
and take care of their older relative. Olha agreed but only on the condition that she 
would work in short periods of 4 months and return to Ukraine for the same amount 
of time. The Italian family accepted this proposition. Olha shares her shifts with her 
brother’s wife, who had already worked in Italy for 4 years and who also wanted to 
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be more involved now in the life of her family in Ukraine. The women agreed to do 
shifts every 3–4 months. According to Olha, they both feel that they succeeded in 
their current situation. This case is an example of migrant empowerment, as it was 
Olha who demanded (and gained) this flexibility from her Italian employer.
Another informant, 57-year-old Natalia, tells us that, in the beginning, the rota-
tional system allowing women to visit Ukraine more often was only an idea circu-
lated in migrant networks. Later, however, migrants dared to discuss this alternative 
option with their Italian employers and even suggested that they would look for 
another Italian family if their requests were not met.
My family where I am working now… At first they didn’t even want to hear about it. To 
have two badante instead of one? It seemed too complicated for them. But I never put my 
job before my family. I can find another job, but who saves my family for me? Finally they 
agreed and even wrote the official contract with me. It works well now.
Therefore, having obtained all the official documents and some financial capital, 
women started to prioritise the needs of their Ukrainian family before those of the 
Italian one. When Natalia has some holiday time, she goes to the hospital for gen-
eral treatment because, as she says, her Italian job worsens her health and psycho-
logical wellbeing. However, like many other women, she prefers, as she says below, 
to continue working in Italy until she earns the right to an Italian pension – to which 
one is entitled at the age of 67 after at least 5  years working and paying taxes 
regularly:
I do not plan to stop yet because I want to have my pension here, I want to get that. If some-
one could find a woman who is ready to share shifts with me, I would go to Ukraine more 
often, it would be very nice for me and my family.
Nina, 32 years old, was the youngest informant I met during my fieldwork. I con-
tacted her after an interview with her mother-in-law, who had been working in Italy 
for almost 10 years. When Nina gave birth to her child, she stayed at home alone for 
many days because of her husband’s (the child’s father) work away from home. 
Nina’s mother-in-law, who is happy to see her first grandson as often as possible, 
organised shifts with her female friend working in Italy and went to help Nina every 
4 months. Nina told me that having the help meant that she started to feel better 
psychologically and even decided to continue with her education. Now Nina is 
studying and both women help each other to look after the child. Nina’s husband 
comes home only at weekends because he also works in shifts.
However, most of the women I met during my fieldwork were thinking of creat-
ing new economic opportunities for women within the family. As Nina’s determina-
tion to gain a higher level of education illustrates, the rotational system can enable 
women to enhance their human capital. Sometimes, the result of these rotations can 
be a newly achieved personal stability and an increased sense of agency among a 
woman’s female relatives. As long-term migrants come back more often to Ukraine 
and take on more of the caring responsibilities at home, the other women in the fam-
ily receive more freedom and space for their own life choices.
Olena Yanevych, the president of the association ‘Ukraine Together’ in Padua, 
Italy, explains the rise of the rotational phenomenon and its advantages for Ukrainian 
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women; she considers that rotations are actually very interesting, especially if they 
occur within the same migrant family. She stresses that a woman who goes back 
home after 3 months in Italy does not need to send money; instead she can take it 
herself, thus gaining more control over it. In addition, the woman does not lose 
contact with her husband and children and can look after them not by phone but 
directly. Further, she can participate in major family events, such as weddings and 
funerals – something that would have been more difficult under the old, less mobile, 
paradigm. However, I argue that this new mobility paradigm does not aim to inte-
grate female migrants into the host society but, rather, prepares their return to 
Ukraine. Olena stresses that the rotational system is so popular that some older 
women (aged 70 years and above) who had worked as caretakers in Italy for many 
years and who already hold an Italian permanent residence permit, take their ‘turn’ 
as scheduled a year in advance. This perfectly confirms Solari’s (2017) point, when 
she suggested that the reason why migrant mothers consent to such a schedule is not 
only their altruistic desire to help their children’s family. In a situation where they 
were being doubly marginalised (2018), grandmothers opened up new opportunities 
for themselves to reclaim their social status and importance in the family – through 
the re-distribution of care inside the family. In this case, the younger woman receives 
financial (but not only) help from her mother’s remittances and the older woman 
gains new social dividends in the form of increased personal agency and authority 
in her extended family. These middle-aged women, who make up the largest group 
of Ukrainian women in Italy, become simultaneously the main ‘breadwinners’ and 
their daughters’ ‘partners’ in the transnational Ukrainian family.
3.8  Conclusions
The case of Ukrainian long-term female migration to Italy illustrates the commodi-
fication of care taking place both in the employer’s family in the country of destina-
tion and in their own family back in the home country. Ukrainian women, who 
initially envisioned their migration to Italy exclusively as a temporary work project, 
have now found in the rotational system a new way to maintain their presence at the 
both ends of the transnational space which their migration created. Having access to 
more private resources – such as personal savings – and benefitting from a slightly 
stronger institutional framework (increased legalisation, better integration in Italy 
and improved air and land transportation), they optimise their work schedules in 
Italy, taking 3- or 4-month turns instead of going abroad for the whole year. They 
thereby not only continue to play in both fields but also deal better with the formal 
and private challenges emanating from their long presence in the transnational 
space and from their long absence from their families back in Ukraine. I have argued 
that these women circulate care not only within the same nation – Italy – but also 
sometimes even within the same family, when mothers replace daughters (and the 




Even though the circulation of care in the transnational Ukrainian family still 
mostly takes place in the framework of a mother-and-daughter contract, this chapter 
has presented other cases wherein migrant women are substituted by other female 
relatives within the extended family or other unrelated female migrants in Italy. The 
rationale behind these shifts is embedded in the old intergenerational contract within 
the families and the old gender norms which continue shaping public discourse in 
the country. One of the main prerequisites for this is that migrant women continue 
to see themselves as solely responsible for the care and domestic work at home even 
after many years spent abroad earning a living for their families in Ukraine. They 
successfully continue to exploit the Berehynia image to justify the moral correct-
ness of their migration decision by emphasising the symbolic and material contribu-
tions they have made to their children’s (and their families’) welfare and wellbeing. 
As some cases have demonstrated, they also manage to convert this burden of 
responsibility into new forms of capital and to increase their agency in the transna-
tional space between the two countries.
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Chapter 4
From Familial Pressure to Seeking One’s 
Fortune: Chinese International Students’ 
Search for Geographical and Social 




In many ways, post-1978 China is unrecognisable compared to how it was under 
Mao. The transition to a market economy, its cultural opening to the outside world 
and a multitude of societal reforms made for a sharp generational divide between 
those who grew up in the pre- reform era and those in the post-reform period (Clark 
2012; Dychwald 2018; Fong 2004). The latter cohort has been raised in a country 
with near-constant economic growth, has been exposed to international media and 
has not experienced the political and societal turmoil that their parents lived through 
(see Chan, Madsen and Unger 1984; Clark 2012). Particularly in urban areas where 
the one-child policy was more easily enforced (Kane and Choi 1999), most Chinese 
youth are single children. This may place the child in a precarious position as the 
social convention is that he or she supports the parent in old age (Fong 2016). This 
leads to a situation where this one child grows up with the totality of his or her par-
ent’s hopes resting on them (Fong 2004). In addition, the official narrative of ever- 
increasing prosperity coupled with exposure to images from Western countries, 
means that young people also tend to have built up high expectations as to their own 
lifestyles (Dychwald 2018; Fong 2011). However, it soon becomes apparent that 
only an extreme minority, such as those with well-connected parents or with out-
standing academic records, will realistically be able to achieve the socio-economic 
lifestyles envisioned. Of course, some achieve this through entrepreneurism – col-
loquially termed ‘jumping into the ocean’ – but this is risky and here, too, only a few 
are able to achieve significant socio-economic advancement. For many, educational 
sojourns abroad are seen as an alternative route to social mobility (Fong 2011; Page 
2019b). This view is often shared by the students’ parents, who can therefore go to 
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great lengths to pay for these sojourns. Some take up loans from friends and family, 
empty their savings or even sell their homes in order to fund their children’s studies. 
While they have high expectations that their children will become successful, the 
convention of familial eldercare acts as a ticking clock. As their parents age, the 
sojourning youth seeking their fortune know that they are expected to eventu-
ally return.
This chapter is based on an ethnographic study of a group of Chinese interna-
tional students in Norway. The topics addressed here are, first, what motivated them 
to travel, second, their aspirations for the future and third, how they envision their 
present experiences as facilitating this future. Norway is a welfare state and, much 
like in other such countries, there has been significant public discourse regarding 
migrants’ perceived abuse of welfare services. However, the Chinese youth studied 
here seem to be focused on a different aspect of Western European welfare – namely 
substantive freedom. This is a central part of the work of Sen (1999), who measured 
a country’s development by the freedom available to its inhabitants. Many of the 
participants stated freedom of choice as a driving reason for leaving China, suggest-
ing that, had they remained, they would have been stuck in a middle- to lower- 
middle- class situation with no realistic pathway to the lifestyle they envisioned for 
themselves. Thus, the potential outcome of migration the most ardently anticipated 
is increased control over one’s own life trajectory. A belief was repeatedly expressed 
that a degree from a Western country would be more internationally transferable 
than one from a Chinese university. In addition, many also stated that studying 
abroad would allow them to cultivate cross-cultural communicative skills. Thus, 
through studying in a country that is developed in terms of its substantive freedom, 
they seek to gain a wider range of possibilities than they would otherwise have had, 
recreating themselves from locally situated people with fixed life trajectories, to 
globally and socially mobile people. In this way, their migration may be seen as 
intended to provide the ability to shape their life courses through individual agency.
While the participants are focused on their own aspirations, many also explain 
that the well-being and future needs of the parents also weigh on their minds. The 
knowledge of the financial sacrifices of their families is a source of pressure, as is 
the knowledge that a deterioration of the parents’ health might necessitate an early 
return. Thus, while they present an image of an ideal future self as a global citizen, 
able to travel anywhere and do anything, they are tethered to China through familial 
obligations. In a manner of speaking, the students’ welfare needs may one day have 
to be weighed against those of their parents – a dilemma that some of the partici-
pants are already dreading. However, even those who expect this call to come sooner 
rather than later believe that they will retain the mobility they have earned. Thus, the 
mobility that these students seem to wish to cultivate for themselves may be seen as 
the potential for movement. They envision that, even should their familial situations 
force them to return, their Western degree and cross-cultural skills will allow them 
to activate their global lifestyles when their life-circumstances permit.
A. G. Page
51
4.2  The Post-1980s Generation or bālínghòu
The concept of generational shifts needs clarification, as births take place continu-
ously and any delineation will unavoidably carry ambiguity (Spitzer 1973). 
Mannheim (1923) is often thought of as having provided the seminal work on gen-
erations or cohorts within the social sciences. A person’s age determines his or her 
cultural location, frames of reference and social and intellectual currents that formed 
them. Members of a given generation will here be seen as ‘those people within a 
delineated population who experience the same significant event within a given 
period of time’ (Pilcher 1994, 483) as ‘[c]ontemporaneity becomes sociologically 
significant only when it also involves “participation in the same social and historical 
circumstances’” (1994, 490). In the case of societies experiencing rapid cultural 
change, it seems reasonable that this will create similar, if not stronger, generational 
differences than formative events. In both these senses, there is a significant gap 
between those who grew up in China’s pre-reform era and those born after it. The 
former experienced famine, political instability and an almost Orwellian demand 
for political orthodoxy. Deng’s premiership, following the death of Mao, was 
marked by a series of reforms that led to rapid economic growth. Because of this, 
the children born thereafter grew up in a very different country to their parents. 
While there are numerous terms used for them both within and outside China, such 
as the ‘me generation’, the ‘Y generation’ or the ‘little emperors’, here the term 
bālínghòu, which translates as the ‘post-1980s generation’ will be used. It is com-
mon in China to speak of children born in each decade in separate terms, differenti-
ating the post-1980s from the post-1990s, post-2000s, etc. However, I argue here 
that the marked generational shift we see around 1980 makes bālínghòu a fitting 
synecdoche. With the economic reforms introduced in 1978 and the one-child pol-
icy in 1979, it is in those born from 1980 onwards that the most marked generational 
shift may be observed. They have grown up with near-constant economic growth 
and have not experienced the hardships and turbulence that their parents lived 
through.
The parents of the bālínghòu, many of whom missed out on tertiary schooling 
themselves, tend to be very intent on their offspring’s higher education. It has 
become usual for urban parents to expect their children to go to a good university 
and to invest time and resources into securing this outcome (Liu 2015). Access to 
higher education for school leavers has risen dramatically since the reform era, from 
0.26 per cent in 1949 to 1.55 per cent in 1978 and 42.7 per cent in 2016 (Sun 2017). 
This means that going to university has shifted from a privilege reserved for but a 
few to being the norm among urban youth. The one-child policy also plays a role in 
the parents’ expectations, as it allows the parents’ resources to be concentrated onto 
a single child. This has also alleviated the gender imbalance in formal education, as 
the limit on the number of offspring prevents sons being prioritised over daughters 
(Fong 2002; Lee 2012).
As is implied by terms such as the ‘me-generation’, those born after the 1980s 
are seen as representing an unfortunate break with previous generations. They are 
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viewed as having lost their forebears’ ability to chīkǔ or “eat bitterness” – meaning 
to stoically endure hardship (Dychwald 2018). Many older Chinese lament what 
they see as a rising materialism and individualism among the bālínghòu (Chan, 
Zhang and Wang 2006; Shi et al. 2016). One of the typical culprits blamed for this 
is the high level of parental investment and attention. Indeed, compared to Europeans, 
Chinese youth tend to be quite dependant on their parents and are less accustomed 
to taking care of themselves (Stanat 2005).
To think of the bālínghòu as being spoiled would be quite unfair, though, as the 
familial pressures many experience are considerable. While the parents are able to 
invest much of their time and resources in their single offspring, their expectations 
are similarly concentrated (Fong 2004). The convention of familial eldercare is one 
of the reasons why parents are so invested in their children’s education, as they will 
one day be dependent on them (Fong 2016). While private enterprise may be lucra-
tive, it is also risky; education is thus seen as the most reliable road to economic 
stability. Young people often feel a great deal of pressure to become ‘successful’, 
both economically and in terms of self-realisation. All these factors, combined with 
rapid urbanisation and economic development, have led to intense competition for 
university admission. While the number of available places has expanded, it has 
increased nowhere near enough to match growing demand. Even a mediocre student 
often spends upwards of 10 hours a day studying, leading some to opine that they 
have given up their youth in exchange for China’s economic rise (Dychwald 2018).
4.3  Sen’s Development as Freedom
Economic development is central to many of the major theoretical frameworks of 
migration. The neoclassical model (e.g. Ravenstein 1895), the New Economics of 
Migration (Stark 1978) and the World Systems Theory (Wallerstein 1974) to name 
a few, all focus on the idea that people move for primarily economic reasons. Indeed, 
this is not illogical as the wish to escape poverty seems to be a central cause of 
migration. The argument of this chapter also fits within this framework as long as 
the view of what constitutes poverty is broadened. While most of the major theories 
of migration take a macroscopic economic view, Amartya Sen (1999) views devel-
opment on an individual level. He argues that there are three metrics that are impor-
tant in gauging economic development, these being political freedom, freedom of 
choice and economic freedom. He defines poverty as the lack of any or all of these 
metrics. Thus, even someone with an income above the poverty line would still be 
considered poor if this individual is lacking political freedom and/or freedom of 
choice. These three measures comprise what are variously known as ‘substantive 
freedoms’ or ‘human capabilities’. These are, in Sen’s analysis, central to develop-
ment. They serve both as a measure of development and as a driver of it, as it is often 
possible to access one type of freedom through another or, in Bourdieu’s (1986) 
terms, transfer capital from one form to another. However, this is not to say that 
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access to one form may always provide access to the others. In fact, Sen (1988, 
1999) suggests that one reason for this extended view of poverty is that a lack of 
political freedom and freedom of choice may limit human capability and develop-
ment in a way which would be masked should one only use strictly economic 
measures.
4.4  Method and Participants
The focus of this chapter is to explore the juxtaposition between the global ambi-
tions of a group of Chinese students enrolled at a Norwegian university (hereafter 
IUN) and the way in which they are tied to the sending communities by their filial 
responsibilities. IUN is situated in a medium-sized university town in Norway and 
is undergoing a push for the diversification of both students and staff. This began in 
the 1990s with the stated goal of making the university ‘internationally excellent’. 
During this internationalisation initiative, the student body has become significantly 
more diverse, at least within certain disciplines such as engineering and computer 
science. While the majority of international students at IUN are from various 
European countries, there are a significant number of ‘non-Western’ students as 
well, the Chinese being the largest group. This study was conducted from September 
2012 to April 2014 and was conceived as an inquiry into the experiences of the 
Chinese students enrolled at IUN. It was an open-ended ethnographic study focus-
ing on many aspects of the students’ lives. As such, the findings are too many and 
diverse to fit in a single paper and some have been published elsewhere (Page 2019a, 
b). The study was conducted using both participant observation and semi-structured 
interviews. The group-based nature of the field setting compared to the one-to-one 
interviews meant that different types of data emerged in the two settings – this chap-
ter is mostly based on the interviews. The research questions concern (a) what moti-
vates their sojourn, (b) their aspirations for the future and (c) how their migration 
would facilitate this.
At the time of this study, approximately 100 Chinese students were enrolling at 
IUN each year. Most of these were on Master’s programmes in engineering, mate-
rial science and IT. It is well-documented that, when there are sufficient numbers, 
international students tend to cluster into co-national groupings (Taha and Cox 
2016). The Chinese, being one of the largest national groupings at IUN, were 
numerous enough to comprise several cliques and milieus and it is on one of these 
that the current study is based. These milieus have fluid boundaries and rotating 
memberships as senior members graduate and new ones enrol. As such, it is hard to 
enumerate how large this group is, although for the purposes of this chapter it can 
be said to consist of approximately 40 individuals.
All the participants quoted herein were in Norway on student visas and were 
engaged on programmes of at least one year’s duration and most commonly two. 
The average participant was a member of China’s urban middle class from a coastal 
city, born in the late 1980s and an only child. For most, it was their first extended 
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stay outside China and, for some, their first ever trip abroad. The group was fairly 
evenly balanced in terms of gender. In order to minimise the participants’ inconve-
nience, interviews were held where and when they considered it the most conve-
nient, with most taking place on campus after lectures. While some Chinese and 
Norwegian was used, the primary language was English. The interviews were 
recorded with the participants’ consent and all names used herein are randomly 
selected pseudonyms.
4.5  Embodying Modernity Through Global Capital
As already mentioned, the bālínghòu participating in this study are in Norway on 
temporary visas and, as such, would be thought of by many as sojourners. However, 
as the duration of their sojourns exceeds a year, they also meet most scholars’ 
criteria to be considered migrants. Migration is defined in many ways but, in a 
broader sense, may be seen as the crossing of a political, geographic or administra-
tive boundary with the intention of remaining for a certain amount of time – 1 year 
being a typical stipulation (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014). The crossing of a 
boundary signifies the movement from one type of place to another and thus involves 
movement from a sending to a receiving region. One common way to understand 
migration is as a result of a calculation between the factors that push someone to 
leave one place and those that draw them to another (e.g. Moon 1995; Ravenstein 
1895; Zhang et al. 2012). From this perspective, asking why the bālínghòu youth in 
this study embarked on their educational travels may be seen as a two-part question: 
Why did they leave China and why did they go to Norway?
4.5.1  Reasons for Leaving China
For many of the participants, their reason for migrating was more marked by the 
factors that pushed them to leave China rather than those that drew them to Norway. 
A surprisingly small proportion of the research on Chinese international students 
deals with the question of why they leave, focusing more on their reasons for choos-
ing the receiving country (e.g. Ahmad and Hussain 2017; Bodycott 2009; Yang 
2007) and their likelihood of staying (e.g. Alberts and Hazen 2005; Han et al. 2015). 
One large-scale study that does deal with push factors is that of Fong (2011) whose 
findings in this regard also fit well with those of this chapter. The participants of this 
study echoed those in Fong’s work in that they expressed a variety of reasons for 
leaving China, some of which were unique to the individual student. However, there 
was a recurrent expression that migration would allow them more control over what 




I worry that, in China, I have no choice in my life. I would, like, do this job, or that job. I 
live here, get married then to this person… I think that you, in these countries, can chose 
your own future.
As previously intimated, the intense competition in China means that only the 
very top academic performers would have their choice of university and the others 
would have to take whatever studies would give the best prospects for employment. 
Thus, they would be required to maximise the benefits of each potential area of 
study and choose the most materially beneficial one. In a sense, the choice would be 
made for them, leading to the feeling of being railroaded. Yao’s statement above is 
an indication that such feelings are also prominent among the participants of this 
study, sentiments echoed by others such as Xuegang (26, m):
In China, I can’t take the Master’s I want. I have to see what I can get into, what will give 
me a job. You can’t just… study the thing your heart says, or your dream. With these results, 
there may be only one thing you can do.
Xuegang and Yao, as well as many of their peers, had begun their studies in 
China. They had enrolled on the best programme that they could get onto with the 
results they had from their higher-education entrance exams (Gāokǎo). The point at 
which the students decided to study abroad varied greatly. One had made up her 
mind to study elsewhere immediately after receiving her Gāokǎo. For her BA in 
China, rather than focusing on her employment prospects, she had attempted to 
maximise her chances of being accepted on a foreign MA programme. Others had 
begun their studies with the intention of completing them in China but had realised 
that the course they had chosen was not for them. They had applied abroad because 
of a belief that this would allow them access to postgraduate studies further removed 
from their BAs and/or that the degrees they received would make them more desir-
able on the job market and thus give them access to a wider field of choice. One 
indication that leaving the sending country was more important than the choice of 
receiving country was that many of the students, including Xuegang and Yao, had 
merely sent out applications to any foreign university they could, in the hope of 
being accepted in at least one.
In Sen’s (1988) terms, we can argue that the students were fleeing poverty in the 
sense of freedom of choice. Such freedom has both an intrinsic value in itself and an 
instrumental value in allowing access to other ‘commodities’. In this specific case, 
what they would be accessing by achieving greater control over their academic and 
career trajectories could be such things as higher pay or greater job satisfaction. 
However, as I demonstrate more clearly later, the students seemed more concerned 
with freedom of choice for its intrinsic value, as its mere possession becomes an 
important factor in their identity construction.
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4.5.2  Why IUN?
We saw above that many of the participants were primarily concerned with leaving 
China and that the actual destination was secondary. Those following this strategy 
might have preferred English-speaking countries as this would make communica-
tion easier. However, Norwegian universities were also an attractive alternative as 
there were no application or tuition fees at the time. The absence of the former was 
especially important to those employing a scattershot approach to application. 
Among the participants of this study, while their reasons for leaving China were 
very much in line with prior studies, their reasons for doing studying at IUN were 
more idiosyncratic.
For some of the scattershot applicants, IUN had merely been the first and/or best 
university which had accepted them. Others had sought IUN specifically because of 
their fields of interest. One student, for instance, was researching a technique of 
underwater pipeline construction in which IUN has special competence. A few stu-
dents had even known of particular professors under whom they wished to study. 
One of these students, Shi, had actually met her future supervisor when he had been 
giving a talk in Shanghai. The two had struck up a conversation, and it was the pro-
fessor himself who had told Shi that the IUN might be of interest for her postgradu-
ate work.
Two of the participants, Chan and Dewei, had personal reasons for applying to 
IUN. Chan had a girlfriend who was studying elsewhere in Norway and entering on 
a student visa was Chan’s best option of being close to her. He had done some 
research and found that IUN was the closest institution to her that had a Master’s 
programme which might be suitable for him. The two took the train to visit each 
other over the long weekends and the shorter breaks where visiting their families in 
China would be impractical. Dewei, on the other hand, had previously held an 
internship with a company in Europe and had taken the opportunity to travel within 
the Schengen area. Among the countries he visited was Norway and he had fallen in 
love with the place. For him, applying to IUN had been primarily about returning to 
Norway and about attaining formal qualifications that would increase his chances of 
being able to remain.
4.5.3  The Opening Up of Life Trajectories
As we have seen, the students expressed a belief that staying in China would 
mean constricting their life courses, that the progression of both their careers and 
their social lives would be more or less determined by their relatively limited 
options. Many of the students said that this was one of their main reasons for study-
ing abroad – that this would give them more control over their lives by opening up 
a larger number of potential avenues (Page 2019a). These avenues were primarily 
concerned with access to more choices in the place of residence and the career. For 
A. G. Page
57
the former, several participants suggested that a Chinese degree would primarily be 
of interest within China, whereas a degree from a Western country would be far 
more internationally transferable. Holding such a degree, it was said, would make it 
easier to get visas and residency permits in whatever place they might wish to go. 
One student, 28-year-old Ni, also intimated that she might wish to continue study-
ing in the US and that she would be more likely to gain access based on a degree 
from IUN than from the Chinese university where she had received her BA. However, 
she had not made up her mind yet. Rather than working towards the goal of further 
education, she wanted to open up the greatest possible range of options.
One of the reasons why I came here is that I want to be free to move around the world. If I 
study in Norway, I have more opportunities. Even if I cannot get a job in Norway, it is easier 
to apply for other universities in other places in the world. […] Also, because, although I 
think even China is developing very fast now, I could not see my career in China. Not yet 
here. I still cannot see my future now but I think that, if I study abroad and I move, I will 
have more possibilities and opportunities.
Both the terms that Ni employed – possibility and opportunity – were very much 
recurrent, appearing in the majority of interviews. Ni notes that, although she does 
not know exactly what she wants to do, she wants the ability to create options for 
herself. In fact, very few of the participants had concrete plans for their future after 
graduation. Rather than being an entry point into a specific career or discipline, a 
Western degree was presented as a commodity granting general access to a type 
cosmopolitan, globally mobile lifestyle. In fact, many of the students placed a pre-
mium on both geographic and social mobility and seemed to aspire to a near- 
nomadic lifestyle.
I’d like to, maybe, not stay in one place, may be stay in some other locations. It’s more fun 
(…) [M]oving different places and working different positions, maybe, like, can make bet-
ter opportunities for me (Chunlei, 27, f).
I really do not have any real plan. I mean, no real plan on what job I want, or where. Maybe, 
like, work three months in one position, then move to another place and another position 
(...) you can gain a lot of different experiences (Lanfen, 28, m).
From this it seems as though the lack of a plan or, rather, the lack of the obliga-
tion to have a fixed life course, is itself a desirable quality. From the above quotes, 
we can infer that the ideal future to which these youth are aspiring is a semi-nomadic 
existence where more thought is given to the potentiality for mobility than to where 
this mobility might lead.
There are two factors to which the students attribute this mobility, one being their 
formal qualifications, the other being informal cross-cultural communicative skills. 
Of course, the idea that higher education may bring increased mobility is quite true. 
Many countries have relaxed immigration policies for highly skilled individuals 
(Wright 2015) and such migrants also tend to face less stigmatisation from the 
majority society (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015). Whether a degree from a not- 
particularly- well-known Norwegian university is more internationally transferrable 
than one from a Chinese university is harder to determine but many of the students 
expressed a belief – or maybe more of an assumption – that this would be the case. 
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One possible reason why this might be so is that study at a foreign university would 
allow the bālínghòu to gain exposure to other cultures and help them to develop 
cross-cultural communicative skills (Fong 2011; Gu and Schweisfurth 2015). These 
benefits would partly consist of English-language skills but would also be seen 
more ephemerally as an acclimatisation to difference generally. These factors, the 
formal and the informal, were seen as together conferring global and social mobil-
ity, allowing the student to go anywhere and do anything.
In the attainment of global and social mobility we see the intrinsic value placed 
on Sen’s (1988, 1999) freedom of choice. It has been argued elsewhere that the 
ways in which these students express themselves suggest that their sojourns are 
more about identity work than about formal qualifications (Page 2019b). While 
travel and job mobility are each valuable in themselves, the vagueness with which 
the participants speak of both are notable. Very little emphasis was given to any 
specific jobs that they would like to do but focused, rather, on the movement from 
one to the other. The same was true of places of residence. Dewei’s wish to stay in 
Norway and Ni’s possible studies in the US were the only times when specific coun-
tries of residence were mentioned. Here, too, what was presented as a valuable 
commodity was the movement between undefined hypothetical places. This is con-
sistent with the emergent middle-class consumer culture in China, whereby interna-
tional travel is among the prime vectors of identity construction (Elfick 2011). Thus, 
it may be that the reason for the lack of specificity is that the specifics themselves 
are unimportant. Rather than the freedom to do any given thing, the participants 
seek to become the kind of empowered people who have freedom of choice in a 
more general sense.
4.5.4  Parental Pressures
One of the dominant research trends on international students follows what is some-
times termed the deficit model (Montgomery 2010). The defining trait of this model 
is its focus around what is lacking in the students’ life, such as money or social 
interaction (Bochner, McLeod and Lin 1977; Pritchard and Skinner 2002; Ward and 
Kennedy 1993; Yu and Moskal 2018). While it may be argued that this perspective 
has been overemphasised (Page and Chahboun 2019), it is not without basis. 
International students typically live under pressure from multiple sources, such as 
social isolation, uncertainty and having to adjust to an unfamiliar educational sys-
tem. While this is also the case for the participants of the current study, the general 
hardships of the international student experience is outside the scope of this chapter. 
However, one particular source of pressure is very relevant and that is parental 
expectations. These generally take two forms related to bidirectional support within 
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the parent–child relationship.1 That is to say, at the time of study, the parents were 
responsible for the children’s economic welfare needs but social norms dictate that 
this state of affairs would 1 day be inverted.
During their studies, economic support was flowing primarily from the parents to 
the children, a fact that weighed on the minds of some of the students. We previ-
ously saw how one factor making Norway attractive was the lack of tuition fees. 
There are also public subsidies, grants and stipends, some of which would have 
been available to Chinese students at the time of this study. However, day-to-day life 
in Norway is expensive and even recipients of full student stipends live well below 
the poverty line. The majority of my participants were supported, either wholly or 
in part, by their parents; in many cases, this would have been a major expense. The 
GDP difference between China and Norway is large enough that a typical Chinese 
salary does not go far. Norway has an unusually high cost of living even for a 
European country, leading some parents to go to extreme lengths to finance the 
children’s sojourns. Those parents with extensive networks of friends and family 
were in a position to borrow what they needed, spreading it out over a large number 
of people – a few hundred here, a few thousand there. Other parents had been central 
urban residents during the economic reforms and had been given the opportunity to 
buy their homes from the government at a relatively low rate. These people were 
now in a position to sell their homes at much higher market rate and move to cheaper 
accommodation. While these major sacrifices were the exception rather than the 
rule, several of the students explicitly noted that their sojourns were an economic 
hardship for their parents.
More common among the participants was stress stemming from the awareness 
that they were eventually expected to become caregivers themselves. In this way, 
the decision as to whether or not to return to China became modulated by the wel-
fare needs of the parents. This responsibility would be wholly on the participants’ 
shoulders, due to the lack of subsidised eldercare in China and the fact that all of the 
students interviewed were only children. In fact, when asked whether or not they 
intended to return, this was taken as such a natural state of affairs that many treated 
the question itself as ridiculous. ‘Of course!’ was the most common response, some-
times followed by a slightly condescending explanation of the one-child policy and 
its implications for parental care. This expectation certainly seemed to be taken 
seriously by the participants but it should not be taken for granted that all would end 
up going home to their parents. While most expressed an intention to return to China 
and none explicitly said that they intended not to, there were some who seemed unsure.
If the primary goal of the children is the attainment of freedom of choice for its 
intrinsic value, this is unlikely to be the priority of the parents. Being potentially 
financially dependent on their offspring and having invested financially in their edu-
cation, they are more likely to focus on concrete and pragmatic concerns. They will 
want to know that their children will be in a sufficiently stable economic position to 
1 For more information on the bidirectional exchange of care, as well as the older generation’s 
perspective, see Chap. 2 in this volume by Zhao and Huang.
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take care of them. While they were no doubt investing in their children’s happiness, 
they were also investing in their own futures. One 25-year-old male student, Liao, 
remarks on the sometimes incompatible goals of the two generations.
I want to see the world. If I go back to China, I don’t know when I’ll be able to leave again, 
so I, like, want opportunities. My parents just ask how much money I will make and what 
my chances are of getting a job with such a degree.
Remembering the importance placed by the participants on mobility, we can 
infer from this that Liao is expressing a concern here with constructing a mobile 
identity. His parents, on the other hand, want to know the likelihood of his getting a 
job and how much this job is likely to pay. As with their offspring, agency is likely 
to play a role in the experiences of the parents as well. They are, as has been stated, 
dependent on their children and it is no doubt stressful to see the letter engaged in a 
costly pursuit that might or might not pay off. It is also no doubt a source of stress 
to them that their children are so far away. At the same time, some students have 
noted that their parents are wary of putting undue pressure on their offspring, as 
Zhelan (24, f) shows:
I call my parents as often as I can, but… many times it is difficult. They always ask me 
when I’m coming back to China, but without asking, you know? Like, maybe, they don’t 
directly ask, because they know I have lot of work and they don’t want to pressure me, but 
they’ll maybe say, like, ‘Someone we know is getting married at this time, and they wonder 
whether you will be coming. We couldn’t say because we don’t know when you’re coming 
home’, something like that.
From these statements, we see an implied dilemma for Zhelan’s parents. They 
want to know when she will return but seem not to want to ask directly. Zhelan 
herself believes that they do not ask directly because they do not want to cause her 
stress and harm her academic progress. Instead, they find a way to inquire indirectly 
by referencing an event happening at some point in the future and saying that some-
one else – not them – wants to know whether Zhelan will be able to attend. However, 
we can see from the statement that she experiences this as a source of pressure. She 
further explains how draining this is, despite or perhaps because, she believes that 
her parents are less concerned about when she will come home but more about 
whether she will actually do so at all. Such nervousness appears to have some justi-
fication, as not everyone was equally sure about returning, as two female students, 
Chunlei, 27 and Lin, 24, explain:
I thought I would be returning to China immediately, maybe my parents need me. But now, 
I don’t know, I like Norway. It’s quite cold, but people are nice. It’s very beautiful, with the 
mountains.
I don’t know. I struggled over whether or not to go back. I’m worried my parents might need 
me. But even if I do go back, the experience from other countries would be valuable (…). 
Lots of good experience here. There are a lot of things Chinese people should learn.
Regardless of whether or not these two would eventually return, it is clear that 
the perceived obligation to the parents was palpable and that staying abroad would 
be felt as neglecting it. The obligation probably has multiple sources – such as the 
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children’s love for their parents, the feeling that caregiving is socially expected of 
them and the tacit urge to reciprocate the care and resources the students have been 
given. However, honouring this obligation would be a severe interruption to the life 
trajectories the youth were imagining for themselves. Here we see again the clash 
between the younger generation’s emphasis on freedom of choice and their elders’ 
wish for freedom from material and economic hardship. While the members of both 
generations imagined that educational sojourns could provide welfare in the sense 
of freeing them from poverty, we see that the specific type of poverty they wish to 
escape from may be hard to reconcile. At first glance, remaining abroad and apply-
ing for family reunion may seem like a viable compromise. However, it must be 
remembered that the emphasis was on freedom of movement – on building a cosmo-
politan self through the potential mobility between geographical and social spaces – 
and caring that for ageing parents would constrain this wherever it would eventually 
be carried out.
4.6  Conclusions
This chapter has explored the motives behind young Chinese people’s migration to 
a welfare state and the inner conflicts that this migration reveals. In a sense, this 
conflict may be considered to be somewhere between dynamism and stability, as the 
students seek to utilise their sojourns to recreate themselves as people whose sense 
of self is bound to the potential to alter their situation, seemingly on a whim. 
However, they are bound by filial obligations to people who are more invested in the 
certainty that their material needs will be met. While the bālínghòu in this study 
wished to travel to a welfare state and their parents largely supported this wish, the 
two cohorts had very different ideas as to what type of welfare was the most impor-
tant. For the younger, it was the freedom of choice; for the older it was income 
security. Thus, while both the parents and the youth themselves wished for the 
sojourn to be a success, this was measured differently. Far from wishing their off-
spring to be globetrotting cosmopolites, the parents were far more likely to be con-
cerned with practical considerations such as the likelihood of employment and 
projected earnings.
On the one hand, the bālínghòu themselves seemed to engage in such stays 
abroad primarily as a project of self-development. For them, China is juxtaposed 
with the West in terms of the substantive freedom available to its residents. While 
China is presented as a place where their circumstances would determine their life 
courses, a European degree would allow the holders to affect these courses through 
their own agency. The end goal was not to achieve any given situation but, rather, a 
high level of global and social mobility. Any concrete destination point in the life 
trajectory seemed intentionally left open, so that the indefatigability itself becomes 
a value in its own right. This can be interpreted as a transcendence of regional 
belonging to a more pan-global disembeddedness.
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This stands in contrast to the fact that they are tied to their sending communities 
by their parents. These latter are currently patrons financing the sojourns but they 
can at some point become dependants in need of support themselves. Indeed, it is 
possible that the fact that the bālínghòu have obligations waiting for them in China 
may be part of the reason for the fluid trajectories. When they know that they will 
be required to return to their parents at some point and may need to care for them 
for many years, embedding themselves too deeply in a new community becomes 
more problematic. This would either mean uprooting themselves at a later date or 
abandoning their parents.
These differing motivations may have a number of causes, one of which is the 
different societies in which these two generations grew up. The bālínghòu were 
raised in a rapidly modernising society with a powerfully expanding economy. 
Being only children, they never had to compete with siblings for their parents’ 
attention; however, they also had no one to help them to shoulder the responsibility 
for them at a later life stage. The expectations they have for their own lives as well 
as those which the parents place on them are both extraordinary. One might say that 
they are raised with the life expectations of modern people in a modernising China. 
Substantive freedom in terms of economic and lifestyle agency is very important to 
them, as is the ability to construct identity through their own choices.
The parents, however, have seen and/or experienced privation on a scale that 
their children are unlikely to ever know. The oldest of them have lived thorough the 
years following the great leap forward, which saw the deadliest famine in recorded 
history, with a death toll in the tens of millions (Dikötter 2010; Roberts 2011). As 
people who have not learned to take material necessities for granted, they are more 
likely to be more pragmatic in such matters. In addition, the more agency their chil-
dren have, the less control the parents have over them; equally, the more the children 
become invested in their lives abroad, the less likely they are to return.
This chapter has concerned thoughts, dreams, imaginations and desires. It has 
not been my goal to fact-check each of the assumptions made, nor to follow up on 
whether the students truly did return to their parents when and if the call came. Such 
questions might be the subject of a future study when the bālínghòu participants 
have grown older and seen how their imaginations fit with the cold, hard reality. 
Such a future study might also shed more light on the outcome of the clash between 
the divergent substantive freedom sought by two groups who are intimately linked 
yet separated by a deep generational divide.
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‘He Has a Better Chance Here, 




In traditional terms, welfare has been defined as ‘a set of entitlements and provision 
provided by the state or guaranteed by it’ (Sciortino 2004, 113) or, more broadly, as 
a ‘sphere of activities of the state and other public bodies and social forces that is 
involved in the development of living conditions of people and interpersonal rela-
tions (especially in the living and working environment)’ (Rajkiewicz 1998, 17). 
These definitions primarily highlight the role of state authorities and public institu-
tions as key entities regarding the provision of social protection. Today, the role of 
other entities has been on the increase – that of market or non-governmental organ-
isations  – which is reflected in terms such as welfare pluralism, welfare mix or 
multi-sectoral social protection. In the welfare-mix model, based on integrating a 
number of different entities, the state, the markets and the family are seen as crucial 
sources of responding to and managing social risks (Powell and Barrientos 2004, 
85–86). This approach is useful for understanding the immigrants’ choices and 
decisions, which are the focus of our chapter. The achievement of basic social pro-
tection for citizens has resulted in the appearance of new expectations of the state’s 
assignments and the expansion of the catalogue of benefits it provides (Głąbicka 
2001). Education has become one such area; though it ‘is not always recognised as 
part of the welfare state’s policy package, it is, no less than other public programmes, 
recognised as a core entitlement in most Western societies’ (Hega and Hokenmaier 
2002, 2). The increased importance of education as a factor determining life chances 
has undoubtedly played a major role in this outcome. The purpose of this chapter is 
to bring education under the umbrella of the analysis of welfare protection for 
migrant families. We assume that, when making decisions on migration and/or its 
continuation, individuals and families act independently but within external 
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considerations which include, among others, the social protection offered by the 
state and society of their destination (Grabowska-Lusińska 2012, 13). We demon-
strate that the inclusive social system of Norway does not have to be a key pull fac-
tor at the moment of emigration; however, it is of importance when the decision is 
made to transform a migration project from a temporary one into settlement or, 
conversely, a return to the country of origin. In the case of families with children, 
assessment of the educational system and educational opportunities in the countries 
of destination as compared to those of the country of origin is one of the key issues. 
This is because a decision to send a child to a Norwegian school means a decision 
in favour of a longer stay in Norway or even settlement (Gmaj 2016; Huang et al. 
2015). It is also interesting to consider whether and to what extent the school con-
tributes to the process of integration of children in peer groups on the one hand and 
of their parents through engagement in the life of the school and their subsequent 
contact with other families on the other. Comparing the Polish and Norwegian edu-
cational systems, it is the latter that puts more emphasis on the active involvement 
of parents at school. This is different from the Polish context, which justifies our 
inquiries into how Polish parents in Norway respond to such expectations and 
whether ideas and practices from the community of origin become transferred, 
negotiated or transformed or, alternatively, whether Norwegian patterns are 
accepted.
In Polish migration studies the issues of welfare and immigration have been rec-
ognised but only to a small degree. Migration decisions have been mainly consid-
ered through the prism of the labour market and the role and importance of social 
networks, whereas the welfare dimension has only been identified as a possible pull 
factor.1 The system of social care has been an object of analysis primarily in relation 
to two-way intergenerational transfers relating to social protection (Krzyżowski 
2013; Krzyżowski and Mucha 2014) and in research into female migrants who 
undertook employment in domestic and care service, especially in countries in 
which state institutional support and financial expenditure for the care of elderly and 
dependent persons are limited (Małek 2012). In this chapter, we focus on another 
aspect of welfare – namely its educational dimension. We are especially interested 
in the way in which migrant parents perceive the educational concept of the 
Norwegian state. We examine the situations in which they develop upward strate-
gies of pragmatic (and sometimes instrumental) use of educational opportunities 
related to life chances for their children. It is also important to mention that migrant 
parents, living in a transnational space, assess all the possibilities, resources and 
their own activities through two prisms: their lives in Norway and the relationships 
which they maintain with their country of origin – in this case, Poland.
1 By way of example, Joanna Napierała (2008, 36) anticipated that, with increasing penetration of 
the Norwegian labour market by Polish employees, ‘Norwegian pay and social care’ would be the 
key pull factors.
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5.2  Welfare and Migration
Until now, research into the impact of the welfare state on migration decisions and 
strategies has mostly been based on an analysis of statistical data (the examination 
of the structure of social expenditure) and carried out from a macro-social and 
macro-economic perspective (Blank 1988; Borjas 1999; Giulietti and Wahba 
2012). It has primarily focused on the issue of migrants using the social benefits 
available in the countries of destination and on answering the question of whether 
social packages act as ‘welfare magnets’ or whether migrants follow the strategy 
of ‘welfare shopping’ (Borjas 1999; Péridy 2006). The research results are not 
unequivocal. Borjas (1999), who authored one of the best-known papers on the 
topic, argued that the expanded welfare state impacted on the skill composition of 
migrants – attracting low-skilled migrants – and that it acted as a buffer protecting 
against turmoil on the labour market. Immigrants are perceived as calculating indi-
viduals, whose choice of where to migrate to are guided by income-maximising 
behaviour (Borjas 1999, 634–635). For example, analysis of internal migration in 
the United States shows that traditionally generous states with extensive social 
support systems, such as California, New York and Wisconsin, are magnets draw-
ing persons with low resources to secure comparatively higher benefits (Levine and 
Zimmerman 1999). Razin and Wahba (2011, 28) criticised such simple explana-
tions, stressing that the skill composition of immigrants depended also on such 
factors as the policy regime or on access to migrant networks, since these lower the 
costs of migration (Giulietti and Wahba 2012). Razin and Wahba (2011) argued 
that the welfare magnet hypothesis is possible in free-migration regimes, where the 
generous systems of benefits mostly attract unskilled immigrants. In turn, research 
done by De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009) into European immigration prior to the 
extension of the European Union in 2004 proved that the level of social protection 
in the receiving state had a measurable but limited impact on migration decisions, 
though these were certainly stronger in the case of non-qualified migrants from the 
new member states.
Other directions of research into welfare and migration related to the conse-
quences of the lack of migrants’ access to social protection (Van Ginneken 2013), 
integration, immigration and welfare state policies (Brochmann and Hagelund 
2012) and the ways in which welfare regimes interacted with migration regimes 
(Sciortino 2004). Though the research area has been growing with the expanding 
notion of welfare, there is still a shortage of papers that consider the positioning of 
individuals in a transnational social field and use a quality-based approach empha-
sising the practices and judgements followed by the migrants themselves.
Classical models of welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990, 2005; Titmuss 1974) 
are based on an indication of the institutional differences in the distribution process 
of produced welfare and their impact on social stratification. The various means of 
distribution and redistribution of resources are perceived as being different models 
of welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990; Golinowska 2018). The declining 
explanatory power of these traditional models has encouraged the emergence of 
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new proposals, with the attendant inclusion of additional, non-economic criteria. 
In addition, as stressed by Golinowska (2018, 20), ‘non-social areas, belonging to 
so-called social investments: education, health care, housing have been increas-
ingly more frequently included in the description of the welfare state’. This finds 
evidence in modern social-policy models which incorporate variables relating to 
labour-market regulations and educational services and assumptions of educational 
systems (see Szarfenberg 2009, 20). When adopting a broader concept of treating 
social policy as a field of influence, then labour, quality of life, social order and 
culture  – including education  – should all be incorporated into the concept of 
welfare.
The increasing volume of migration and the resultant intensification of transna-
tional engagements bring with them new ways in which to theorise and explain 
these processes. The proposals offered by Levitt (2007) and Levitt et  al. (2017) 
incorporate into the analysis migrants and non-migrants and the number of transna-
tional engagements. This marks a departure from adopting the perspective of the 
receiving or the sending country only and thus ‘splitting migrants’ lives into discon-
nected areas’ (Serra Mingot and Mazzucato 2018, 142), in favour of the simultane-
ous inclusion of both locations. Levitt et al. (2017) offer an analysis of how migrants 
navigate transnational social protection spaces to piece together resources across 
the international borders of nation states. Moreover, they emphasise that social pro-
tection should not be perceived only through the prism of the state as the main 
source of protection but that it should additionally consider three further sources: 
the market, the third sector and social networks (Levitt et  al. 2015, 6). All the 
resources available to migrants from these four sources, scattered across interna-
tional borders, constitute migrants’ welfare resources environment, which operates 
transnationally. At the same time, the scope of support available from each of the 
sources varies for the different individuals and is also dependent on the time and 
place (Levitt et al. 2015). The content of social coverage is thus partially regulated 
by the state and depends on the model adopted (for instance in the marginal model, 
the basic channels of protection include the market and the family and, therefore, 
the state offer will be insignificant). Conversely, ‘the social protections available to 
any person are strongly influenced by his or her individual characteristics – educa-
tion, skills, resources, the legal status, the country of origin, the country of resi-
dence, the place of residence within a country, social networks and so on’ (Levitt 
et al. 2015, 12).
Nordic countries which represent the social-democratic type of welfare-state 
regime (Esping-Andersen 1990) are typically characterised by a universal access to 
social protection and high levels of redistribution (Brochmann and Hagelund 2012; 
Dziewięcka-Bokun 1999) and are regarded as ‘encompassing’ welfare states (Korpi 
2000). They also, in general, provide universal free access to health care and educa-
tion (including such aspects as textbooks and educational aids). An important crite-
rion applied to the Scandinavian model is the principle of social responsibility – or 
activities aimed at having such a social-policy system in which, through the joint 
collaboration of its citizens, the needs of all community members will be satisfied 
at an appropriately high level.
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In recent years, significant migration from new EU member states to Norway has 
stirred up a discussion over the universal social-support model that provides (or 
does not) migrants with immediate access to the resources of the receiving country 
(Brochmann and Hagelund 2012; Strzemecka 2015; Ślusarczyk and Pustułka 2016; 
Ślusarczyk et al. 2018; Wærdahl 2016). In the case of Norway, social coverage for 
distinct categories of immigrants differs. For example, Polish and other EU/EEA 
migrants are not entitled to free Norwegian language courses, as they are viewed by 
the authorities as self-sufficient migrants moving to Norway primarily for work 
reasons. They must pay for these courses or look for alternative sources of support 
(e.g. free courses arranged by various organisations).2
5.3  School as an Element of the Welfare State
The school has a special place in the analysis of processes relating to migration. 
Since education is compulsory, it becomes a test of the adopted strategy of integra-
tion; in view of the common belief in the importance of both a formal education and 
the knowledge and skills for life that an individual gains at school, education is an 
object of constant interest among parents (see Lopez Rodriguez 2010; Mikiewicz 
2016; Niezgoda 2011; Ślusarczyk 2010). From a state point of view, the school is a 
place in which to shape citizens; similarly, it is an object of constant interest among 
politicians (Boli et al. 1985; Coleman and Hoffer 1987; Hadjar and Becker 2009; 
Labaree 2012; Meighan 1977). For migrant families with children, schooling can be 
a turning point, since the decision about which country their children will go to 
school in involves a choice between returning to the country of origin or settling in 
the receiving country.
The current form of the Norwegian educational system was shaped after World 
War II. Its fundamental features include a uniform educational system and curricu-
lum and a teachers’ educational system standardised across the country (Mańkowska 
2012). Key values of Norwegian society include egalitarianism and co-operation, 
both of which researchers trace back to historic conditions: the absence of either a 
feudal system or a home-grown aristocracy, which led to the development of a 
‘country of farmers and fishermen’ (Aase 2008, 13–17 cited in Mańkowska 2014, 
54). The inclusiveness of the schools, the equality, the co-operation of the social 
partners and the solidarity of the citizenry are all based on these same assumptions. 
The purpose of the system is to provide children and young people with an equal 
right to education, regardless of their place of residence, gender or social and 
2 It is arguable whether access to free language courses is indispensable in the case of economic 
migrants and whether it should be treated as a part of social-welfare protection. Moreover, highly 
skilled migrants from third countries who are staying in Norway on temporary work permits are 
not, as a rule, entitled to unemployment benefit. However, migrants themselves perceive this lack 
of access to Norwegian language courses as a form of inequality (Ślusarczyk 2019).
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cultural background  – thus the provision includes those who are migrants.3 The 
adoption of these goals, among others, meant that there would be no selection or 
segregation of pupils according to ability and also no practice of having a student 
repeat a class within the period of compulsory education (primary schools and the 
first level of secondary school). Furthermore, there would be no separation of chil-
dren with special educational needs (the disabled, immigrants and those lacking 
knowledge of the mother tongue).4 The school is also obliged to take care of the 
necessary facilities and professionals, e.g. teacher assistants (Mańkowska 2014; 
Ślusarczyk 2019). The Norwegian school expects solidarity and co-operation from 
parents and assistance in the attainment of the various educational, socialisational 
and integrational goals by, for instance, working together to organise extracurricular 
activities or friendship groups5 (Mańkowska 2014; Wærdahl 2005, 2016).
5.4  School and Life Chances
As mentioned in the previous section, the decision to send a child to school in the 
receiving country often resulted in the family either settling there permanently or at 
least for the long-term (Gmaj 2016; Ryan et  al. 2009; Ślusarczyk and Pustułka 
2016). Even if immigration seems to be a short-term solution to economic difficul-
ties, as soon as the children’s schooling is involved it becomes a point of reference. 
One of the main factors here is the comparison of the educational opportunities in 
Poland and Norway. Based on this assessment, parents decide which educational 
system can provide their children with better life chances. As it is broadly under-
stood, the term ‘life chances’ encompasses the parents’ imagination and ideas con-
cerning the future of their children – in particular, the educational, professional, 
economic and social prospects that would enable the children to maintain their 
3 Developed in the period after World War II, the model remained in place until the 1990s, with just 
minor modifications. It was meant to embody socio-democratic ideas and thus, primarily, to pro-
vide equal educational opportunities (Mańkowska 2014). It also implied the marginalisation of 
non-public schooling as it was felt that private schools contributed to an increase in social differ-
ences. Introduced as of the 1990s, neoliberal elements, especially the principle of freedom of 
choice and adjustment to a competitive market (Ahonen 2002) brought about changes – such as a 
turning point in the case of private schools (since 2002) – and the publication of school rankings in 
terms of the students’ performances at the end of the compulsory education stage, which had been 
prohibited before (Welle-Strand and Tjedvoll 2009).
4 Some municipalities and/or schools place migrants in special schools or classes. However this is 
an opportunity for children with a migration background to receive support from bilingual teachers 
in introductory/welcome classes or school until they know enough Norwegian to join the regular 
class. The choice of solution depends on the policy adopted, the financial possibilities of the com-
mune and the number of migrant children (Ślusarczyk and Nikielska-Sekuła 2014; Wærdahl 2016).
5 A school class is subdivided into smaller groups – friendship groups (in Norwegian, vennegrup-
per). The parents of the children in the group are supposed to organise a social gathering at the start 
of the term and invite all of the children from the group to their homes. The children can play 
together while the parents spend some time together and get to know each other better.
M. Ślusarczyk and A. Małek
73
parents’ social status or even allow them to take ‘one step up on the ladder’ are all 
taken into account (Brown 2013; Croll 2004; Lopez Rodriguez 2010).
In general – and not simply in the case of migrant parents – Polish parents’ aspi-
rations and expectations for their children’s education are relatively high (Kozłowski 
and Matczak 2014).6 In Martha Nussbaum’s (2016) division between education for 
profit and education for democracy, the focus of Polish parents is more on the sphere 
of future benefits and what they would expect from schooling (Guðmundsson and 
Mikiewicz 2012; Mikiewicz 2014; Ślusarczyk et al. 2018). Randall Collins (1979) 
called it a strategy of ‘escaping forward’ when individuals try to achieve more ‘cre-
dentials’ and educational accomplishments (diplomas, certificates etc.) to grant 
themselves (or their children) a ‘better future’7 but sometimes also in order to avoid 
social or economic deprivation. The high aspirations of Polish migrants correspond 
to the situation in post-transformation Poland, when seeking to achieve a higher 
level of education was a coping strategy against unemployment and growing dif-
ferentiation in society, as in the 1970s in the United States (Adamski 1977, see also 
Długosz 2009, 2013; Gmerek 2011; Ślusarczyk 2010). Although this strategy did 
not lead to success but, rather, to the depreciation in the value of diplomas and an 
increase in social inequality, it did, however, spread across Polish society (Długosz 
2009; Nyczaj-Drąg 2011).
Polish migrant parents’ experiences of the post-communist transformational 
period in Poland, with its many years of unstable labour markets and low wages, 
make them no exception. Even if, as migrants, they accept deskilling or a lower 
social position themselves, when it comes to their children they present different 
expectations (Garapich 2016; Lopez Rodriguez 2017). When reflecting on their 
children’s education, Polish parents prefer the strategy of an ‘escape forward’, 
choosing the educational system which they perceive as better and – if possible – 
seeking greater advantages (e.g. choosing the school assessed as being the best, 
with additional activities for pupils and exerting pressure to achieve the best results). 
Such an approach is the most characteristic among parents from the middle and 
upper classes (Sadura 2018) and may be termed a transnational game for seeking 
greater opportunities everywhere.
6 Data on the level of parents’ expectations is provided by cyclical PISA surveys (Dolata et al. 
2013; Federowicz 2013; Federowicz and Sitek 2017). They document their unchanging high 
level – about half of parents hope that their children will obtain at least a Master’s degree and about 
30% are counting on a doctoral degree.
7 In terms of social status and a professional career in knowledge-intensive economies which push 
up the skills premium (Esping-Andersen 2005).
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5.5  Methodology
The empirical material that serves as the foundation of our analysis was collected 
within the framework of the research project Transfam.8 This chapter is more par-
ticularly based on 31 biographical interviews, partially structured, conducted with 
41 persons. Respondents were Polish families living with their children in Oslo and 
its environs who had lived in Norway for at least 6 months (the longest stay was 
over 20 years, while the average was 8.5 years). Our respondents consisted of 10 
couples interviewed together, and 21 individual interviews, 19 women and two men. 
Such disproportions are not uncommon in family research as women tend to be the 
‘default’ informants on family matters, especially in societies with the rather tradi-
tional gender order one finds in Poland (see e.g. Kilkey et  al. 2013 or Pustułka 
2015). The number of children per family varied between one and five and their age 
from a few months to early adulthood (23 years of age). There were substantial dif-
ferences in terms of their place of origin, education and professional status. The 
respondents came from different regions of Poland, both from big cities (including 
Warsaw) and from smaller towns and villages. Their educational background was 
diverse: 27 held a university degree, 11 graduated from high or technical schools 
and three from vocational schools. The majority (32) of respondents were employed 
(from low-level jobs to prestigious positions), whereas nine were unemployed or 
currently not working (e.g. maternity leave).
The scope of the research covered a wide range of areas related to migration and 
family life: from the decision to leave, through settlement, to any potential decision 
on staying longer or permanently. We were also interested in the process of entering 
the labour market, how leisure time was spent, in the division of roles in the family 
and how the children were being raised. Education was a particularly important area 
and we inquired about the process of making educational decisions  – including 
sending children to kindergarten and the perception of the school and related expec-
tations, about learning the Norwegian and Polish languages and, among others, 
about the possible decision to send children to a Polish supplementary school, as 
well as about their family language strategies.
8 Doing Family in Transnational Context. Demographic Choices, Welfare Adaptations, School 
Integration and Every-day Life of Polish Families Living in Polish-Norwegian Transnationality 
(2013–2016). The project was financed by Norway Grants under the Polish-Norwegian Research 
Programme carried out by the National Centre for Research and Development, Contract No. Pol-
Nor/197905/4/2013. The fieldwork took place in February–March 2014 by Paula Pustułka, Inga 
Hajdarowicz and Anna Bednarczyk.
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5.6  Migrant Strategies in the Context of the Welfare State
5.6.1  Norwegian School in the Eyes of Polish Parents
A division into narrower and broader understandings of the welfare state is impor-
tant in the context of the analysis of migrant strategies. We believe that the migrants’ 
point of departure is usually first the view from a labour-market perspective, labour 
protection and the prospect of welfare and social protection9 and Norway is very 
highly rated in these areas (Isaksen 2016).10 The early stages of Polish migration to 
Norway right after the enlargement of the EU were dominated by men, mostly with 
a lower level of education and qualifications, who migrated for employment mainly 
in the construction and fossil-fuel industries (Friberg and Eldring 2011; Friberg and 
Tyldum 2007; Iglicka et al. 2016, 2018). An important factor involved in the deci-
sion to migrate was the difference in pay and purchasing power, which meant that 
the migration of only one member of the household appeared a sensible, pragmatic 
choice, with the rest of the family remaining back in Poland (Friberg 2012; Sokół- 
Rudowska 2011).
The second, less common form which, nonetheless, marked a more distinct 
trend, was made up of migrants who would arrive with their families from the start 
or who would quickly bring them in to the receiving country (Gmaj 2016). Generally, 
such migrants have a higher educational background, their position on the labour 
market is also better and their perception of Norway as a welfare state is broader and 
relates to the life chances of their children, too.11 Thus, with the extension of their 
stay in Norway, the perception has expanded to include the dimension of the work–
life balance, and, within the family context, a reflection about the consequences of 
either staying or returning for the future of their children (Gmaj 2016; Iglicka et al. 
2018). First of all, they become aware that, if their children start to attend school in 
Norway, the family will probably stay for a longer period of time. Adam12 (8 years 
in Norway), one of the fathers interviewed, stressed that it ‘would be hard’ for his 
daughters to change school where they have friends and also to get used to a 
different educational system. Knowing Polish school from his own experiences, he 
9 There is also, of course, a range of other migration reasons – e.g. family matters, marriage or 
quality of life in the receiving country; nevertheless, labour migration is the dominant type among 
Polish migrants (e.g. Huang et al. 2015).
10 Existing research shows a worse situation for migration workers in that respect. In the case of 
Polish migrants, the instability of employment, pay discrimination, failure to comply with OHS 
(Occupational Health and Safety) rules or gender-related opportunities on the labour market are 
indicated (Engebrigtsen et al. 2017). Simultaneously, migrants point to activities of the Norwegian 
Tax Administration, or Skatteetaten, which persecutes dishonest employers, while stressing that 
these are conspicuous but not common cases. A major proportion of Polish migrants declare that 
they enjoy favourable and stable forms of employment (Huang et al. 2015).
11 This statement was confirmed by most of our respondents (see also Gmaj 2016; Huang 
et al. 2015).
12 The names of all respondents have been anonymised.
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was convinced there would be ‘big obstacles and curriculum differences’. So, as 
Huang et al. (2015) point out, sending a child to a Norwegian school is one of the 
most important reasons for staying longer or even for settling in Norway. The other 
perspective is the calculation of life chances. Sabina (6 years in Norway) and her 
husband decided that their son, ‘who was bilingual and in general felt good here’, 
had greater opportunities in Norway – by which they understood the possibility of 
studying at a good university and obtaining a better career in the future.
When migrant children start at a Norwegian school, the parents’ first concern is 
how well they will cope with the new situation. Their worries relate to their children 
not possessing sufficient Norwegian and not adapting to the school environment due 
to their migratory background. They appreciate, therefore, the language support for 
children – like, for instance, introductory classes or a native language teacher. They 
stress the importance of individual assistance for children which, in their case, is 
especially needed at the early stage of learning the language, as Jan (7 years in 
Norway) explains about his daughter, A.:
Of course, the beginnings were quite hard, because she started to learn Norwegian in kin-
dergarten then, on the first or second day, we got a phone call that we had to go to pick up 
the child, because she was crying horribly (…). And one of the tutors, such an old lady, 
very, very patient, would sit her on her lap and teach her Norwegian words. After two weeks 
there were no problems at all and next, it just went on smoothly. So, there weren’t any 
problems or complaints or issues with A.
Parents also appreciate the Norwegian schools for the reduced burdens imposed 
on their children. Cyryl (14 years in Norway) stresses that ‘they [the pupils] are not 
graded here’ [in primary school]. He is not sure in which year grading begins – he 
thinks the third or fifth grade13 – but he perceives the fact that it is impossible for the 
child to fail as an advantage. Some parents rate the school curriculum positively, 
likewise with the emphasis put on the ability to take care of themselves. Sabina 
admits that ‘they [Norwegians] bring up children differently here’ and emphasises 
that her son, in his first school year, ‘beautifully learnt how to prepare food’. She 
compares this with her own experiences with Polish kindergarten14 where every-
thing was served and, therefore, believes that the Norwegian educational system is 
more focused on practical skills. Other parents value the fact that the curricula are 
not overloaded compared to Polish schools and that children are also taught empa-
thy and encouraged to express their emotions, talk about them and try to understand 
them. Some of the respondents pointed out that this will probably produce better 
learning results than the larger number of hours spent at school and the intense pres-
sure to succeed found in Polish schools.
With time their opinions tend to become more nuanced. What at first seemed like 
an advantage (the curricula or the way of teaching and learning) later raise concerns 
13 In fact it is from eighth grade. This quote demonstrates that migrant parents are familiar with the 
system only to a certain degree – there are things that they do not yet know.
14 The respondent is referring to the pre-school period because her child, who in Norway has 
already started attending school, would still have been in kindergarten in Poland, where school 
attendance is mandatory from age seven, although it is possible for a six-year-old to attend.
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and sometimes criticism. The respondents, like Kornelia (8 years in Norway) are 
also used to comparing the requirements in Norwegian schools to those in Poland 
(at least as far as they can remember or have been told by relatives):
The educational system, well… far behind, but I won’t say behind who. If P. [daughter] had 
come here at the age of 10, she would have been a year or two ahead of her peers. My 
brother is a year older than P. and is a fourth-grader [in Poland] and the maths curriculum 
is at a much higher level; they here… I don’t know… have a different level of teaching and 
educational system.
The comparisons quoted relate to a very important aspect concerning the attitude 
towards school or, namely, aspirations. Kornelia expressed the concerns of many 
Polish parents who expect a high level of teaching, often identified as a good quality 
education. They hope for good school results and, if possible, special achievements 
(e.g. winning school competitions etc.) because they equate these with increasing 
the life chances of their children. The equality and inclusiveness at school that 
migrants favourably assess at the stage of entering the educational system, when 
later confronted with their aspirations, become an obstacle (Ślusarczyk 2019; 
Ślusarczyk and Pustułka 2016). Referring to Norwegian schooling, Polish parents 
thus asked themselves if was ‘good’ or, rather, if the level of transferred knowledge 
would provide their child with the opportunity to go to a good secondary school and 
university and then on to a well-paid job. If the answer was negative they tended to 
seek solutions which would increase their children’s educational chances. 
Confronted with Norwegian society and its school system, migrant parents appreci-
ate the egalitarianism and inclusiveness and accept the language or integrational 
support but would also like to ‘equip’ their children with extra skills or 
competences.
Moreover Polish migrant parents, in their first years in the receiving country, do 
not fully understand the Norwegian concept of education, which assumes a deeper 
parental involvement in the life of the school (e.g. organising extracurricular activi-
ties, participating in voluntary work or actively taking part in friendship groups). 
They do not see these as activities that are beneficial to the children but as additional 
burdens. Patrycja (17 years in Norway) refers here to a fundamental argument often 
put forward by Polish immigrants – since she works hard, the school should not and 
could not demand too much from her. Part of this reasoning is also due to the fact 
that, in the Polish educational system, neither intense parental involvement nor 
socialising with other parents is expected.15 With time, however, ‘for the sake of 
15 The role of the parent is still seen as quite passive although the education law creates a space for 
home–school collaboration (Banasiak 2013; Mendel 2002; Zbróg 2011). Parental committees 
sometimes contribute to the cost of investment and occasionally carry out any necessary renova-
tions etc. or provide support with regard to organising school excursions or events but only a few 
parents are interested in being a member of such a committee (Ślusarczyk 2010). There is also very 
limited parental interest and willingness to partake in shaping the school’s curriculum, lesson 
plans, etc. (though some schools do involve parents in these decisions). The parents’ involvement 
also depends on many other factors, especially their socio-economic status and social milieu. 
There are also huge differences between public and private schools where, in the latter, parents can 
sometimes influence the whole process of schooling. Still, as most of our respondents confirm, 
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their children’ (Malwina, 11 years in Norway) migrant parents become more and 
more involved and have an opportunity to gradually accept or follow the expecta-
tions of actions of solidarity aimed at having the best school possible. An example 
could be Antonina (24 years in Norway), who now runs sporting activities at school. 
Magda (8 years in Norway) helps with all school events and Malwina was, for some 
time, engaged as a native language teacher.
5.6.2  Increasing Life Chances – Parents’ 
Supplementary Strategies
Despite entering the Norwegian educational system, Polish migrants in Norway 
remain in a transnational complex of relationships, references and beliefs. When 
calculating the life chances of their children, they measure staying in Norway 
against a potential return to Poland or migrating to another country. This means that 
they tend to transfer solutions from Poland – or those applied in a competitive sys-
tem – into the realities of school in Norway, since migrants would then benefit from 
both what they receive under the welfare-state approach – egalitarianism and inclu-
siveness – and from the additional resources with which they would ‘equip’ their 
children. The basic solution here requires permanent interference in the learning 
process of the child and the expectation of achievement. One of the mothers inter-
viewed told us how she had to look on the Internet for additional homework exer-
cises for her daughter who, according to her, ‘was not sufficiently stimulated’ at her 
Norwegian school. She also said that the school ‘just undermined’ her daughter’s 
capabilities and did not benefit her at all and she regretted that the Norwegian school 
did not encourage pupils to take part in international competitions like ‘Kangourou 
Sans Frontières’.16 Finally, she moved her daughter to an international school as she 
considered it to be more supportive and more responsive to her daughter’s needs.
Another interviewee, Agata (4 years in Norway), did not change her daughter’s 
school but was actively pushing for her daughter to achieve the best results possi-
ble – doing her homework with her and sometimes even for her. She admitted that 
‘it was not that fair; perhaps the other children had written it on their own’ but all 
she wanted was to help her daughter. She was anxious about her daughter’s school 
results and tried to motivate her to work more by repeatedly telling her she was good 
but could be even better if she tried harder.
In their efforts to increase their children’s educational opportunities, Polish 
migrant parents also seek solutions outside the school system, such as educational 
camps or summer schools in Poland (especially focused on Polish 
Polish migrants come to Norway with the conviction that family and school operate as quite sepa-
rate institutions.
16 Kangourou sans Frontières is an international association founded in France to support the 
teaching of mathematics in schools and to promote a positive perception of the subject. Its most 
popular activity is the annual Kangaroo Mathematics Competition.
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language-learning) or attending Polish Saturday schools in Norway.17 This fits into 
a strategy of navigating resources locally and across borders to increase the sense of 
safety and their life chances in the case of children (Levitt et  al. 2017). Jan, for 
example, sent her daughter for the summer holidays to Poland and part of that time 
was devoted to studying to ‘brush up both her Polish and English’. Helena (17 years 
in Norway), in turn, urged her daughters to attend a Polish language summer school 
at a Polish university because the additional language meant better results at their 
Norwegian school and greater opportunities during the university recruitment pro-
cess or ‘sometime at work’. According to her, it is a strategy pursued by many 
families:
The parents explain it saying ‘Listen, you’ll pass a Polish language examination here and 
you’ll have it on your school certificate and it’s simply an additional foreign language, 
right, and you’re a certified user of it’. So they are working hard here to get such grades and 
those ambitious children pass those examinations here and she already wants to do that now.
Migrant parents admit that this strategy is sometimes quite difficult. While 
younger children are happy to attend the supplementary school as they can meet 
other Polish children and play together, older children are less willing to continue 
their Polish education. Ela (17 years in Norway) told us that her daughter com-
plained a lot that she had to spend Saturday18 at school but her mother felt that it was 
worth it because ‘maybe someday it will be useful for her’. On the one hand, this 
can be perceived as an example of Collins’ ‘escaping forward’ but, on the other, it 
could also be an example of how migrants navigate their resource environments 
(Levitt et al. 2017). In order to secure her child’s future, the migrant uses various 
elements of the ‘package of protection’ to which she has access. Another inter-
viewee, Kaja (4 years in Norway) followed the same strategy. As she admitted, at 
that time she had no intention of returning to Poland but wanted her son to learn 
Polish because they ‘did not know how it [the dice] would roll in the future’ – per-
haps her family would have to return to Poland or her ‘son would like to study in 
Poland’. Helena, cited above, emphasised that, after the crisis period had passed, 
her daughter found the schooling useful for her future, her mother describing it as 
‘a new way of thinking’.
5.7  Conclusions
Do Polish migrant parents resort only to using the assumptions of the welfare state 
in the area of education – egalitarianism and inclusiveness – when designing for 
themselves national and transnational strategies for gaining resources for their chil-
dren? The education system acts like a magnifying glass, showing the Nordic 
17 The most important reasons here are to preserve a link to the sending society, to maintain family 
ties or to foster national identity but there is also a utilitarian motive.
18 In most Polish supplementary schools in Norway, classes take place on Saturdays.
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welfare model with its key principles of social solidarity, freedom, equality, co-
operation and mutuality. However, as we have seen, in the case of migrant parents 
one of the key issues is the assessment of the education system and educational 
opportunities in both the country of destination and of origin. Certain ideas and pat-
terns known from the country of origin are confirmed and strengthened by transna-
tional practices and how they function in the transnational social field. Relationships 
with children and parents in Poland or the community of origin and the exchange of 
experiences and judgements cause migrant parents to constantly draw comparisons 
between the two systems. At the same time, due to their experiences of the post- 
Communist transformational period in Poland, with its many years of high unem-
ployment and an unstable labour market, these parents tended to build strategies for 
increasing their children’s life chances. They perceive the education system as a key 
factor in achieving this goal and treat it as a valuable resource. Yet they understand 
education not as a good that should be equally accessible and granted to all children 
but, rather, as limited capital. As a result, a position of rivalry becomes the preferred 
attitude, with the focus on the benefits to their own children. The parents’ attitude 
towards the school system is – especially in the first years – somewhat pragmatic 
and individualistic rather than cooperative.
May it thus be summarised that, in general, Polish migrant parents show less 
involvement in the life of the school and treat it instead as a service? Our findings 
demonstrate that their lack or lower level of engagement may be caused by their 
unfamiliarity with the Norwegian education system and their expectations of school. 
Polish assumptions are transferred onto Norwegian schools, especially the convic-
tion that the lives of the family and of the school lie in separate spheres of reality. At 
the same time, these parents have been willing to co-operate primarily because of 
their children – so as not to harm them. Moreover, living in a transnational space, 
they learn to navigate resources accessible in both countries in order to receive and 
provide social protection (Levitt et al. 2017). Finally, to a certain extent, it is – as our 
narrative demonstrates – simply that both the passage of time and their increasing 
integration into Norwegian society reveal that the migrant parents’ approach may be 
subject to change.
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Chapter 6
Settling for Welfare? Shifting Access 
to Welfare, Migration and Settlement 




Japan provides a compelling case for interrogating the relationship between wel-
fare, migration and citizenship for several reasons. Firstly, its declining fertility rate 
and rapid ageing bear implications for the budgetary allocation of social provision. 
These demographic changes, coupled with a stagnating economy, pose a challenge 
to Japan’s capacity to provide for the welfare of its elderly and ensure the overall 
well-being of its families (Sano and Yasumoto 2014, 319). Second, ageing brings 
about ambivalence in the life chances of future Japanese citizens, while the rising 
cost of raising children affects Japan’s desirability as a place of permanent settle-
ment for migrant families. Thirdly, as the working-age population declines, Japan 
must induce the employment of its young and female members (as well as migrants) 
who will bear the brunt of the welfare system. Such social change may undermine 
the hard lines of gendered labour. Fourth, the slow but steadily rising number of 
immigrants raising their Japan-born children – as single mothers or as parents in a 
mixed family  – invokes questions about social citizenship and welfare 
accessibility.
Building on interviews with and the life narratives of Filipina single mothers in 
Tokyo, this qualitative study examines how various kinds of social support impact 
on their migration aspirations and trajectories in and beyond Japan. It does so 
through analysing their welfare resource environment (Righard 2008), looking into 
their access to public social protection across the life course in relation to the family 
provisions available in Japan (and in the Philippines to some extent), the responsi-
bilities commensurate with social benefits and their perceived inclusion in or exclu-
sion from Japanese society. Lastly, the study discusses the extent to which receiving 
social protection across borders influences the migration and settlement aspirations 
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of Filipino immigrants. The remainder of this chapter introduces the context of 
immigration and welfare support in Japan, discusses theoretical concepts, research 
methods and data and summarises the findings.
6.2  Immigration and Welfare in Japan
The steadily declining birth rates and rapidly greying population have raised pro-
found questions about the future of work and family life in Japan. Yet Japan remains 
reluctant to open its borders and support the permanent settlement of immigrants, 
whose numbers account for 3% of the total population (Ministry of Justice 2019). 
Japan’s restrictive immigration regime has left migrants with relatively few ways of 
entering the country; these few ways take the form of family migration (by marrying 
a Japanese national), student migration or migration into the business sector, under 
all of which pressure the newcomer to assimilate into Japanese cultural practices 
and norms is high (Liu-Farrer 2014).
In April 2019, the right-wing government under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
resolved to accept thousands of migrant workers in order to address the labour 
shortages in 11 industries or sectors, including nursing (Rich 2018). This recent 
immigration decision, however, drew mixed reactions from the public and civil 
society. With Japan’s ‘revolving door’ disposition towards migrants, the govern-
ment continues to face the challenge of fully integrating its foreign residents and 
recognising their broadening social roles (Takao 2003, 552). On the contrary, the 
general Japanese population holds fairly positive perceptions about immigration. 
According to the 2018 Global Attitudes Survey, for instance, the majority of 
Japanese respondents viewed immigrants more as contributing to job skills and the 
talent pool of the country (59%) than as being a social burden in terms of access to 
jobs and social benefits (31%) (Stokes and Devlin 2018). The study, however, does 
not account for whether these attitudes concern only migrant workers or are relevant 
to permanent foreign residents as well.
Filipinos constitute a group of permanent migrant residents in Japan. The bubble 
economy of Japan in the 1980s stimulated an increased migration of Filipina 
migrants (or Filipinas) in response to the growing demand for sexualised and repro-
ductive labour. They are identified as either hanayome (brides) to Japanese men in 
rural areas or Japayuki (bound for Japan) entertainers working in Japan’s booming 
nightlife districts. By raising families with Japanese nationals, most Filipina 
migrants have settled in Japan permanently. Permanent residency is made available 
to immigrants who have been in Japan for 10 years, while long-term residence is 
bestowed on migrant women who are granted legal custody over their child with a 
Japanese father (Ishii 2005; also cited in Celero 2017, 196) who recognises such a 
decision. The number of Filipinas with a long-term residence permit (on the basis of 
having Japanese-born children) increased from 37,870 in 2010 to 51,097 in 2018, 
while the number of permanent residents rose from 92,754 to 128,446 during the 
same period (Ministry of Justice 2018).
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However, not all Japanese-Filipino marriages were successful and not all 
Filipinas married in Japan. There are one million Japanese and non-Japanese single- 
headed households (mostly single mothers) in Japan, marking a 50% increase 
between 1992 and 2016 (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 2016). As parents 
to Japanese-born children, some Filipina migrants are eligible for a number of social 
support programmes. Developed largely after World War II, Japan’s social welfare 
system consists of various monetary, service and other provisions primarily target-
ing poor and vulnerable members of its population (Furukawa 2008; Komatsubara 
2012; Miyamoto 2003). With its limited welfare state, Japan has always under- 
prioritised its social policy (Holliday 2000). Amid its steadily ageing population, 
Japan only began to allocate 20% of its GDP for public social spending on elderly 
care and healthcare in the early 2010s (OECD 2012).  
The legal framework for Japan’s welfare system is called ‘Six Social Welfare 
Laws’ and consists of the Daily Life Protection Law, the Child Welfare Law, the 
Mother with Dependent and Widow Protection Law, the Welfare Law for the Aged, 
the Law for the Welfare of Physically Handicapped Persons and the Law for the 
Welfare of Mentally Disordered Persons (JICA 2009; Koijima 2011). All single 
parents are entitled to the universal Child Allowance (CA). Single parents who pass 
income tests can also receive the Child-Rearing Allowance (CRA), which amounts 
to 41,720 Japanese Yen or JPY (approx. US$ 380) per child per month and is paid – 
if the parent’s annual income is less than JPY 1.3 million (US$ 11,900) – until the 
year in which the child turns 18 years old (Komatsubara 2012). This allowance is 
paid for partly by the national government and, since 2006, the prefecture and the 
municipal government (Komatsubara 2012). Factors that shape access to the CRA 
include the number of children and the age of the parent. While paid together with 
a much-reduced CA, child support payments are time-bound and can only be used 
to supplement the family’s income (Ezawa and Fujiwara 2005).
The total decline of the fertility rate to a record low of 1.57 in 1989 prompted the 
Japanese government to shift the goal of social policies from being family-oriented 
to achieving a work–life balance, further enhancing childcare services (Abe et al. 
2003; Ikezoe 2014; Komatsubara 2012). The Angel Plan, among other measures, 
tripled the number of daycare services and child-minding centres, from about 2000 
to 7000 across the country (Boling 1998). Reforms were introduced to the social 
welfare system in 2000, shifting from administrative to contract-based welfare 
arrangements, with the national government obliging local government units (cities, 
towns and villages) to be more involved in welfare planning (JICA 2009). 
Consequently, daycare centres grew exponentially and gave more options for work-
ing mothers although the privately run ones tend to cost more and are of better qual-
ity than government-funded types (Abe et  al. 2003). By 2015, the number of 
childcare facilities had increased to 24,234, of which 15,380 were privately and 
8854 publicly funded (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 2015).
In the absence of a male provider, single mothers without their own income can 
also apply for public assistance, known as the Living Subsidy Allowance (seikatsu 
hogo). The Living Subsidy Allowance (LSA) supports all residents (regardless of 
gender, nationality and economic status) in meeting and maintaining minimum 
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standards of living and achieving socio-economic freedom (Aoki and Aoki 2005; 
Ezawa and Fujiwara 2005; Furukawa 2008). Living subsidy recipients obtain pro-
tection from poverty and inequality through securing assistance in eight categories 
of need: a basic living allowance to cover food, clothing and utilities, housing costs, 
compulsory education, medical care, elderly care, the cost of giving birth, skills 
training and funerals (Komatsubara 2012; OECD 2012). In exchange, these recipi-
ents are encouraged to work in order to lead a decent and independent life. The 
number of households on public assistance went up from 1.27 million in 2009 to 
1.64 million in 2017, indicating rising incidences of household poverty in the coun-
try, with single-parent households of a single mother and her children below 
18 years old reaching almost 93,000 (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 2017).
In the post-World War II period, the living subsidy allowance was available 
solely to all Japanese citizens in accordance with the Daily Life Protection Law. In 
1954, following the local governments’ humanitarian decision to give support to 
foreign residents in need, the scheme began assisting ‘special permanent and per-
manent residents, spouses of permanent foreign residents or Japanese nationals, and 
those who received refugee status from the government’ (Ezawa and Fujiwara 
2005). Preferential grants and the allocation of public housing (danchi) were like-
wise extended to low-income or single-parent families.
Despite the Japanese government’s efforts to promote inclusivity within the wel-
fare system, the gradual diversification of welfare schemes further reinforced social 
inequality, disaggregating Japanese citizens and non-citizens and, at the same time, 
producing hierarchical categories of welfare dependents whose usage is contingent 
upon their migrant (vis-à-vis non-migrant) and socio-economic status. In her study, 
Celero (2014), for example, explained that Filipino mothers on public welfare 
formed a group of living-subsidy recipients situated on the lowest rung of Japan’s 
dual social hierarchy. On the first level, citizens and migrants on living-subsidy sup-
port are situated below those who are not on welfare and paying taxes and are able 
to maintain high standards of living. On the second level are migrant groups who 
access different kinds of welfare support.
6.3  Theoretical Framework
To provide a structured analysis for this study, I used welfare, transnational social 
protection, the life course and im/mobility as conceptual tools, Carling’s aspiration/
ability model as the theoretical reference and the life-course model as the basis for 
my analytical design.
Welfare is understood here as a set of policies, practices and relations that are 
central to the management of the subject population and their conduct (Clarke 2002, 
cited in Morgen and Maskovsky 2003, 321). As an extension of governmentality, 
welfare policies in general are designed to promote equality, social inclusion and 
well-being (Kotkas and Veitch 2017, cited in Atac and Rosenberger 2018, 3). Access 
to social welfare is a function of one’s citizenship or membership in the nation state. 
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In other words, social-welfare benefits are entitlements based on a person’s social 
citizenship. Social citizenship, according to Turner (2008) designates a dual process 
of inclusion that entails the redistribution of resources and exclusion marked by the 
formation of strong identities based on assumptions about ethnicity, gender and 
class. People can access social support through specific contributions made to soci-
ety, such as activities of social reproduction – giving birth – child-rearing and main-
taining a household. Capturing the constitutive relationship between welfare 
systems and human migration, the concept of transnational social protection is use-
ful for describing the ways in which migrants knit together their own and their fami-
lies’ social protection from different sources located across the borders of nation 
states (Levitt et al. 2018). De Jong and de Valk (2019) likewise recommend paying 
attention to the welfare systems in the countries of both origin and destination. I 
argue that migration, along with the change in migrants’ socio-economic status, 
legal status, residency and social networks, affects the welfare arrangements and the 
degree to which migrants participate in social reproduction and other obligations.
The analytical approach used for these data is that of the life course, giving 
salience to the intersectionality of life events, time, risk and uncertainty with inter-
action in the analysis of social and demographic change (Willekens 1999). Emerging 
from the field of developmental psychology, the life-course approach has gained 
traction in international migration research, recognising that migrants are embedded 
in societies and social processes across borders and that migration is integral to 
people’s lives over time (Bailey 2009; De Jong and de Valk 2019; Wingens et al. 
2012). By examining the ‘continuities, twists, and turns in individual lives’ 
(Hutchison 2018, 8), a life-course approach in research emphasises the social 
agency of humans navigating systems of opportunities and risks while making life 
choices and constructing life journeys. In the context of this study, a life-course 
approach is useful in presenting the major migrant life transitions through which 
Filipinas seek different social provisions from their changing resource environment 
in order to better organise their migrant family lives. Building on these life events 
related to marriage, family formation and employment helps us to understand how 
the migration and settlement aspirations of Filipina immigrants are influenced by 
their life experiences, relationships and interactions with both Japanese and Filipino 
society.
In addition, this study engages with Carling’s aspiration/ability model to theo-
retically explain the inextricable relationship between migrants’ access to welfare 
support and their life-course events, migration and settlement decisions and trajec-
tories. In his aspiration/ability model, Carling (2002) theorises that im/mobility is 
shaped by at least three conditions: (1) opportunities for legal migration from devel-
oping to industrialised nations, (2) labour migration as a fundamental characteristic 
of developing economies and societies and (3) the increasing number of people 
leading transnational lives, relations and everyday activities in two or more nations. 
Despite the emphasis given to involuntary immobility – i.e. aspiring to migrate but 
unable to do so – and the greater preference of migration over non-migration, the 
aspiration/ability model acknowledges the dynamic interaction between structure 
and the social agency of migrants and recognises that such interactions become 
6 Settling for Welfare? Shifting Access to Welfare, Migration and Settlement…
92
more complex over time, resulting in a range of available migration pathways 
(Carling and Schewel 2018). The present research shows that, whereas some 
Filipina immigrants are likely to settle in Japan, others plan to return to the 
Philippines in the future; such aspirations, however, are contingent upon the con-
tinuous evaluation of macro- and personal-level factors. At the macro level, they are 
affected by the restrictive nature of immigration, labour and the welfare policies of 
the Japanese government as well as the ambivalent acceptance of migrants in 
Japanese society. On the other hand, individual-based factors such as legal status, 
residency and social networks variously impact on the socio-economic roles and 
everyday individual- and family-related activities and bonds that they forge over 
time in Japan and the Philippines.
This chapter therefore examines how Filipina immigrants’ access to and use of 
social-welfare protection shapes their aspirations to move and settle in Japan and 
how such decisions are embedded in their life course. It analyses how using a range 
of welfare services may influence the extent of their commitment to society/societ-
ies as members and how these commitments can transform their aspirations and 
abilities to move across time, between spaces and among immigrants.
6.4  Research Methods and Data
The data are derived from informal and semi-structured interviews with 70 Filipino 
mothers raising Japanese-Filipino children in Tokyo. I followed their families from 
2010 to 2019, through either face-to-face or online communication. The respon-
dents were recruited through the snowball technique and personal networks. The 
interviews, which lasted 2–3  h depending on the openness of respondents, were 
aimed at collecting their life narratives by addressing their migration, education and 
family background and the economic activities and social services received in 
Japan. The interviews were conducted using a mix of English, Filipino and Japanese 
languages. In addition, three focus-group discussions with four members each were 
organised in 2015 and 2016 with Filipinas who are permanent residents in Yokohama 
and Tokyo. Finally, follow-up interviews were conducted in 2019 in Tokyo and its 
immediate environs to get updated information about the family and the economic 
status of 15 respondents and key informants.
Table 6.1 shows the profile of Filipina respondents in this research according to 
their family background and socio-economic status. Concerning their status upon 
entry to Japan in relation to education, most of the Filipino interviewees were former 
entertainers (42), with some college education (41). Their civil statuses also vary, 
with majority of them being either divorced (33) or married (29) at the time of inter-
view. According to residency status, 54 of my respondents were permanent residents 
at the time of interview, and 43 of them resided in Japan for more than 20 years.
Table 6.2, meanwhile, shows the family and socio-economic characteristics of 
Filipinas in my study. As illustrated, there were 41 single parents in my sample. 
Single parenthood is defined broadly herein as the absence of a male spouse 
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supporting the household. The composition of their family is diverse owing to social 
factors such as divorce, the lack of a marriage, re-marriage, the death of and/or sepa-
ration from a Japanese spouse and the re-unification with or separation from one’s 
children. Consequently, their socio-economic status forms a spectrum of socio-eco-
nomic activities in relation to the Japanese labour market and business and welfare 
service sectors.
Table 6.1 Profile of Filipina respondents in Japan
Age 
































N.A. Widow (3) N.A.
Table 6.2 Family and socio-economic profile of Filipina respondents
Description Number
Structure
 1. Dual parent 29
 2. Single parent 41
Composition
 1. Japanese father, Filipino mother, Japanese-Filipino child 20
 2. Japanese father, Filipino mother, left-behind child/adopted child from the 
Philippines, Japanese-Filipino child
4
 3. Filipino mother, Japanese-Filipino child 25
 4. Filipino mother, left-behind child in the Philippines, Japanese-Filipino child 10
 5. Japanese father (remarried), Filipino mother, Japanese stepchildren, Japanese- 
Filipino child
4
 6. Japanese father, Filipino mother (remarried), Japanese-Filipino child 4
 7. Filipino mother, Filipino husband, Japanese-Filipino child 2




 1. Full-time job (parent, child, both) 17
 2. Part-time job (parent, child, both) 20
 3. Business 12
 4. (Previously/currently) on living subsidy allowance 10
 5. On child-rearing allowance 19
 6. On child allowance 22
 7. Owns government housing 8
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At the time of interview, 17 respondents were employed full-time, while 20 were 
engaged in part-time jobs in factories, homes for the elderly, laundries, hotels and 
other service-related companies. Twelve of the women interviewed owned their 
own business, such as an ethnic store, restaurant, bar  and beauty salon. From 
business- owners to welfare-dependents (Higuchi 2011; Tenegra 2004), the varying 
socio-economic roles of the Filipino migrants are intimately tied to the life transi-
tions that they go through while leading a migrant family in Japan. The following 
section elaborates on this relationship.
6.5  Filipina Mothers’ Transnational Social Protection
While their welfare environment consists mostly of state, third-sector and personal 
sources, the Japanese government provides the largest proportion of support for 
many of the Filipinas in my study. Notwithstanding, the role of migrant support 
organisations as cultural, language and legal brokers is vital to the Filipina migrants’ 
ability to access the wide range of family and childcare services that the Japanese 
government provides. At the same time, some Filipina respondents outsourced 
information, economic resources and care to their personal networks and extended 
family in the Philippines in order to reconfigure their family life in Japan.
This section takes a life-course approach (De Jong and de Valk 2019) to present-
ing the link between welfare arrangements and Filipino mothers’ major life-course 
events such as divorce, single parenthood and employment. It investigates the rela-
tionship between structural factors such as immigration, labour and welfare regimes 
that determine the barriers to and opportunities for social support, host-society atti-
tudes towards migrants and individual factors such as legal status, residency and 
social networks as resources for activating social agency. I centre my analysis on 
three major transitions that influenced the lives of my informants in Japan: from 
marriage to divorce, from a nuclear to a single-parent family and from part- to full- 
time employment and home-ownership. During the interviews, the living subsidy, 
child benefit, child-rearing allowance and government housing were identified as 
major forms of social protection received from the Japanese government, services 
which were combined with private arrangements with the families in the Philippines.
6.5.1  Marriage to Divorce
Experiences of physical abuse, marital dispute and separation often led to 
divorce, based on the life stories of 33 of the 70 informants in this study. In terms of 
their residency status in the country, these divorced women were initially living in 
Japan either on a spouse visa or on a permanent resident permit due to marriage. 
Having a Japan-born child allowed the divorced Filipina mothers to secure the long-
term residency necessary for remaining and raising their child in Japan. Prior to 
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getting divorced, some respondents stated that they knew nothing about the social-
welfare system of Japan due to the language barrier. Since most mothers rely on 
their husband and in-laws to access information and support (Ito 2005), divorce 
often meant a severe economic loss. As a result, many of them, such as 43-year-old 
Lydia (on the living-subsidy allowance) relied largely on Filipino migrant support 
organisations for assistance in securing government support.
When I divorced my husband, I sought the assistance of an NGO who helped me to look for 
a lawyer because I needed to acquire full child custody rights. Without their assistance, it 
would have been hard to fight in court because my Japanese language ability was lim-
ited then.
Many of my respondent acquired their first public-assistance support after 
divorce or separation from their Japanese spouse. Some of them also benefitted 
from the information and emotional support of their migrant friends. The period in 
which they relied on the living allowance was determined by factors such the age of 
their children, the state of their health, their residency status and the size of the fam-
ily. Lia came to Japan as an entertainer in 1991. Before her third contract expired in 
1993, she had decided to marry her Japanese boyfriend whom she had met at work. 
When she gave birth in 1996 to their son, however, they began to have marital prob-
lems. Her husband became abusive and rarely helped to take care of their baby. On 
the advice of her close friend in Tokyo, she planned her escape in 1998, memorising 
the right trains and buses departing from her town and heading to Tokyo. On arriv-
ing safely in Tokyo, her friends helped her to file for divorce and apply for the 
living- subsidy allowance. Except for clothes, she had nothing to declare at the office 
when undergoing means tests to prove her eligibility. After a few weeks, her case-
worker found an apartment for her where she and her child could start family life 
anew. She also found a job at the lunchbox factory where her friend worked.
Unlike Lia, who secured permanent resident status prior to separating from her 
spouse, other Filipina respondents in this study once had an undocumented status 
which could have hindered their access to welfare support and trigger return migra-
tion to the Philippines. Through the assistance of an NGO in central Tokyo, Nerisa 
obtained a long-term residence permit and consequently living-subsidy support in 
2010, a week after her partner’s sudden death. Unable to read Japanese and with a 
5-year-old daughter to raise alone, she described this event as the darkest phase in 
her life. She had to file for long-term residency in order to stay in Japan, fearing 
deportation and eventual separation from her Japan-born child. The NGO provided 
her with language and legal support to fill out all the necessary documents prior to 
undergoing means tests. Depending on the Living Subsidy Allowance or LSA, she 
had to take care of her child full-time. Receiving JPY 170,000 (US$ 1500) a month 
would have been enough to raise her only child but with an aging mother and a child 
left behind in Manila, she had to endure sending them JPY 30,000 (US$ 278) for 
2 years. Unable to access daycare, she had to wait for her child to reach primary- 
school age before she could return to work and increase the remittances.
While the LSA has enabled Filipina recipients to head up a nuclear household 
following divorce, family separation or the death of a partner, the stigmas attached 
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to this welfare benefit have made them aware of its temporary nature. People receiv-
ing the LSA are stigmatised because this denotes helplessness and dependence in 
life and is often regarded as ‘stealing’ taxpayers’ money. In addition, most recipi-
ents are attributed a negative reputation for violating its terms through sending 
remittances and returning to the home country, leading an undesirable lifestyle or 
being reticent about finding a job despite their good physical health (Celero 2014). 
Being aware of the negative public discourse surrounding LSA and the persistent 
need to support Filipino kin, some respondents sought other welfare services such 
as public housing and day-care services in order to resume employment.
6.5.2  From a Nuclear to a Single-Parent Family
Changes in family composition caused by divorce affect Filipina’s capacity to rear 
their children. When they become divorced and single parents, only a few mothers 
strive to raise a child on their own in Japan because it entails huge costs. Thus, only 
25 of the Filipinas interviewed could afford to live as a mother-and-child household 
in Tokyo in the 1990s. Some had to leave their infant in the Philippines, while others 
had to deal with physical separation until their child reaches school age in order to 
overcome the burden of childcare. Access to social support and jobs was secured 
through the assistance of local ward offices, migrant support organisations, social 
networks or a combination of these agents, depending on the level of Japanese lan-
guage ability and their years of residence in Japan.
Having two sons to raise, Yolly (50, on child-rearing allowance) thought she did 
not need to get either of the two types of child allowance. A survivor of domestic 
violence, she took her children away from her philandering husband despite having 
a stable life with him. After running away, she sought the aid of their municipal 
ward office, which then assisted her in filing for divorce and seeking alimony as 
well as child support from the ex-husband. She realised a few things:
My ex-husband was really smart; he pledged to give child support to our kids on the condi-
tion that I divorce him. I should not have relied on his promise... He did not pay for spousal 
support and only pledged partial support for our kids... he would only support their educa-
tion. It’s a good thing that the municipal office told me I could get child allowance for my 
two kids. I receive a small amount every three months but for me it is enough. I believe my 
kids are my responsibility now and I have to work to give them better lives. I do not need to 
entrust their future to others. I must prove to my husband that I can make it without him.
Yolly represents those Filipinas in this study who may have benefitted from the 
CRA but only on a temporary basis and with a limited amount. At the time of the 
interview in 2011, she was working as a lending investor. Other recipients of the 
CRA in my study worked full- or part-time. Ezawa and Fujiwara (2005, 51) observe 
that, since child allowance is not a substitute wages, the government encourages 
mothers to seek paid jobs by placing their children in public day-care.
A second-generation Filipina born in Japan, Susan was only 19 years old when 
she gave birth to Yuki. She chose to move to an apartment in Sagamihara City in 
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south Tokyo, where day-care is more affordable. The city also provides financial 
assistance and resource materials on childcare to foreign residents (e.g. the Child 
Raising Handbook). Susan was able to pay JPY 23,000 (US$ 211) every month for 
day-care from her salary as part-time food shop staff. As a high-school graduate, her 
job options in Japan are limited. Co-residing with Dina, her mother, who had been 
living in Japan for 7 years before she was born, Susan manages childcare duties. 
They take turns in caring for Yuki; Susan tends her son while Dina is at work during 
the day. From early evening on, Dina takes charge of her grandchild while Susan 
goes to work in the shop.
Even married Filipinas mothers who are unable to access day-care due to its 
limited availability seek help from their Filipina neighbours, who can babysit for a 
small fee. Mothers like Nancy, aged 41 and on living-subsidy allowance, lent a hand 
to her Filipino neighbour while the latter worked at night. Nancy explains why she 
helps her friend:
My friend did not know it would take time for her son to get accepted for day-care and she 
has found work. When she asked me to look after her son, I could not say no to her because 
she is a Filipina, and we used to work together at the bar in the past. Yuta gets on with my 
Toshimi. Besides, I love taking care of kids.
Thus, a short-term, pseudo- or fictive kin system based on close friendship ties 
(Ebaugh and Curry 2000, 189) is vital when migrant women cope with shortages in 
childcare facilities and services across Japan. Most Filipino respondents relying on 
the LSA also applied for public housing to further reduce their financial burden. 
While waiting for the housing support, some mothers resolved the problem by send-
ing their children to the Philippines where their natal family performs child-rearing 
tasks in exchange for remittances.
6.5.3  From Part-Time to Full-Time Employment 
and Home-Ownership
The economic status of the Filipina immigrants in this study has shifted over the last 
four decades from that of entertainers to workers in the manufacturing, service, 
education and health-care sectors. In my own sample, 17 women have become full- 
time caregivers and assistant language teachers, 12 have endeavoured to run an 
ethnic store or a beauty salon, to buy and sell businesses or set up a home-based 
English language school, while 20 have remained part-time workers in factories, 
hotels and shops. The attainment of a secure economic position signals financial 
autonomy among Filipinas after years of living in Japan.
Contributing to this status, according to single-parent Filipinas, is the conve-
nience of owning a house in a city with a high cost of living like Tokyo. Public 
housing units are given to deserving applicants through a lottery. Lea and Cristy 
were former entertainers who had their names drawn in their respective ward offices 
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in a bid to acquire a public housing unit. Lea, 40, recalls below how she became a 
public housing (danchi) owner in 2004:
It took me seven years, though, to get a danchi. My friend encouraged me to keep following 
it up. Getting a house was life-changing for my son and me. Before, when I was still an 
entertainer, I had to send him frequently to the Philippines because I could not take care of 
him here. When I finally got this house, I was released from getting seikatsu hogo (LSA) 
and I now work in the daytime. I am happy about working for a company now and no longer 
being fed by the government. I have a better status than those who are on seikatsu hogo. I 
am proud… You know why? Most people think it is tough to get a house from the govern-
ment… I can now attend to Yuji’s schooling. I think it is my responsibility to guide my son...
As Hirayama and Ronald (2007, 23) emphasise, owning a house in Japan, regard-
less of whether or not it is gained through government assistance, brings a feeling 
of middle-classness among the Japanese. Similarly, Filipinas in this study empha-
sised the advantages of owning an actual house in Japan, which includes paying a 
low monthly rent and being able to manage family and work duties. Cristy (38, on 
LSA) said the following:
This [house] is truly a blessing and it gives me a sense of dignity. I am a domestic violence 
survivor and this house has helped me to regain my self-esteem. I now have a decent means 
of supporting my children; I don’t need a husband.
Both Lea and Cristy recognised how their lives have changed over time from 
being an entertainer, to a welfare support dependent and to a home-owner and full-
time employee. They have achieved a better socio-economic status compared to 
those stuck on LSA. Since 1998, Japan has introduced employment reforms such as 
flexible working hours, care leave and options to switch to part-time employment 
(Peng 2011). As a result, some Filipinas have been able to fulfil parental duties 
while doing a day job, reducing the likelihood of having to leave their children in 
the Philippines. Some Filipinas can afford to invite their mothers and siblings (typi-
cally sisters) over to Japan to assist with childcare, especially immediately after the 
birth. Those who cannot do so often opt to send their children to the Philippines for 
longer periods to save on childcare costs. Government housing enables some single 
mothers, however, to cope with the family and the difficulty of achieving a work–
life balance in Japan.
Acquiring public housing also allowed the majority of my respondents to quit 
night work and secure a day job – a turning point in their socio-economic lives. 
Engaging in paid work has enabled them to be in control of their family life since 
they only get minimal assistance through child allowance. Transitioning to full-time 
day jobs, along with securing long-term and permanent residency, is a marker of 
membership in Japanese society.
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6.6  To Settle or to Return? The Impact of Social Welfare 
on Filipinas’ Migration and Settlement Aspirations
Increasing numbers of Filipinas have become long-term and permanent residents in 
Japan recently; obtaining this residential status is a prerequisite for, rather than a 
consequence of, access to social protection. As Japan’s welfare system primarily 
targets families, Filipina single parents sought the requirements to qualify as social 
citizens in need of protection. They secured paternal recognition to legally stay and 
raise a child born out of wedlock in Japan, without which they may face deportation 
and separation from their Japanese child. They also gathered the necessary informa-
tion and legal documents to qualify for welfare support in return for fulfilling their 
social obligations, such as giving birth to, rearing and socialising future Japanese 
citizens (Celero 2014, 2017). If they construct generally positive views about receiv-
ing welfare services as well as towards the Japanese government, why do some 
Filipinas aspire for a more transnational life trajectory?
Most Filipinas in my research seemed to strongly prefer denizenship – i.e. per-
manent residence with a wide band of social and civil rights – to naturalisation, 
seeing the former as a flexible and utilitarian choice because it promotes legal 
mobility, an option they share with Korean and Chinese immigrants (Liu-Farrer 
2014). In their respective studies, both Liu-Farrer (2014) and Lee (2005) have 
observed this is common trend among immigrants in Japan who have achieved a 
socio-economic status over the years through gainful employment and transnational 
business, while naturalisation has been revealed as a legal strategy of many less- 
educated immigrants. In my own sample, Filipinas who have successfully graduated 
from the temporary phase of social welfare reliance, together with those who have 
thankfully never known poverty, are not keen on switching to Japanese citizenship 
and find it convenient to be a permanent resident, like Melissa, 50, who is in receipt 
of the child allowance:
I think I am a Filipino citizen for convenience only. But it is also tough to switch to Japanese 
citizenship because I already inquired about it before… I got lazy because you must declare 
everything, every single property you have, even your jewellery, your bags, expenses… it 
was quite troublesome for me to do. But if it were easy like in the US…. Currently, I hold 
a permanent residence visa... since I have not had any problems with visa processing and 
all. I do not see the importance of becoming a Japanese citizen.
Some Filipinas doubt other Filipinas’ intention to change their citizenship as 
requisite to seeking inclusion of their family through sharing citizenship with their 
Japan- born children. Others allude to ethno-nationalist sentiments when asked 
about their changing citizenship. They affirm their homeland affinity and belonging 
to the Philippines despite decades of living in Japan, as 52-year-old Sara (on child 
allowance) recognises:
I have friends who have already changed their citizenship because they are concerned about 
travelling abroad but, for me, changing citizenship is more than that. I cannot imagine 
myself not respecting our [Filipino] flag any more. I do not think that there is a problem 
with me staying here in Japan as a Filipina. My husband accepted me as a Filipina.
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As the narratives suggest, Filipinas’ preference for permanent residency fulfils 
their strategic intent to manage a transnational family and affirms their strong sense 
of ethnic and national belonging to the Philippines. Permanent residency is a more 
pragmatic choice through which to negotiate the problem, for single mothers with 
young children to raise, of settling in Japan and eventually returning to the 
Philippines; this return is characterised by conditions that revolve around the age of 
their children: ‘When the children are grown-ups’, ‘When I find a babysitter’, 
‘When I obtain permanent residence’ and ‘When I secure public housing’. The 
younger a person’s child, the more likely they are to depend on social support and 
to opt to stay on in Japan. The more inaccessible the childcare support in Japan, 
however, the more likely they are to outsource childcare in the Philippines in order 
to reorganise their economic situation in Japan. Access to a broad range of social 
welfare is less of an influence on their decision to settle than being socio- 
economically independent, even though they acknowledge its importance in over-
coming several family life contingencies, particularly in dealing with the absence of 
a spouse, as well as the requirements and challenges of raising children in a for-
eign land.
Another condition that intensifies the im/mobility dilemma is associated with 
migrants’ retirement plans. Most of my respondents in this study are now in their 
mid-40s to early 60s, indicating that Filipina immigrants in Japan are also becoming 
older. This demographic trait suggests the changing health status and economic 
activities in which they could engage in Japan. Those contemplating the timing of 
their return to the Philippines made mention of their savings as a ‘fallback’ solution 
in case they fail to overcome their reliance on social services in Japan. Such a con-
sideration reflects the transnational status paradox (Nieswand 2011) as an outcome 
of socio-economic inequality between Japan and the Philippines and Kabeer’s 
(2007) observation of female migrant workers from South-East Asia. Filipinas may 
simultaneously experience downward mobility due to their dependence on family- 
related welfare provision in Japan and upward social mobility thanks to the remit-
tances and care arrangements that they managed to pull together for their children 
and families who stayed behind in the Philippines. Other ageing Filipinas who have 
not managed to build up some savings back home may choose to settle in Japan 
because there are no clear prospects for their return, as Lia, 50 and on LSA, 
says here:
I do hope that they [the Japanese government] will not send me home because I am getting 
support. I can be anywhere. Here or there will do… it is either here or there. I never expected 
that I would last this long in Japan but, as the years go by… like last year I fell ill, I had an 
operation. I had to [get medical support]. But so far, the kids are here, I live in government 
housing… I am okay with permanent residency, so I am here for now.
As Ong’s (n.d.) study with ageing Filipinas suggests, getting older presents a 
new struggle for Filipina immigrants, who need to create positive subjectivity by 
continuously working in Japan to alleviate fears about becoming a burden on its 
ageing society while securing an acceptable standard of life for themselves and 




This paper has explained the links between the welfare access, migration and settle-
ment of Filipino immigrants in Japan. It has discussed the range of welfare arrange-
ments that they are able to access in the host country and the support which they 
seek from their birth families in the Philippines in order to organise their family and 
work lives through time and across borders.
Filipina immigrants constitute a group of mothers who have relied on a broad 
range of social protection over their life course. The most vulnerable phases of their 
migrant lives include divorce, single parenthood and struggles finding full-time 
employment. As they go through each of these life stages, Filipinas transition from 
being completely dependent upon the LSA to combining the child-rearing allow-
ance, day-care services and public housing. Acquiring a public housing unit, land-
ing a day job and managing both work and family life signifies social membership, 
owing to the greater degree of socio-economic freedom to maintain a transnational 
household which being a breadwinner and a caring parent at the same time gives 
them (Williams 1995). An integral aspect of the ongoing improvement in their 
socio-economic status and image in Japan is their collective and individual desire to 
break away completely from welfare support.
While they recognise its significance in helping them through episodes of contin-
gency and hardship in family life, Filipinas are not conveniently ‘magnetised’ by 
welfare, so much so that they will choose not to exchange their ethnic or national 
membership in order to obtain it. Having lived and worked for decades, they have 
attained permanent residency in Japan as a utilitarian choice popular among immi-
grant Filipinas who wish to keep their options for the future open. Filipino single 
mothers’ aspirations to return to the Philippines in the future or settle in Japan are 
contingent upon the age of their children, their savings and their dreams of a desir-
able retirement.
Whereas there is a hierarchy among Filipino migrant mothers on welfare, the 
various forms of support which they receive represent their continuing efforts to 
attain socio-economic autonomy both in Japan and in the Philippines. As Filipino 
women move from one form of welfare assistance to another, they attempt to de- 
marginalise themselves from the generally negative perception of them by Japanese 
society and to negotiate structural inequalities that render them vulnerable in certain 
life-course events owing to their being Filipina, a divorcee, a single parent and a 
low-skilled, part-time worker. As demographic and economic pressures loom large, 
it becomes imperative for Japan to rely extensively on its migrant, female and 
elderly populations. To govern its social citizens in the future, the state must guar-
antee that social protection adequately addresses shifting family forms and realities. 
Contributing towards overcoming these complex challenges will enable Filipina 
immigrants to further extend their life projects as moralised, transnational Filipinas.
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Throughout Europe, care is provided mostly within families, with public welfare 
provisions supporting and complementing these family efforts (Bettio and Plantenga 
2004). Notions such as ‘care deficit’1 (Hochschild 1995) or ‘crisis of care’ 
(Triandafyllidou 2013) describe care deficiencies within both families and public 
welfare systems. In the last two decades, care deficits in Western Europe have been 
fuelled by demographic and social transformations, such as population ageing, 
changes in household structures (where nuclear families no longer live with their 
extended families), welfare programme reforms and an altogether lower involve-
ment of the state in care provision (Leon 2014). These care deficits, particularly in 
high-income countries, have been addressed through, for instance, migrant labour 
which, in turn, contributes to increasing care needs in the migrants’ sending 
countries.
Previous studies on care mobility and care migration2 have analysed transna-
tional care practices and transnational families, as well as the ways in which 
migrants informally re-organise family care obligations in their home countries 
1 A ‘care deficit’ is seen as the result of an increased need for care and difficulties in contracting a 
matching supply (Hochschild 1995).
2 Following the UN definition of migration, which is a change in a person’s place of residence for 
at least three months (UN 1998), the term ‘mobility’ implies fewer than three months of stay abroad.
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(Alpes and Van Walsum 2014; Bauer and Österle 2016; Escriva and Skinner 2008). 
Research on family migration found that caring responsibilities within migrants’ 
families are constantly negotiated (Evergeti and Ryan 2011). This is, to a certain 
extent, described as the ‘mobility of care’ (Baldassar 2007), which implies that 
responsibilities develop over time and are also influenced by cultural expectations 
about caring obligations within families. Previous studies also showed that the ways 
in which migrants’ families re-organise their care commitments in the sending 
countries are linked and, to a certain extent, depend on the care regimes there (Bahna 
and Sekulová 2019; Bettio and Plantenga 2004). However, less attention has been 
given to specific contexts of welfare provision in countries of origin, particularly 
with regard to the linkages between family care needs, cultural attitudes towards 
care and care workers’ mobility (Rogoz and Sekulová 2019).
This chapter explores the re-organisation of care within families – caused by care 
workers’ mobility – in the sending countries. It argues that what can be called a 
‘familialistic’ orientation of relevant welfare policies in sending countries has an 
influence on labour mobility patterns. Through the case study of Romanian and 
Slovak live-in caregivers3 working in 2- or 4-week shifts in Austria, the chapter 
analyses the linkages between care workers’ strategies for addressing the care defi-
cits of their families living back home, the deficiencies of related public policies in 
their respective countries of origin and the care workers’ mobility patterns. It argues 
that, when it comes to the relationship between mobility and care needs, there seems 
to be a ‘tipping point’ in the needs of care workers’ families which makes care 
workers decide to permanently return to their countries of origin in order to care for 
their family members. As care deficits in migrants’ families emerge mainly in rela-
tion to children and elderly family members, we focus here specifically on childcare 
and care for the elderly. The remainder of this chapter unfolds as follows. First, 
contextual information is provided on care-work mobility, as well as on current 
public policies in the areas of childcare and elderly care in Romania and Slovakia. 
Second, the chapter’s conceptual framework is laid out and the methodology 
employed briefly described. Third, the main body of the chapter addresses family 
care re-organisation due to care mobility, the effects of the family’s care deficits and 
of welfare provisions of care on mobility and care re-organisation in families with a 
mobile carer. Finally, the last section draws the main conclusions and summarises 
the contribution’s central argument.
3 Live-in (24-h) care provision by migrant care workers represents a specific type of mobility/
migration in Central and Western Europe. For more information about the specifics of live-in care 
work in Austria and its developments, see Österle and Bauer (2012), Sekulová and Rogoz (2019) 
and Winkelmann et al. (2015).
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7.2  Family-Related Policies in and Care Mobility 
from Romania and Slovakia
In many Western European countries, families’ care needs are increasingly being 
complemented through migrant work – be they citizens of other EU countries or 
third-country nationals. The main differentiating aspect of care-work mobility from 
other types of labour mobility lies in its over-representation of female migrants. For 
the purpose of this paper, ‘care work’ refers to all types of assistance provided to 
support the daily life of a dependant in a family setting, either in the carer’s own 
family or as a remunerated assistant in the household of an unrelated dependant. In 
this sense, care work can be either indispensable (for young children, for the severely 
ill) or needed in order to improve the quality of life (such as supporting someone 
with a disability, depending on the degree of disability). Care work or the labour 
aimed at supporting family and household reproduction referred to by feminist 
scholars as reproductive labour, can entail a large array of activities – from domestic 
work to providing company for an elderly person who lives alone. The cultural 
framework of care, particularly in Eastern European countries, attributes the main 
responsibilities to women and thus the labour mobility involved affects family care 
capacities in countries of origin.
Care mobility from Romania and Slovakia to Austria is mainly economically 
driven and is encouraged by wage differences and limited labour-market opportuni-
ties in the two countries compared to Austria (Bahna 2014). Most live-in caregivers 
work in Austria in private households, in 24-h personal care for the elderly. 
Caregivers from Romania and Slovakia commute regularly4 on a short-term basis 
between Austria and their respective countries of origin. According to our research, 
in general, Romanian care workers commute to Austria in 4-week shifts – usually 
working uninterrupted 4  weeks in Austria and then going back to Romania for 
4 weeks. Slovak care workers commute on a 2-week schedule – that is, they work 
2 weeks in Austria and then go back to Slovakia for 2 weeks. According to internal 
statistics from Caritas Austria,5 the Romanian care workers in Austria are younger 
than the Slovak carers. Most of those from Slovakia are middle-aged women and 
only a few have children under 15 (Bahna and Sekulová 2019). Consequently, the 
unmet care needs in the country of origin emerge differently in Romania compared 
to Slovakia. While, in Romania, women’s care-work mobility affects both childcare 
and care for the elderly, in Slovakia it dominates the area of elderly care.
In both Romania and Slovakia, paid parental leave for early childcare is available 
for the first 3 years, depending on a child’s needs (Búriková 2016; MMJS 2016). In 
Romania, nurseries are available for children between 3 months and 4 years old 
(Monitorul Oficial 2009). While nurseries for children younger than 3 years exist in 
4 The circular mode of care provision has been determining care mobility to Austria since its begin-
nings, in the early 1990s, before the 2007/2008 legalisation on migrant care work (Österle and 
Bauer 2016).
5 Shared directly with the authors in the framework of their research.
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Slovakia, the widely accepted social norm is that young children are best cared for 
at home (Saxonberg 2011). Eastern European countries score the lowest in Europe 
when it comes to the use of formal childcare services for those under 2 years old. 
Thus, the share of children aged 0–2 in formal childcare arrangements was less than 
20% in Romania and under 10% in Slovakia in 2012 (Plantenga and Remery 2015). 
According to data from Eurostat (2018), Romania and Slovakia also have some of 
the lowest rates of paid formal childcare for children below 12 years of age. In 2017, 
just 3% of children in Slovakia and only 1% in Romania received any form of paid 
formal care before they turned 12.6 In addition, the states provide complex sets of 
financial support for children’s education. In Slovakia, the core consists of child 
benefit (EUR 24.34 in 2019) paid monthly up to 18 years old or, if the child goes on 
to study at college or university, up until the completion of these studies or a maxi-
mum of 25 years old. At the same time, there is parental benefit (EUR 220.70 in 
2019) paid monthly until the child reaches the age of three – or up to 6 years in 
particular circumstances (e.g. the poor health of the child, etc.).7 Similarly, in 
Romania, all children (under 18 or, if older, until graduation), are entitled to monthly 
paid benefits of around EUR 31 for children aged 2–17 and EUR 62 for all children 
with disabilities8.
Care for the elderly subscribes to provisions under the long-term care system, 
which comprises a complex range of health and social services for the elderly and/
or persons with disabilities who are dependent on help with their daily activities 
over an extended period of time (Hirose and Czepulis-Rutkowska 2016). Most 
European countries do not define this as a separate social field (Spasova et al. 2018). 
In Romania, for instance, long-term care includes measures aimed at supporting the 
elderly and disabled (Council of the European Union 2014; Popa 2010), the respon-
sibility for which is split between different levels of the administration – social- 
service provision falls under the responsibility of local authorities, with NGOs 
playing an important part, while the financing mechanism combines central and 
local resources. The social services available under long-term care are the 
following: homecare, care provided in day centres and care provided in residential 
centres (European Commission 2019). In Romania, there are no cash benefits for 
6 This Eurostat analysis is based on the EU-Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 
ad hoc module 2016 (Eurostat 2018). Paid formal childcare refers to childcare by a professional 
childminder at either the child’s or the childminder’s home: ‘Parents are often employers and pay 
the carer directly; furthermore there are no controls over the qualification of the childminder by an 
organised structure. “Professional” childminder shall be understood as a person for whom looking 
after the child represents a job of work or paid activity. The term “professional” does not contain a 
notion of qualification or of quality of care. Babysitters and “au pairs” are also included here’ 
(Eurostat 2017: 4).
7 For details, visit the website of the Slovak Central Office of Labour, Social Affairs and Family: 
https://www.upsvr.gov.sk/socialne-veci-a-rodina-2/davky-pre-rodiny-s-detmi/prehlad-davok-pre-
rodiny-s-detmi.html?page_id=696894. Accessed 14 September 2020.
8 For details, visit the website of the Romanian Directorate-General for Social Assistance and Child 
Protection: https://dgaspc3.ro/servicii-dgaspc/ajutoare-sociale/copii-si-familii/alocatii-de-stat-
pentru-copii/. Accessed 14 September 2020.
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the informal care of the elderly, only for those who are officially recognised as dis-
abled. However, if the person has been assessed as disabled, he or she can benefit 
from a care allowance granted to a member of the family (European Commission 
2016a). While both public and private residential homes exist, these are either insuf-
ficient or too expensive (particularly the private ones). In order to access public resi-
dential homes, contributions by the general public increased from 26% of the total 
cost in 2012 to 30% in 2016 while, to access private residential homes, a person has 
to pay more than 70% of the cost (Pop 2018). Thus, long-term care for the elderly 
in Romania is provided mainly on an informal basis.
In Slovakia, the long-term care system consists of formal care services provided 
by professionals either in residential institutions (nursing homes, hospitals etc.) or 
at home (Council of the European Union 2014; Radvanský and Lichner 2013; 
Repková 2011). Municipalities are in charge of social services, as they have the 
main responsibility for the provision of community social-care to the elderly. 
Regional- and county-level administrations are responsible for residential services 
for the elderly and persons with disabilities. Private services are somewhat rare due 
to the low purchasing power of people in need of social and health services (Repková 
2012). Formal care provision, both institutional and in private homes, covers around 
14% of those who need care in Slovakia (Radvanský and Dováľová 2013). The 
long-term care system in Slovakia has four main clusters of carers: those providing 
care informally within their families (and receiving cash benefits to provide this 
care to a family member registered with the authorities), home nursing personnel 
(who are employees of municipalities or private providers), personnel in residential 
care facilities and volunteers. Informal carers (nearly 60,000 persons), mainly fam-
ily members of those in need of care, may apply for a cash benefit (European 
Commission 2016b), provided through the network of local labour, social affairs 
and family offices (European Commission 2016b). Entitlement to these cash bene-
fits is means tested and the claimant’s income and assets cannot exceed a certain 
ceiling. As the income increases, the cash benefit is reduced (European Commission 
2016b). Recently, the basic cash benefit increased significantly, from EUR 249.35 in 
2018 to EUR 430.35 in 2019.9 Officially recognised informal carers are, at the same 
time, insured (health and pension insurance) by the state and entitled to some public 
services which are marginally used (European Commission 2016b).
7.3  Concepts and Theoretical Perspectives
The extent to which informal care is provided by family members and the responsi-
bilities which this entails differ significantly across Europe (Bettio and Plantenga 
2004; Saraceno and Keck 2010). Informal care refers the most commonly to all 
9 For details, visit the website of the Slovak Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family: https://
www.employment.gov.sk/sk/rodina-socialna-pomoc/tazke-zdravotne-postihnutie/penazne-prispe-
vky/pp-opatrovanie/. Accessed 14 September 2020.
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unregulated, mostly unpaid activities to support children, elderly relatives or others, 
while formal care provisions can be defined as regulated by policies or other forms 
of contractual arrangements between individuals (Bettio and Plantenga 2004). In 
addition to the relationship between the carer and the person cared for, the setting is 
also important: care work provided within a household, by a family member to 
another family member – which is often but not necessarily unpaid – is also catego-
rised as informal care. However, the concept of informal care is narrower than that 
of reproductive labour or unpaid work in a broad sense for it refers specifically to 
situations wherein the care is provided by a close family member, a relative or a 
close friend, often without a formal qualification for providing such care (cf. 
Repková 2012). In practice, the boundaries of situations described by these con-
cepts are often blurred  – some carers, as the example of Romanian and Slovak 
caregivers in Austria shows, may have vocational training in the field of care. In 
childcare, the concept of informal care refers to an array of activities carried out by 
members of the extended family in order to support children at home. The concept 
of formal care in this context, however, refers to formalised care services provided 
by professionals in residential care, day-care facilities, day centres or private house-
holds. Similarly, informal care for the elderly is provided by a family member, often 
within the same household, and often but not necessarily unpaid.
The literature on informal caregiving and the culture of care finds that its organ-
isation differs between diverse national and cultural settings (Pharr et al. 2014). In 
addition, cultural norms and attitudes towards care influence the distinction between 
informal care provision and the utilisation of institutional frameworks. Although 
women remain the predominant caregivers, the extent and form of their involvement 
in family care depends upon cultural norms, family structures, social policies and 
welfare provision. Extended families where the members share resources allow 
greater flexibility in caring responsibilities. Typically, grandparents may provide 
care to grandchildren or adult daughters can share caring responsibilities for elderly 
parents. However, even nuclear families may still rely on extended family care 
resources while living separately – with one of the parents living abroad. A recent 
cross-country analysis of 35 long-term national care systems10 found that, although 
over the last 10 years (2008–2018), there have been some changes in the distribution 
of caregiving tasks in general, ‘women continue to take responsibility for and to 
carry out the bulk of caregiving’ across Europe (Spasova et  al. 2018, 30). A 
Eurobarometer report on health and long-term care in the European Union found 
that women were ‘more often fully involved in informal care than men’ – 47 vs 36% 
in 2007 (European Commission 2007, 83). The same report finds that ‘women are 
slightly more likely than men to expect to have at least partly to give up paid work 
to care for their elderly parents in the future – 9 vs 6 per cent’ (2007, 90). When 
asked about the best care option for an elderly person who lives alone, 56% of 
Romanian and 47% of Slovak respondents consider that living with one of their 
10 The synthesis is based on 35 country reports by the European Social Policy Network (ESPN) 
country teams, covering: EU member states, North Macedonia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, 
Serbia, Switzerland and Turkey (Spasova et al. 2018).
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children is the best (European Commission 2007). More-recent studies show that, in 
Slovakia, social norms expect families to stay together and women to be responsible 
for family care (Bosá et al. 2009; Voľanská 2016). Similarly, a study on long-term 
care found that, in Romania, most informal caregivers are women – as a rule wives 
or daughters (Popa 2010).
Existing studies underline the connections between the extent of informal care 
provision, general institutional frameworks and states’ involvement in responsibili-
ties in the area of care (Brandt et al. 2009; Verbakel 2018). From a state institutional 
perspective (Brandt et al. 2009), formal and informal care are complementary and 
an extensive welfare state – with wide support for care – may motivate family mem-
bers to provide less-intensive informal care, where this latter is defined as care pro-
vided for a minimum of 11 h per week (Verbakel 2018). On the other hand, less state 
involvement may lead to family members providing more intensive informal care. 
According to Verbakel (2018), in countries with extensive long-term care provision, 
individuals are more likely to provide informal care, while the likelihood of inten-
sive caregiving is lower. Countries with less state involvement have fewer informal 
caregivers but more intensive care is provided.
Care provision in terms of services provided to those in need of care and the 
general recognition of the role of the family depend on national contexts. The role 
of social policies and welfare provision with regard to care can be categorised on the 
familialism/de-familialisation continuum (Esping-Andersen 1990; Leitner 2003; 
Saraceno and Keck 2010). The differentiating indicator on this continuum is the 
presence of policies that explicitly support the family in its caring functions. At one 
extreme – familialism – family members are expected to remain responsible for car-
ing for their relatives and the elderly in particular (Bettio and Plantenga 2004). 
According Saraceno and Keck (2010), familialism refers to policies which, usually 
through financial transfers, taxation and paid leave, support family members in 
keeping up with their care responsibilities. De-familialisation means the opposite, 
the when individualisation of social rights reduces family responsibilities and 
dependencies (Saraceno and Keck 2010) and, instead, makes the state responsible 
for welfare provision. The position on the familialism/de-familialisation continuum 
of welfare provision with regard to care, as the example of Romanian and Slovak 
caregivers shows, influences care workers’ mobility patterns. Both Romania and 
Slovakia display a ‘familialistic’ (Österle 2010) long-term care system. Data from 
the 2016 European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS)11 confirm that both Romania and 
Slovakia are among the countries with the lowest proportion of people using formal 
long-term care services themselves or having someone close who had used the ser-
vice – with 3 and 2% of respondents, respectively (Eurofound 2017a). Although the 
number of public care homes increased considerably in recent years in both Romania 
11 The fourth EQLS was carried out from September 2016 to March 2017 in all EU member states 
and the five candidate countries (Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey). It was coordinated by Kantar Public, with local partners inter-
viewing a total of nearly 37,000 people in 33 different countries, with sample sizes ranging from 
1000 to 2000 per country (Eurofound 2017a: 9).
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(by 30% from 2008 to 2014) and Slovakia (by 39% between 2004 and 2017) 
(Eurofound 2017b), the limited availability of residential services in the two coun-
tries contributes to the importance of care provided by family members.
7.4  Methods and Data
This paper draws on qualitative data from 60 in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
conducted in Romania and Slovakia between October 2017 and March 2018.12 The 
selection of care workers was based on several criteria, among which the residing 
region in sending countries, working in care for the elderly abroad and having car-
ing responsibilities for their own family dependants in their respective countries of 
origin (either children or the elderly) were the most relevant. Of these, 18 were 
semi-structured interviews with care workers and their adult family members, with 
a focus on the care needs of families and the use of care services delivered by private 
or public service-providers in the two countries of origin. This paper also draws on 
five additional, qualitative, semi-structured interviews with care workers in Slovakia 
and Austria – three Slovak and two Romanian – conducted outside the REMINDER 
project. These five additional interviews focused on the role of informal care in 
caregivers’ families, the ways in which the provision of care was re-organised 
within the family and the cultural norms concerning women’s role in this 
re-organisation.
7.5  The Needs of Care Workers’ Families and Strategies 
Employed to Address Them
The rich body of literature on transnational care practices and transnational families 
has addressed the ways in which women re-organise family care obligations while 
working abroad (Alpes and Van Walsum 2014; Bauer and Österle 2016; Escriva and 
Skinner 2008). Many Romanian and Slovak caregivers who work in Austria have 
family care obligations at home – towards their own children and grandchildren, 
their own parents or other older relatives. Despite working abroad, they remain, to 
a certain extent, responsible for family care and continue to be involved in the 
decision- making processes in their families (Bauer and Österle 2016; Sekulová 
2013, 2015).
12 The data were collected mainly in the framework of a Horizon 2020 project REMINDER (‘Role 
of European Mobility and Its Impacts in Narratives, Debates and EU Reforms’). The REMINDER 
project was part of a larger study exploring under-researched aspects of the social and economic 
implications of intra-EU mobility on the sending countries in the Eastern part of Europe. For more 
details visit https://www.reminder-project.eu/publications/work-packages/wp6-countries-of-ori-
gin/. Accessed 14 September 2020.
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Like earlier findings (Bauer and Österle 2016; Sekulová 2013, 2015), where care 
workers have care obligations towards their own family members, we found that the 
re-organisation of care follows family ties whereby the husband/partner and grand-
mothers play the most important role(s) during the absence of the main caregiver. 
Family care is thus most commonly delegated, depending upon family type (nuclear, 
two-generational, kin-network nearby), to spouses, grandmothers or older children. 
Importantly, the delegation of care to other family members is only temporary, until 
the caregiver returns home (Sekulová 2013).
Caregivers referred to the need for financial resources as one of the main current 
problems for their families. The financial aspect is closely related to family care, as 
remittances are being spent on the different care-related needs of family members. 
For instance, Katarína, a caregiver from Slovakia, mother of three children, spends 
remittances from Austria on school-related expenditure such as study fees or stu-
dent accommodation for her children. Some care workers, such as Helena (50) from 
Slovakia, may also provide support to adult family members with financial 
constraints:
Now, when I leave for Austria, my son does not cook, so he eats at restaurants. The money 
I earn for care work I spend on basic family expenditure.
In the specific case of Romanian and Slovak care workers commuting to Austria, 
family care needs and the strategies employed to address them are determined by 
the short duration of caregivers’ stays abroad, which typically range from 2 to 
4 weeks in Austria and followed by an equal amount of time spent in their home 
countries. This mobility pattern enables care workers to take charge of a significant 
volume of family care responsibilities, as 47-year-old Katarína, from Slovakia, 
explains:
[Because I return after two weeks] I take over the responsibility in the household for every-
thing. But I must admit that my children make an effort to at least prepare the house before 
I come. They tidy up, wash the dishes, my daughter even irons. But it is automatic, that once 
I return home, everything lies on my shoulders. They help, but not intensively, and only if I 
am absent.
We found that, while the ways vary in which families cope with the mobility of 
the main caregivers, the family care needs of Romanian and Slovak caregivers 
working in Austria have a substantial influence on the care-work mobility project. 
Changes in a family’s care needs over time, as the health situation of family mem-
bers changes or the children grow up, determine the scope of the care worker’s 
mobility. Family needs determine the caregivers’ return home to take over emerging 
caring responsibilities, as the following chapter illustrates.
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7.6  Care Needs as a Determinant of Mobility: 
The Tipping Point
Recruiting migrant caregivers from other countries as a strategy to cope with defi-
cits resulting from one’s own care migration – and known as care-chain migration – 
is not evident in the Slovak context (Bauer and Österle 2016; Búriková 2016; 
Sekulová 2013). Instead, we found that extensive family care obligations represent 
a constraint on mobility, as women with particular care obligations are less likely to 
migrate.
Our material suggests that Romanian and Slovak women only work abroad if 
their respective families do not suffer from a care deficit. If care workers themselves 
declare that a big part in their decision to return is played by the care needs of mem-
bers of their families, then the absence of these care workers from their families 
begins (at least from a certain point onwards) to create a care deficit in the family. 
While care workers are abroad, families cope with their care needs as long as these 
needs are quite limited. In other words, there seems to be a tipping point in the care 
needs of care workers’ families, which determines that care workers can no longer 
work abroad but must to return to their countries of origin to fulfil these duties. 
Thus, the women in our sample often started to work as caregivers abroad after their 
commitments to family dependants ended (after the parents or parents-in-law passed 
away, for instance). Similarly, their decision to permanently return home and no 
longer work abroad was often taken due to their family’s new care needs.
Two Slovak carers whom we interviewed had been providing informal long-term 
care for their parents until they passed away and only afterwards did they start work-
ing as carers in Austria. In spite of the financial constraints due to loss of a wage 
during the time they provided informal care to their own family members, both 
considered it as unacceptable to work abroad and leave their parents without care or 
in state-provided residential care facilities. Diana took care of her mother for 5 years 
until the latter passed away. For Diana (49 years old) this was considered part of her 
duties as a daughter, even if this meant a difficult life period for herself. She did not 
consider resorting to residential care services – at that time largely regarded to be of 
poor quality and insufficient – even though her mother would have been eligible 
for them.
After my mother passed away, I started [to work as a caregiver in Austria]. I was happy that 
I took care of her until she passed away [rather than placing her in residential care]. But it 
is a very sad and difficult story which I went through. The state did not help me in anything 
at all. Nothing, nothing, nothing.13
Maria, a 49-year-old woman from Slovakia, decided to return back to her home 
country to look after her mother, whose health had worsened:
[For] two weeks I would live with my mother, helping her and spending time with her. 
When I went abroad, my sister would spend two weeks with her and look after her. In 
13 The care worker interviewed made reference here to both support in kind and cash support.
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September 2018, she got seriously sick and her health worsened. […] We discussed what to 
do and whether she would become dependent upon [the] care of other people. All this hap-
pened in December 2018. So, I decided to quit my job. At the beginning, I took unpaid leave 
from my work14 and searched for opportunities to be employed as a full-time carer of my 
mother… However, my mother passed away in mid-January 2019. Therefore, in February, 
after a few weeks at home, I returned and since then I have been working as a caregiver in 
Austria normally [on the two-week rotational scheme].
Andrea, a 35-year-old care worker originally from the Republic of Moldova, is 
married in Romania, where she lives with her husband and their three children. 
While she works in Austria on a 4-week shift, her children are cared for either by 
her mother, her husband or her brother, depending on who is available at the time. 
Her husband works in Italy and comes home every 3 months. Her brother, who 
previously worked in Germany, was searching for a job at the time of the interview. 
One of the stories shared by Andrea shows that, although care is being organised 
and transferred to other family members, she remains heavily involved in care at 
home, particularly when extraordinary situations arise:
Violence is really an issue in their school. When I returned home last time, my son was 
injured […] and he even needed specialised medical care… Because that took place while 
I was in Austria. And my mother did not know to go there [to enquire about the situation at 
school] … but [upon return,] when I saw that bruise on his hand, I went to the police and 
the police sent me to get a medical certificate [that he was hit]. And after two weeks [since 
the incident] he still needed to spend four days in hospital. … Sometimes we leave our 
children but even in schools they are not safe. … [The school] did not react in any way. The 
boy who hit him got a lower mark but nothing else happened. … My son no longer wants 
to go to that school and I decided with my husband to get him into another school.
Irina, 36, has been a care worker in Austria since 2013. Previously, she had been 
working in Romania but when her company started to have problems paying 
employees’ salaries, she resigned and begun looking for intermediaries who could 
help her to find a job as a care worker abroad. She had no previous experience as a 
care worker in Romania. At the time of the interview, her two children – aged eight 
and nine  – were living with her husband and parents-in-law while she worked 
abroad. In the event that her parents or parents-in-law need her to care for them, she 
has said that she will no longer work in Austria. However, as long as this is possible, 
she wants to keep the job. Her grandmother passed away last year but, in the final 
period of her life, the family employed a woman from the same village to take care 
of her. Irina is currently working 4-week shifts. She is considering moving to Austria 
with her husband and the two children.
Oana, A 25-year-old Romanian care worker, single mother of a 4-year-old, has 
been working for nearly 2 years in Austria. She had previously worked in the Czech 
Republic as a supply manager in a warehouse and in agriculture. After returning to 
Romania, she heard about care work from her acquaintances. She likes being a care 
worker. Her son is currently living with her mother, grandmother and brother. When 
14 As self-employed caregivers in Austria are not entitled to paid leave (as in regular employment), 
the reference here is to the fact that the family in Austria (the recipient of care services) used the 
services of another caregiver at that time.
7 Labour Mobility from Eastern European Welfare States: Zooming in on Romania...
116
Oana is in Austria and there is financial need in the family, her brother steps in. She 
plans to find employment in Romania to be closer to her family. When her mother 
and grandmother get older, she plans to leave her job in Austria and take care of 
them herself.
One must find a way to do both [take care of home and work abroad]. But I like the work I 
am doing and I try to do everything at home as well. … The needs are many – I am a single 
mother, I raise my son by myself. And it is difficult. But things are better now. He is four 
and a half. …My son stays with my mother and my grandmother. Sometimes my brother is 
involved as well. Practically, my mother has been involved since my son was two weeks 
old, so that I can work to support the family. …My mother has diabetes and cannot work. 
Her medicine costs about 100 EUR per month and my grandmother has a very small, mini-
mal pension. So, I must work… When I leave, it is very difficult. When I return home is the 
most beautiful thing but it is very difficult. To be a mother [and leave your child] is difficult.
In addition, caregivers may work abroad due to the care systems in their respec-
tive country of origin. In the Slovak sample, for instance, one woman was able com-
mute to Austria due to the existing state-provided care services. Lena, 55 years old, 
divorced and mother of four children, one of whom had severe disabilities, said she 
needed a break and a change after she had been caring for her daughter for 17 years. 
Because of financial constraints and the need for a life change, she placed her 
daughter in a residential care home and left to work in Austria. Whenever she comes 
back to Slovakia for 2 weeks, she takes her daughter home.
I was officially registered as a carer, by the Labour Office, of my own child. I did not have 
responsibility for more clients, only for this one particular person. My daughter. So the state 
paid me, the scheme had a title ‘care for a relative’ at that time... The income, however, was 
very low and it was impossible to pay the rent for a three-room apartment, expenditure on 
my children’s education and other costs. Without a second part-time job, 4 hours per day, I 
would not be able to survive, to cover all the necessary expenditure. And, to be precise, we 
overcame these problems thanks to my parents´ financial contribution… So, I decided to try 
something else and try paid care abroad.
This life situation also reflects another aspect, where the state offers a universal 
scheme for families with a disabled member. However, the financial support is 
insufficient, so care work mobility, in this particular case, represents a coping strat-
egy for the family’s financial situation. In a context of social norms attributing care 
responsibilities to women and the ‘familialistic’ public-policy orientation in 
Slovakia, Lena’s migration to Austria is possible as her family does not need inten-
sive care. Her parents are in no need of care, as her mother is self-reliant and her 
father passed away. If the situation in the family worsens (e.g. her mother needs), 
Lena declares that she will perhaps stop commuting to Austria and return perma-
nently to Slovakia, where she can find a job, although less-well paid (compared to 
what she currently earns in Austria) in order to care for her mother.
Another participant from Slovakia, 37-year-old Lucia, a mother of seven, works 
in Austria due to the availability and affordability of childcare services in her home 
town. Although her husband and relatives are taking over her responsibilities while 
she is abroad, she declares that she can work in Austria thanks to how kindergarten 
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and school are organised in Slovakia and also thanks to a nanny who has been help-
ing her husband.
My husband takes care of the children while I am abroad. For the youngest [11 months old 
when she started with care work] I hired a nanny. So, he took the youngest to the nanny in 
the morning, the older children to school and in the evening he collected them. They had 
all-day activities, after-school activities – such as music class or painting – then he took 
them home at five. I paid the nanny 10 euros per day.
In this case, care work in Austria financially complements Lena’s husbands’ 
wages and the state-paid child benefits, which would not be sufficient to cover the 
family’s daily expenditure. Lucia is thinking of quitting care work in Austria as soon 
as the children turn 18 and are self-supporting or if another major need for care in 
the family arises.
As this section has shown, the interviewed families made use of public care ser-
vices to different extents. Some did not utilise any services, either because these 
were not available or because the family was not interested in the rather unsatisfac-
tory public support and declared that they relied on the family’s care resources 
instead of searching for institutional support. According to cultural norms, elderly 
members of the family should continue to live at home, being cared for by family 
members. Placing an elderly family member in a residential home is seen as inap-
propriate. Similarly, Romanian care workers who participated in our research 
declared that there is a generational obligation for them to take care of their elderly 
parents.15
7.7  Conclusions
Mobile care workers circulate between their respective countries of origin and work, 
being ‘here and there’ without necessarily intending to settle in the country of work 
(Morokvasic 2013). This chapter has shown that, despite commuting to Austria to 
work in care, these women remain responsible for the organisation of care in their 
own families – which tends to be rather sporadic, temporal and limited. The carers 
we interviewed referred to the main care needs during their absence as being sus-
taining basic services in the household and reproductive labour for the closest 
15 A previous study on female care migration from rural Romania found that it led to shifting evalu-
ations of institutional care. Through the particular example of two Romanian villages, Thelen 
(2015, 151) argued that ‘the phenomenon of care migration to the West has changed perceptions of 
care institutions for the elderly’, particularly with regard to institutional arrangements through 
which elderly people living alone are being cared for in their homes, with the support of the local 
community. Looking at a particular example of community-based elderly care, Thelen found that 
‘not sending the elderly out of their homes must be avoided, but they must certainly not be sent out 
of the village’ (Thelen 2015, 152). As our research focused on care workers’ strategies for address-
ing their families’ care needs, we found that care workers feel responsible for caring for their 
elderly relatives. Furthermore, we found that, in addition to being their responsibility, care workers 
do not intend to place their elderly parents in institutional care.
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family members such as children, partner/spouse or parents. The ways in which 
these needs are addressed, as our qualitative study has shown, are influenced by 
several factors – relationships between family members, family structure and type 
(e.g. nuclear family, extended family or double-generational family), length of 
shifts abroad, cultural norms and expectations towards women, spatial distance 
between family members’ residences in the origin country and welfare provisions 
for care.
The high reliance of Romanian and Slovak care workers’ families on informal 
care is also influenced by the cultural norms according to which the provision of 
care is the result of intergenerational solidarity and socially expected behaviour. 
Some narratives reflected on the strong social expectations. The mobile caregivers, 
the main carers in their families in the countries of origin, leave in order to under-
take paid care abroad while the care needs within their families must be satisfied in 
different ways. The social construction of care and cultural values, together with 
gaps in institutional frameworks in the two countries, affect mobile caregivers’ deci-
sions. Care systems interfere with patterns of labour-market behaviour, including 
cross-border mobility. The examples in this chapter underline that, once the acute 
need for care for a family member appears, women no longer engage in care work 
abroad or they leave care work altogether and return home to take up their respon-
sibilities caring for their own families.
Depending on the age of their children or the needs of their elderly parents left at 
home, the re-organisation of informal care within the family and accessing/utilising 
public services do not seem to differ in the two countries. However, the differentiat-
ing factors appear to be the time spent abroad and the commuting distance between 
their homes and the private homes where they work in Austria. We argue that the 
existing care needs in care workers’ families facilitate this type of work; alterna-
tively, mobility patterns influence the ways in which care needs at home are being 
addressed. Existing (limited) care needs that enable the reconciliation of family 
responsibilities and working abroad allow carers to engage in this transnational care 
work, as shown by the transnational care provision from Romania and Slovakia to 
Austria. The specific mobility pattern in the form of short-term commuting – ‘back 
and forth’ – enables carers to be involved in family care at home too. At the same 
time, women with extensive care obligations are less likely to migrate. As limited 
formal services put pressure on families to continue providing care informally, we 
argue that these institutional frameworks – particularly for childcare and care for the 
elderly – also influence care workers’ mobility strategies.
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Chapter 8
Welfare Considerations Underpinning 




Slovenian public healthcare has historically relied on the immigration of healthcare 
workers1 from former Yugoslavian republics such as Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina 
and Serbia (Albreht 2011). After the country’s independence in 1991 and the intro-
duction of a restrictive migration policy for foreign nationals, shortages began to 
rise persistently. Slovenia counted on the supply of healthcare workers from the 
other European Union (EU) member states after joining the EU in 2004 but the 
realisation that they preferred to choose other countries with significant competitive 
advantages over Slovenia prompted a policy turn aimed at achieving self- sufficiency. 
The result was not entirely satisfactory for a variety of reasons that will be discussed 
further on; certain positions continued to remain unfilled, geographical imbalances 
in supply and demand persisted and discontent among an overburdened healthcare 
workforce began growing. Glances back towards the Western Balkan countries 
revealed that healthcare workers were now being heavily targeted by high-income 
European countries, some of which have adopted specific policy measures that 
make recruitment from third countries easier for employers (Lazarevik et al. 2016; 
Živković 2018). Many of the third-country nationals who did find employment in 
Slovenia used the country merely as a stepping stone, as the efforts to retain them 
failed in light of the better working conditions and remuneration offered to them in 
other countries. Different motivations prompted Slovenian healthcare workers to 
1 The chapter defines healthcare workers as all healthcare service providers, including physicians, 
dentists, nurses, midwifes, pharmacists and other providers who deliver personal and non-personal 
health services. The term does not include managerial and support staff, such as managers and 
planners, who are not engaged in the direct provision of health services.
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start looking for jobs abroad themselves, be they in neighbouring Austria, other EU 
countries or overseas. It became evident that, in the global labour market for health-
care, Slovenia was going to draw the short straw.2
This chapter explores a complex interplay of motivations prompting healthcare 
workers to emigrate from one welfare state to help to sustain another, focusing in 
particular on motivations related to social-welfare protection. It draws on different 
notions and conceptualisations of welfare. First, it understands welfare as subjective 
wellbeing, happiness, health and prosperity (Greve 2008) and the fulfilment of the 
essential needs of individuals and families in terms of having, loving and being 
(Allardt 1975, cited in Greve 2008, 55). Second, it understands welfare in terms of 
service provision and institutional arrangements by the state with the purpose of 
ensuring the social and economic wellbeing of its residents. The use of the concept 
of welfare in this chapter therefore encompasses a person’s everyday life perspec-
tive and a societal macro-level perspective (Greve 2008). Given the fact that health-
care workers are themselves providers of welfare to those in need of medical 
treatment and care, the chapter also discusses the workers’ ethical considerations 
about leaving patients behind on the one hand and the pursuance of the provision of 
healthcare in other countries on the other – in other words, it explores how the pro-
vision of welfare to others builds into workers’ own imaginaries and feeds the ratio-
nale behind their decision to migrate.
The findings are based on an extensive literature review and in-depth semi- 
structured interviews conducted with 27 healthcare workers, including ten nurses, 
ten physicians and seven midwives, who all emigrated from Slovenia to take up jobs 
in healthcare abroad. Ten interviewees were men  – aged 28–45  – and 17 were 
women, aged 23–52. Seven out of the ten interviewed men were physicians, whereas 
three were nurses. All interviewees had obtained a university degree in midwifery, 
nursing or medicine. Prior to emigrating from Slovenia, they all worked in Slovenian 
public healthcare institutions for at least 2 years. The interviews were conducted in 
Slovenia, the United Kingdom, Norway and Australia  – and via Skype  – in the 
period from 2015 to 2018 and lasted between 1.5 and 2.5 h. Data collection was 
primarily guided by curiosity about the extent of the welfare considerations of these 
highly skilled professionals when deciding to move abroad as well as by the under-
lying concern shared with Buchan et al. (2014) that healthcare-worker mobility and 
migration will continue to be a significant element in European healthcare labour 
markets and will have a strong impact on healthcare delivery across EU member 
states. Hence, data outlining the rationale behind individuals’ choices to emigrate 
from Slovenia were also collected with the aim of contributing to the evidence base 
that feeds policy and informs strategic responses to healthcare workforce planning. 
The research was therefore concerned both with identifying the deeply embedded 
rationale and trigger factors that prompt the decision by healthcare workers to move 
2 Given the urgency of the topic, especially when taking into consideration that Slovenia has statis-
tically one of the fastest-ageing populations of all EU member states, has one of the lowest physi-
cian densities in the EU (OECD 2017) and is not particularly successful in retaining its healthcare 
workforce and achieving sustainability, it is surprising that the issue has not received more atten-
tion in Slovenian migration and healthcare policy studies.
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abroad and with exploring the remarkable impact on and consequences of ground- 
level subjective decisions on systemic and normative frameworks. In line with 
Vindrola-Padros et al. (2018), an important point of departure was the realisation 
that migration and healthcare are not only influenced by global and national policies 
and structures but are also shaped daily by the aspirations of and choices made by 
individuals.
The chapter first sets the context and then moves on to identifying some of the 
particularities underpinning the growing vulnerabilities of the labour market for 
healthcare in Slovenia stemming from the healthcare workers’ choice to emigrate. 
It does so by focusing primarily on the struggle to achieve the sustainability of the 
healthcare workforce and maintain the high quality of public healthcare services in 
an increasingly vulnerable welfare state. It then moves on to exploring a wide vari-
ety of motivations prompting healthcare workers’ emigration from Slovenia,3 focus-
ing in particular on the aspects related to the pursuance of subjectively defined 
welfare and wellbeing, welfare-state-provided social security and services and the 
welfare of new patients versus those left behind.
8.2  The Migration of Healthcare Workers
Healthcare provision is an integral part of a welfare state and its complex web of 
policies by which it intervenes in the operation of the market economy to reduce 
social inequalities (Bryant and Raphael 2018). The obligation of public healthcare 
systems operating within welfare states is to reduce differences in health outcomes 
between socio-economic groups and across geographic regions. To do so they need 
to work towards securing a steady supply and sustainability of qualified healthcare 
workers, since there can be no health without a workforce (Campbell et al. 2013). 
In other words, the provision of public healthcare depends heavily on the dynamics 
and functioning of the labour market for healthcare workers. Unfortunately, this lat-
ter is a particularly vulnerable structure and does not have the capability of adjust-
ing to the dynamics of supply and demand with ease and rapidity. One of the main 
reasons for that is the fact that the reproduction of healthcare workers is a time- 
consuming and costly process (Plotnikova 2018). It takes several years to train a 
nurse and a decade or more to train a doctor. Investments in healthcare workforce 
education are therefore observed with a significant delay and in addition do not 
always result as planned. The stability of the workforce depends on many factors, 
including the levels of turn-over rates – which are often high due to heavy work-
loads, professional exhaustion, psychological pressures and low remuneration – and 
the ability to attract young graduates to take positions within specific specialties or 
take up work in rural and remote geographic areas.
3 In some cases, the interviewees who emigrated from Slovenia did not stop at the initial country of 
destination chosen but continued migrating further. The analysis includes their narratives related to 
chain migration insofar as they are welfare-related and thus contribute to building the argument.
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Shortages of healthcare workers are observed at the global level and are a persis-
tent worry in both developing4 and developed countries (Buchan et  al. 2014; 
Plotnikova 2018; WHO 2016). It is estimated that European Union (EU) countries 
will face a shortage of one million healthcare workers by 2020 (European 
Commission 2012), while challenges in ensuring an adequate supply are set to per-
sist in light of an aging population that requires more healthcare, a high percentage 
of the aging healthcare workforce who are approaching retirement and insufficient 
replacement rates (Matrix Insight 2012). The problem for individual countries 
within the EU is significantly exacerbated by the rise of cross-border mobility or 
commuting, as well as continuous emigration to popular destinations outside the 
EU, such as the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. As 
these countries are themselves experiencing deficits, they are actively recruiting 
healthcare workers from abroad in an effort to fill the vacancies, prompting other 
countries to follow such a modus operandi. The emergence and development of 
global care markets in the context of globalising care economies (Yeates 2009) has 
thus created a cycle where countries with more competitive comparable advantages 
recruit from countries with fewer  – and the latter recruit from countries further 
down the hierarchy. For example, when doctors from the United Kingdom move to 
the United States of America, they are replaced by doctors from Britain’s former 
colonies or other European countries such as Germany which, in turn, recruits from 
Central and Eastern-European or Western Balkan countries.5 Competitive advan-
tage is, of course, a relative term as its definition depends on the aspirations of each 
individual healthcare worker but, mostly, it refers to high remuneration, good work-
ing conditions, opportunities for professional advancement and a better quality of 
life in general. Therefore, compared to lower-income, resource-strained countries, 
wealthier countries have more policy capacity to act and more means to invest – and 
are as such more successful in attracting healthcare workers (Glinos et al. 2014).
8.3  The Slovenian Case
Slovenia is among the countries that have historically relied on and benefited from 
the immigration of healthcare workers from abroad. Before its declaration of inde-
pendence from the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991, Slovenia 
4 The World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that a global deficit reached 17.6 million in 
2013. The largest needs-based shortages are in South-East Asia at 6.9 million and Africa at 4.2 mil-
lion. In relative terms, the most severe challenges are in the African region. Although the global 
demand in 2030 is estimated to decline overall by 17%, the African needs-based shortages are 
forecast to worsen (WHO 2016).
5 It is estimated that, between 2012 and 2014, around 1700 physicians from Serbia, Macedonia, 
Albania and Kosovo left to work abroad (Lazarevik et al. 2016). The Bosnian Chamber of Medicine 
announced that, in 2016, about 300 highly qualified doctors left the country. This number does not 
include junior doctors who left immediately after completion of their medical degree. Germany is 
among the most popular destinations for the countries of the Western Balkans (Živković 2018).
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was an attractive destination for healthcare workers from other Yugoslavian repub-
lics. Tit Albreht (2011) writes that physicians and dentists from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia were drawn to Slovenia because of three main 
factors: the chronic shortage of health professionals, the numerous opportunities for 
medical and dental graduates that resulted from those shortages and an expanding 
healthcare sector at a time of significant limitations in several other republics. In 
other words, while Slovenia was experiencing shortages, many other republics were 
experiencing an over-supply and new graduates encountered difficulties in finding 
employment. The three republics became the source of 80% of immigrant physi-
cians and dentists in Slovenia. After independence, immigration came to a near stop 
due to the war erupting in the Balkans but the pace picked up again in 1995 (Albreht 
2011). Although the trend was discontinued when Slovenia joined the EU and 
restrictive regulations relating to recruitment from third countries came into force, 
physicians from the republics of the former Yugoslavia still represent the highest 
share of foreign physicians today. According to the Medical Board of Slovenia, 524 
registered physicians with foreign citizenship currently work in the country, of 
whom 187 come from Serbia, 96 from Croatia, 82 from Macedonia, 47 from 
Montenegro and 42 from Bosnia and Herzegovina (STA 2019).6
Because it was relatively easy for Slovenia to recruit from the former Yugoslavian 
republics, no active policies to attract healthcare professionals were introduced 
immediately after independence. As the opinion was that any shortages were only 
temporary and the evaluation of needs was based mostly on a retrospective impres-
sion, the intake of students remained limited and no new medical or nursing schools 
were established. However, shortages continued to persist in the period between 
2000 and 2004. The Ministry of Health reacted by announcing its intention to recruit 
more healthcare workers from abroad but Albreht (2011) notes that this intention 
never materialised because of two main factors: diverging views on the topic among 
the key stakeholders in the newly established state – i.e., the Ministry of Health, the 
Health Insurance Institute of Slovenia and professional Chambers – and the limited 
interest of foreign healthcare workers in taking up jobs in Slovenia. Slovenia was 
not an attractive destination for healthcare workers from EU countries, who pre-
ferred to seek employment in the old, high-income EU member states. In the 
absence of favourable recruitment policies and incentives and due to restrictive poli-
cies relating to the immigration of third-country nationals, workers from the Western 
Balkans increasingly turned to those countries as well. Restrictiveness can be partly 
linked to the politics of the nation-building process that sought to establish and reaf-
firm Slovenian identity based on ethnic origin and as such viewed immigration, 
especially from third countries, as detrimental. Another reason can be found in the 
organisation of the Slovenian health professional regulatory system, which is decen-
tralised and gives substantial power to the independent professional organisations 
6 At the end of 2017, the overall number of physicians employed in Slovenian healthcare facilities 
was 6408 (NIJZ 2018).
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called Chambers, which have their own specific interests when it comes to health-
care workforce planning (Albreht 2011).
The realisation that foreign healthcare workers will not be able to fill the short-
ages came after two important studies had laid out the projections for the supply and 
demand of physicians and nursing staff in the near future (Albreht 2002, 2005; see 
also Albreht and Klazinga 2002). In response, Slovenia attempted to move towards 
self-sufficiency by opening an additional medical faculty and five additional nurs-
ing schools, as well as by significantly increasing student intake in the two medical 
faculties. This resulted in an increased supply although self-sufficiency has not been 
achieved and shortages persist. Hospitals and primary care centres, primarily those 
in remote and rural areas, continuously warned that the system was at a breaking 
point as vacancies were not being filled. In 2011, an intervention law was passed for 
the recruitment of healthcare workers from third countries, which was successful in 
attracting a foreign workforce but did not stop the downward spiralling – and frus-
trations grew stronger. Although many recruited healthcare workers did settle in 
Slovenia, a substantial number used the country as a stepping stone to employment 
in other EU countries (Zupanič 2011). In addition, Slovenia-trained healthcare 
workers also increasingly started looking for jobs across the border, with some opt-
ing for settlement in other countries and others commuting to neighbouring Austria, 
where salaries are higher, working conditions are better and the workload is man-
ageable (Fajnik Milakovič 2018).
According to the Nurses and Midwives Association of Slovenia, most Slovenian 
hospitals were experiencing shortages of nurses and midwifes in 2018. In the 
University Clinical Centre Ljubljana (UKC), the biggest Slovenian hospital, the 
shortages totalled 10% or 340 nurses while, in peripheral areas, the percentage was 
significantly higher. In Sežana, for example, 43% of vacancies remained unfilled 
while, in Šempeter, the figure was as high as 54% (RTV SLO 2018). In all Slovenian 
hospitals the shortage of nursing amongst midwifery staff is estimated to be over 
2000 (Jager 2018). The mobilisation of retired nurses and paid overtime were the 
main strategies put in place to cope with the workload as vacancies continuously 
remained unfilled, leaving nurses burned out and under immense psychological 
pressure. In UKC Ljubljana, one third of the intensive care unit was closed down in 
2018 as nine nurses resigned and the management could not replace them. In the 
same hospital, critical shortages of nurses and physicians were reported in several 
departments, including children’s intensive therapy, cardiology, cardiovascular sur-
gery, pulmonology, otorhinolaryngology, orthopaedics, dialysis, transplant medi-
cine, emergency medicine and the intensive care unit (RTV SLO 2018). In the 
second-largest university hospital in Maribor, over 80 vacancies for medical spe-
cialists remained unfilled in 2016. Only one radiologist was employed in the oncol-
ogy department and when she started her maternity leave, radiation treatment for 
new patients had to be suspended. The gynaecology department could not fill 16 
vacancies, anaesthesiology 13 vacancies and the urology department was so severely 
understaffed that four burnout specialists resigned in protest. In the past couple of 
years, 70 physicians left the hospital to work either in other medical facilities in 
Slovenia or abroad or because they were due to retire (Seršen Dobaj 2017), leaving 
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behind a depleted system. Community-level healthcare centres across the country 
have also been overburdened for years. Family medicine specialists, gynaecologists 
and paediatricians are in short supply in most regions. The breaking point was 
reached in the first half of 2019 when, in the cities of Nazarje and Kranj, family 
physicians collectively resigned due to caseload quotas, which they claimed left 
them burned out and patients at risk (Jager 2019; Kos 2019). In Kranj, the number 
of physicians who resigned was 23 out of 34, which had an immediate impact on the 
40,000 patients and family doctors across the country have declared that they will 
follow their colleagues’ lead if conditions do not improve.7 Public healthcare 
seemed to have ended in intensive care and the discussion among healthcare work-
ers about the possibilities of commuting or emigrating abroad intensified.
How many healthcare workers actually leave Slovenia to find employment abroad 
is not entirely clear. The Statistical Office of Slovenia does not systematically follow 
the number of Slovenian citizens abroad and bases its estimations on the data derived 
from the Central Population Register kept by the Ministry of the Interior.8 It also 
does not have comprehensive statistics on the number of emigrated or commuting 
healthcare workers (e-mail correspondence with Statistical Office of Slovenia, 12 
March 2019). Estimates can be made based on the issued certificates of good stand-
ing which healthcare workers need to obtain from their professional chambers in 
order to apply for jobs abroad. The Medical Board of Slovenia has been issuing 
between 200 and 300 certificates on a yearly basis from 2013 to 2018 (Benedičič 
2019) while, in the past couple of years, 420 nurses requested the certificate (Fajnik 
Milakovič 2018). However, these data do not indicate whether or not the person 
emigrated. Excluded from this proxy are also graduates who leave immediately after 
graduation or those whose employer did not request the certificate. The frequency of 
commuting to neighbouring countries has also not been statistically recorded 
although, based on the data collected through empirical research, the number of 
daily commuters is substantial. The geographical proximity of the Štajerska and 
Koroška regions to neighbouring Austria, which is experiencing major deficits in its 
own healthcare workforce,9 makes Austria one of the most convenient  destinations 
7 There have been insinuations, based on the content of trade unions’ internal correspondence with 
their members, that mass resignations are a collective mutiny of Slovenian primary-care physicians 
who, in this way, aim to set in motion the privatisation of primary healthcare (Jager 2019). Since 
this issue is not the immediate focus of this chapter, it will not be elaborated upon.
8 The Central Population Register contains information on the citizens of Slovenia who are absent 
from the country for more than 3 months, either permanently or temporarily (Stropnik et al. 2014). 
Information on emigration flows and stock are derived from data on permanent residence deregis-
tration and combined with data on the resident population. According to the Statistical Office of 
the Republic of Slovenia, 9900 Slovenian citizens emigrated from Slovenia in 2017.13 Most of 
them left for Austria (25%), Germany (19%), Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The negative 
net migration of citizens of Slovenia was recorded for the eighteenth consecutive year 
(Razpotnik 2018).
9 According to the Austrian Medical Board, Austria has been losing an astounding 600 graduate 
physicians per year to other countries. Due to the high retirement rate, emigration and an increased 
demand for healthcare services, the Board estimates that they will need to fill 938 vacancies on a 
yearly basis in the near future. In 2017, 1665 senior students were set to graduate but, since an 
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for commuters as well as settlers. Data on intermediary or final destination of health-
care workers have also not been systematically collected, which additionally reveals 
a significant niche in research on the migration of healthcare workers from Slovenia. 
Data on yearly outflows, however, are scarce or non-existent in most European 
countries. The information base on healthcare workers in Europe has, in general, 
been described as ‘patchy, of limited quality and outdated’ (Maier et al. 2014, 95).
8.4  Spectrum of Motivations for Migrating
Several factors impact on healthcare workers’ decision on the location of their 
employment. According to the OECD Health Working Paper No. 69 on geographi-
cal imbalances in doctor supply and policy responses (Ono et al. 2014, 15) these 
include: (i) the general attractiveness of the locational environment, including edu-
cational opportunities for children, career opportunities for spouses, housing etc.; 
(ii) the mode of employment; (iii) the income potential, i.e. payment schemes; (iv) 
the working conditions, including working hours, access to appropriate medical 
equipment and support services, challenging patient populations and professional 
development opportunities; (v) issues of prestige and recognition; (vi) the expecta-
tions of work and life in remote regions and the capacity to adjust to the environ-
ment. Glinos and Buchan (2014) propose an alternative typology, one that adjusted 
to the rationale for emigration in the context of European countries. They put forth 
a typology that identifies six types of mobile health professional based on their 
motivations for and purpose of migrating, conditions in the home and destination 
countries, personal profile and the likely direction of the move and length of stay 
abroad. They distinguish between the livelihood migrant, the career-oriented 
migrant, the backpacker, the commuter, the undocumented and the returner. In sum, 
the livelihood migrant moves to earn a (better) living, the career-oriented migrant 
travels to develop his or her career, the backpacker works to travel, the commuting 
migrant commutes across borders to work, the undocumented migrant is migrating 
for work unofficially and works in the informal sector and the returner migrates in 
reverse. The authors acknowledge that the categories sometimes overlap and that 
the mobile health professional can evolve from one type into another but, neverthe-
less, promote the categorisation by arguing that ‘each (arche) type translates into 
specific advantages and difficulties for data collectors and policy-makers’ (Glinos 
and Buchan 2014, 136). A noticeable absence of welfare concerns as a reason for 
emigration permeates this typology – be it concerns for their own welfare or con-
cerns for the welfare of those to whom they will provide services.10
estimated 40% of graduates leave Austria to work abroad on a yearly basis, the deficit is likely to 
persist (Kordaš 2019).
10 The category of the livelihood migrant does mention the better living standards of the migrant 
and his/her family as an encouragement to leave but this refers to the economically related advan-
tages and job security.
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The empirical research on the motivations of healthcare workers for emigrating 
or commuting from Slovenia to other countries revealed a somewhat similar ratio-
nale to that laid out by Glinos and Buchan (2014) but has, in addition, exposed a 
number of more-deeply embedded reasons, motivations and aspirations for migrat-
ing. In line with a number of other similar studies (Young et al. 2014) this one, too, 
confirmed that very few respondents explain their decision to migrate in terms of 
one single reason. A unique combination of push and pull factors was described by 
each respondent, in most cases spanning macro, meso and micro levels.11 The analy-
sis, however, focused in particular on motivations related to their subjective welfare 
and wellbeing, welfare-state-related provisions and the welfare of their patients.
8.4.1  Subjective Wellbeing
Subjective wellbeing is a social indicator and a welfare measure (Fischer 2009). 
It is the most often defined as a person’s cognitive and affective evaluations of his or 
her life, which include emotional reactions to events and cognitive judgements of 
satisfaction (Diener et al. 2002). The concept includes experiencing pleasant emo-
tions, low levels of negative moods and high life satisfaction (Diener et al. 2002). 
An important component of the concept of life satisfaction is job satisfaction, which 
is defined as the positive feelings of individuals towards their job (Gaszynska et al. 
2014). The factors influencing the level of job satisfaction include salary, working 
conditions, recognition and responsibility (Gaszynska et al. 2014). In light of the 
current condition of the Slovenian healthcare system, most interviewees stated that 
their motivation to look for jobs abroad stemmed largely from their poor working 
conditions which led to stress, fatigue, anxiety and burnout but also from an indeci-
sive and ambiguous workforce management and poor remuneration. These factors 
have contributed, in their opinion, to lower work and life satisfaction, quality of life 
and overall wellbeing, as Physician 3, who migrated to Germany, recounts:
I was longing for better management, more opportunities for professional growth, more 
constructive interaction and cooperation with other specialists. The promise of a better sal-
ary was definitely a welcome bonus. I was getting little satisfaction from my work and that 
was very disappointing for me. I was feeling tired. Bad-tired, not good-tired.
Eight out of ten nurses interviewed stated that they feared they would make a 
mistake leading to fatal consequences because their unit was continuously under-
staffed and they felt fatigued, emotionally drained and disorganised. They all 
believed that they deserved better pay as well as more respect from the physicians 
and human- resource- management department. Two nurses who migrated to 
11 The macro level includes (national) economic and socio-political factors, the meso level includes 
profession-specific factors (for example, education, training, work conditions and career develop-
ment) and the micro level includes ‘individual circumstances and attitudes through which macro- 
and meso-level drivers are viewed but which also influence migration decision-making in their 
own right’ (Young 2011, 314).
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Slovenia from Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina strongly felt that they were 
not respected within the medical team due to their foreign diploma, ethnic origin 
and accent, which was thus an important motivation to look for jobs outside 
Slovenia. Two midwifes who emigrated from Slovenia to the UK and then onwards 
to Australia also expressed their dissatisfaction with the way other medical staff 
treated them in the UK. It was the little things with a strong symbolic message, such 
as continuously mispronouncing their names or making jokes about their accent, as 
Midwife 1 said:
I constantly had to remind them that my name (Jelena) is pronounced Y-elena and not 
J-elena, that I’m from Slovenia not Slovakia and that I don’t speak Russian but Slovenian. 
It didn’t bother me that much in the beginning, but after a few years the frustrations grew 
and I felt disrespected. I left because of things like this. Not feeling accepted, not being 
respected.
The last straw for many interviewees was a gesture or occurrence that they sub-
jectively perceived to be disrespectful. One doctor claimed that it was yet another 
request by the Medical Insurance Institute to check his patients’ records in search of 
fraud committed by him or his staff. For one junior nurse, Nurse 1, who migrated to 
Austria, it was a refusal by the management to provide her with a parking space or 
cover her parking costs, which were significant due to her frequent overtime and 
double shifts.
I spent a tremendous amount of money on parking and I was on a minimum wage. The car 
park next to the hospital was too expensive for me to use, so I tried to park on the street 
somewhere close to my ward. I had to leave home early to find a spot and I was always 
struggling with this because the hospital is in the very centre of the city. The problem was 
also that I needed to renew the parking ticket for street parking every few hours. Since I 
couldn’t manage to do that every day I got a bunch of fines. I work at a retirement home in 
Austria now and I have my own parking lot right next to the entrance.
For another young nurse it was the constant lack of eye contact with the doctors 
on her ward, making her feel disrespected and unappreciated. The lack of teamwork 
was the last straw for a young female physician as well, who said she found a posi-
tion in Switzerland days after applying and left as soon as all the arrangements were 
made. When asked if her overall wellbeing has improved as a result of this emigra-
tion she responded that it has – not only because of her better relations at work but 
also because of the better work–life balance and higher socio-economic status. For 
all respondents, the promise of increased personal wellbeing was of paramount 
importance when contemplating migration.
Apart from work-related subjective welfare, the decisive factor for many inter-
viewees was the possibility of embracing a desirable lifestyle, be it linked to a prefer-
able climate, cuisine or cultural scene, to opportunities to pursue hobbies, to an 
affinity to live in a culturally diverse society or simply to a desire to embrace a 
mobile lifestyle. As Midwife 4, who migrated to Austria, the UK and Canada reveals, 
experiencing ‘the romance of crossing borders’ Doerr and Davis Taïeb (2017) for 
them went hand-in-hand with the pursuit of subjective welfare and wellbeing.
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I always wanted to travel and I chose this profession because I knew it would enable me to 
go places. I’ve been working in Austria, the UK and Canada and had short placements in 
South Africa and Australia. I took every job opportunity that presented itself, even if it was 
not paid well. I wanted to lead a cosmopolitan life, I wanted to make friends with people 
around the world. I was never concerned about the safety net. I knew I would always be able 
to earn a living.
Nurse 5, who migrated to Australia, also states:
I left Slovenia because I was stigmatised for being gay. I felt I could not pursue my desired 
lifestyle there. I realised that I was leaving behind my safety net – family, social security, 
good public services. That made me a bit nervous. However, in the end it was my happiness 
that mattered the most and I gave it priority over guaranteed social security.
These narratives are in line with the findings of an extensive research project 
conducted by Papademetriou (2013), which determined the most important vari-
ables influencing high-skilled migrants’ choices of destination. These include, 
among others, attractive lifestyle options, a healthy environment and a tolerant and 
safe society. All those factors were emphasised as important by a majority of my 
respondents in terms of contributing to their wellbeing.
8.4.2  Social Welfare Benefits and Services
The aspect of emigrating in order to benefit from better or more-generous social- 
welfare protection was not brought up as a decisive factor. All the respondents were 
confident that they would always be able to secure employment with their level of 
skills and that they would not have to reply on social benefits provided by the state. 
In other words, contrary to Borjas’ (1999) welfare magnet hypothesis, according to 
which individuals’ migration decisions are influenced by the generosity of the wel-
fare system in the country of destination, respondents such as Physician 5, who 
migrated to the US, ruled out the robustness of the welfare state as a decisive factor 
for migration:
The Slovenian welfare state is not bad. Maternity leave is long and well-paid, the primary, 
secondary and university-level education system is free of charge and public healthcare is 
free at the point of entry. It’s true that social transfers seem to be in decline and the health-
care system is facing tremendous challenges but the country is still providing a very decent 
safety net. When I decided to move to San Diego I realised that the situation was going to 
be very different. However, it never occurred to me that I would not take a job here because 
the welfare provision is poor, just as it would not occur to me to take a job in Norway just 
because they have a generous welfare system.
More than state-provided support, healthcare workers contemplated the social 
benefits which are part of the employment-quality dimension. In line with Wiskow 
et al. (2010) and Muñoz de Bustillo et al. (2009), who argue that contractual rela-
tions that allow for pension schemes, flexible retirement policies and childhood 
provisions are important factors influencing job quality, my respondents considered 
in-job benefits as a significant motivational factor. Many have been impressed by 
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the policy of providing free childcare and housing at least during a transitional 
period following immigration, which has certainly facilitated their decision to emi-
grate and settle down. Quality professional development programmes – i.e. the pro-
grammes that healthcare institutions provide for their employees in order for them 
to evolve professionally and personally  – were also brought up by a number of 
respondents as an important incentive. These programmes vary significantly but 
often provide free-of- charge psychosocial support and counselling as well as train-
ing in how to cope with stress and anxiety.
Welfare-state-provided services such as healthcare, social care and education 
were nevertheless considered by some respondents as an important incentive, espe-
cially by those who had dependent members in their family and considered access 
to quality education and public services to be an important factor when choosing the 
destination. This is in line with Buchan et  al.’s (2006) research on international 
nurses in the United Kingdom, which revealed that education opportunities for chil-
dren are one of the main motivators for moving, as Nurse 2, who migrated to the 
UK, explains:
It’s good to have a safety net, especially if you’re in precarious employment. However, 
that’s not the case with healthcare workers. We are in demand everywhere. I don’t care 
about the generosity of social transfers in destination countries. However, when I was look-
ing for a job abroad, I was googling public schools for special-needs students and social- 
care systems because my child has a developmental disorder. It was important for me to 
move somewhere where quality schools and public services would be provided.
8.4.3  Patients’ Welfare
Healthcare workers who migrated to untypical destinations, such as India and 
remote Australian territories, spoke about a different rationale behind the decision 
to emigrate. For them it was mostly the urge to put their skills to good use in socio- 
economically disadvantaged environments and contribute to reducing health 
inequalities; however, many of them also felt the need to go back to grass roots and 
practice medicine without the use of sophisticated equipment and the pressures of 
bureaucracy, as Physician 1, who emigrated to the UK and India explained:
I felt like a machine for issuing prescriptions and referring patients to specialists. I did not 
feel like a doctor at all. It was not easy to find a placement in India but I eventually moved 
there and found work in a small local hospital in a remote area. It was very exciting to actu-
ally be able to practice medicine, to use my hands and my brain again, especially when 
encountering difficult cases. It was such an authentic experience.
For the healthcare workers, the need to help others was, in many cases, coupled 
with a strong urge to find comfort and feelings of self-fulfilment, a desire to be part 
of a close-knit community, to be appreciated and respected. These motivations for 
migrating were revealed by Malkki (2015) in her portrayal of international aid 
workers with the Finnish Red Cross and their need to alleviate their own neediness. 
In her book, she argues that their intense personal and professional engagement 
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with the world has become a way of losing themselves while paradoxically staying 
vitally alive. Aid workers are thus not portrayed by Malkki as self-sacrificing indi-
viduals performing heroic acts but, rather, as persons seeking to alleviate their own 
need to travel, give, help and be part of something bigger than themselves. The nar-
ratives shared by my respondents  – here, Midwife 3, who went to the UK and 
Australia – are strongly aligned with this line of argumentation.
My children left for university and I felt a sudden loss of purpose. It was definitely a very 
persistent case of empty nest syndrome. I wanted to change the scenery, I wanted to lose 
myself in work but, most of all, I wanted to feel needed again. I took a job at a community- 
style healthcare centre in remote Australian aboriginal territory. I managed to overcome my 
personal crisis by immersing myself in work and helping others. I felt like I was going back 
to the roots of midwifery and it felt great. I was invited to peoples’ homes and to their cel-
ebrations. I feel so happy that I took on this profession. It enabled me to move around the 
world and made me feel significant.
When asked how they felt about their patients left behind, the discussion turned 
to contemplating the ethical dilemma of the desire to move and the duty to remain. 
This issue is particularly controversial because it is causing a conflict between two 
sets of human rights: the right to health of patients in source countries and the right 
to the freedom of movement of healthcare workers. Alkire and Chen (2006) are 
among the most prominent scholars to acknowledge and throw light on this conflict. 
They argue that healthcare workers are themselves a locus of human rights that are 
to be protected, such as freedom of movement, the right to development, safe work-
ing conditions and a living wage; however, they argue that they are also a crucial 
instrument of the very health care to which others in a population have a right. In 
regard to this dilemma, some respondents noted that they struggled with guilt after 
moving abroad. They noted that they were the building blocks of the Slovenian 
healthcare system and that their emigration may have weakened healthcare delivery 
in their town or region. Other motivations prevailed, nevertheless, over the sense of 
patriotic obligation or obligation towards the state as a funder of their education, as 
Physicians 5 and 9, who moved to the US and Switzerland respectively, reveal:
I was once told that I should be ashamed of myself for leaving our own to take care of oth-
ers. That I should be ashamed of taking money from the taxpayers to get my degree and 
then deciding not to serve the very people who paid for my education. However, it was that 
very system that was actually pushing me to move abroad. My choice to move abroad was 
not because of the incentives from the foreign countries that would pull me towards them. 
It was because I was pushed away by poor workforce management, an overly hierarchical 
structure, a lack of respect from supervisors in my hospital and a tremendous level of 
machoism that I could no longer take.
I was very emotional when I decided to leave my patients behind. At some point I contem-
plated if what I was doing was ethical. I asked my supervisor if he had found a good 
replacement for me and he told me not to worry, everyone is replaceable. I asked him if they 
would be recruiting new physicians from the former Yugoslavia and expressed my worry 
over recruiting from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina because I knew they were lacking 
doctors and nurses there as well. However, I don’t think he was bothered with the ethical 
issues of recruitment at all.
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This dilemma has been discussed thoroughly by Shah (2010), who points out 
that opinions diverge considerably about what an ethical response to the interna-
tional migration of healthcare workers would be.12 There is ambiguity about the 
moral obligations of governments, individuals and health systems and the roles that 
global institutions should play. There are also apparent conflicts between the human 
rights of different parties and proposed responses can themselves appear discrimi-
natory in the light of conflicting stakeholder interests. In practice, however, beyond 
ethical and policy conundrums, a relentless urgency surrounds the problem of the 
accessibility of health facilities and services if healthcare workers decide to emi-
grate in substantial numbers from the very welfare states of which they are the 
building blocks. The problem is exacerbated further when a country does not have 
any significant comparative advantage in relation to other recruiting countries that 
are experiencing a deficit of healthcare workers themselves.
8.5  Conclusions
The healthcare sector is considered and governed as a public service and is part of 
the welfare state in many countries of Europe and elsewhere. This means that gov-
ernments have a responsibility to their citizens to provide healthcare (Glinos and 
Buchan 2014). In this chapter we have seen that Slovenia is committed to sustaining 
quality public healthcare but has been facing challenges in many areas, including 
healthcare workforce management. For a variety of reasons discussed in this chap-
ter and due to the fact that healthcare as a welfare service is subject to global market 
forces and the globalisation of reproductive labour (Yeates 2009), Slovenia has been 
continuously struggling to achieve the sustainability of its healthcare workforce. It 
was argued that the Slovenian market for a healthcare workforce is particularly 
vulnerable because it is targeted by other countries, some in close proximity, that 
have significant competitive advantage over Slovenia in terms of providing better 
remuneration and working conditions. At the same time, historically established 
patterns of labour recruitment from Western Balkan countries were disrupted by 
strong incentives introduced by higher-income countries. While a turn towards sus-
tainable healthcare workforce planning has been observed in recent years, the 
results have not yet been satisfactory and shortages continue to persist.
Poor strategies for workforce planning and retention are seen as one of the key 
reasons for emigration (Plotnikova 2018), which seems to be the case in Slovenia as 
well. When coupled with the demographic challenges which the country is facing, 
it becomes evident that firm policy action is required to mitigate the negative effects 
related to emigration and high turn-over rates. However, the vulnerability of the 
labour market for healthcare is exacerbated by the fact that the motivations for 
12 Although some soft regulatory mechanisms are in place, such as the WHO Global Code of 
Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel (WHO 2010), their implementation 
is challenging due to the insufficient engagement of key policy decision-makers (Siyam et al. 2013).
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healthcare workers’ emigration vary significantly, which makes policymaking and 
healthcare-workforce planning challenging. As Plotnikova (2018) notes, policies 
are ‘not always attuned to the individual creativity and imaginaries of health work-
ers that ultimately affect their mobility’ (Vindrola-Padros et al. 2018, 7). Migration 
as a physical movement is always accompanied by internal phenomena, the so- 
called inner negotiations in which people engage as they consider and employ 
mobility as a resource in their search for care and caring (Pfister 2018), welfare and 
wellbeing. Specific incentives may therefore either be a success with some health-
care workers or a failure with others. Some respondents participating in the study, 
for example, decided pragmatically to study medicine or nursing because they knew 
that these professions are in high demand globally and would, at some point, enable 
them to pursue a desired lifestyle outside Slovenia. Better management and remu-
neration might not, in their case, play an important factor in their decision to move 
abroad. Moreover, motivations to migrate change with age, vary according to life 
stages and are affected by unique life situations and desires. Thought processes and 
emotions that guide and affect the decision to migrate are always dynamic and per-
petually evolving processes. At some stage in their lives, healthcare workers might 
be attracted by the prospect of low-cost housing, childcare or other job-related ben-
efits offered to them while, at some other period in their life, they may be drawn by 
the need to provide care to disadvantaged people in poor regions or countries. Their 
narratives illustrate how unpredictable and intangible ground-level decisions to 
emigrate may be and what substantial effect they have on healthcare planning, pro-
vision and, subsequently, public health. That said, it should also be noted that the 
vulnerability of the healthcare sector, in terms of being constantly understaffed and 
under strain, should be perceived not only as a consequence of emigration but also 
as a cause. The relation between the two factors should therefore be conceived as 
circular.
Another finding stemming from this empirical research is that the generosity of 
social benefits in destination countries is not a decisive factor for healthcare workers 
emigrating from Slovenia. This can be attributed to the fact that most of the respon-
dents considered the Slovenian welfare state system as relatively generous in itself 
and to the firm conviction that their perpetually-in-demand profession is their most 
valuable and trusted financial safety net.
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Chapter 9
When the Expatriate Wife Returns Home: 
Swedish Women Navigating National 
Welfare Politics and Ideals of Gender 
Equality in Expatriate Family Migration
Catrin Lundström
9.1  Introduction
All the injustice, all the women without pension when they return, for example, with hus-
bands who may have left them, without a cent when they return, who raises those ques-
tions? […] These are the people folks want to forget. And many perhaps think that they have 
spent... that they have had a luxurious life. […] And perhaps some of them had (Elise, 70 
years old).
Social insurance services provided by the Swedish welfare state are primarily 
based on the contribution of the individual in terms of income and taxation. Such 
duties and obligations tend to be implicit in the idea of the citizen, further constitut-
ing the foundation of ‘the Swedish model’, including ‘the gender equality contract’, 
implemented in Sweden from the 1970s onwards (Hirdman 2002; Lundqvist 2015). 
Even though the period of ‘the great reforms’ stems from the 1930s, it was the 
expansion of a strong public sector  – comprising the parliamentary decision on 
individual taxation in 1971 (within the sphere of the family), subsidised child care, 
paid parental leave, a national health insurance system and the redistribution of 
social benefits and rights during the 1960s and 1970s  – that paved the way for 
women’s entrance into the labour force (Lundqvist 2015).
These foundational pillars of gender equality in Sweden rest upon rights and 
responsibilities relative to the welfare system, nurturing an ideal in which (men and 
women in) the dual-career family share responsibility for care and household work. 
The same premise characterises the political discussion at large – dealing with the 
possibilities for women (rather than men) to combine work and family – often with 
the point of origin in mothers’ (and, to a lesser extent) fathers’ life puzzle in a het-
erosexual family, which constitutes the ideal type for gender equality policies in 
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Sweden (Bäck-Wiklund and Bergsten 2010; Lundqvist 2015; Nordenmark 2004). 
Because of the strong dual-career ideal, there are virtually no discussions about the 
situation for women whose lives happen to be structured differently.
This chapter is based on interviews with former expatriate wives who returned to 
Sweden after living as ‘trailing spouses’ abroad. It asks how they navigate Swedish 
norms of gender equality in policy and practice upon return. The aim is to discuss 
how the women’s narratives of political and practical ideals formed around work, 
gender equality, dual income and pension all intersect – and sometimes conflict – 
with notions and idea(l)s of gender, Swedishness and heterosexuality. It is argued 
that their experiences of expatriate life are related to questions of national identity, 
gender dependencies and disadvantages in terms of welfare for the women.
Starting from Elise’s question (above) about the situation for returning expatriate 
wives without ‘a cent when they return’, the chapter discusses the socio-political 
consequences of the women’s economic situation and their gendered dependency, in 
terms of welfare state policies of redistribution and pension issues. Though it would 
be utterly incorrect to compare this group of expatriate women with poor pensioners 
in general – since the women in this study often had access to significant resources 
such as property, family assets and social capital – their stories do shed light on an 
existing gap for both migrants and women in general in the Swedish welfare state.
In this manner, questions of emigration and immigration are highlighted, as are 
issues involving citizenship and gender in relation to equality, welfare and redistri-
bution within the family and society at large. How do expatriate wives navigate 
market-based solutions abroad – without access to, for example, childcare – and 
what are the implications for their migration, work and gender equality when they 
return to Sweden? How do they reflect upon gender, national identity and hetero-
sexual family ideals in this situation?
9.2  From Gender Equality to Homemaker and Back Again
The transition from a system built on ‘stay-at-home-mums’ to the dual-earner 
household has been crucial for the Swedish model from the 1960s and onwards, at 
a time when traditional values and ideas about the nuclear family were questioned 
(Lundqvist 2015). Economic and social independence guided governmental com-
mittees at the time, with the goal that women should no longer have to choose 
between having a job and having children (SOU 1964, 36). In conjunction with this 
vision, the Swedish state initiated an activation programme to bring women out into 
the labour force which, in the coming decades, would introduce one million women 
to salaried labour; women in Sweden would thus proceed from a ‘housewife con-
tract’ to a ‘gender equality contract’, in which (primarily) childcare was taken over 
by state institutions (Hirdman 2002). Carbin et al. (2017, 106) argue that homemak-
ers can be defined ‘by their absence from the labour market and their presence in a 
heterosexual marriage’. This is also a dynamic that is centred in the women’s narra-
tives, their situation of being an expatriate wife and  – at least during this 
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period – being located outside the labour force and the relation to issues of work, 
pensionable income and financial dependence on their husbands.
In contemporary Swedish society, with the dual-earner household and the pri-
macy of salaried work as the core of the welfare state, criticism has drawn attention 
to how ‘employment’ is prioritised over the question of how much we actually need 
to work in a society where productivity is constantly increasing (Paulsen 2010). The 
feminist critique of the primacy of salaried work points out that women’s historical 
entry to – and ‘liberation’ through – the labour force during the 1960s and 1970s 
also meant that the ‘housewife norm’ was replaced by a ‘salaried work standard’, 
where state-run childcare and domestic work would be performed outside, or along-
side, salaried labour – a task referred to as ‘the second shift’ (Carbin et al. 2017, 36; 
Hochschild 2003). Women still devote a larger amount of time to household work 
compared to men (Statistics Sweden 2018).
9.3  Gender and Migration in the Swedish Pension System
Since two-thirds of my informants were 60 years or older, the pension system is of 
particular interest for this chapter. The income-related pension system in Sweden is 
based on three parts: general pension (allmän pension, which includes all kinds of 
state-financed subsidies through social taxes), occupational pension (tjänstepen-
sion, which is income related and paid by the employer) and private savings. Of 
pivotal importance in relation to gender and migration is the change in the income- 
related pension which, after the 1994 Swedish pension reform, was guided by the 
‘lifetime-income principle’ (Government Bill 1993/94:250). The lifetime-income 
principle replaced the earlier rules that were based on the best 15 income years of a 
person’s life, which was considered too expensive. This change would disadvantage 
both those working part-time and those who were periodically located outside the 
labour force as a result of unpaid (care) work or for other reasons – in other words, 
primarily women and immigrants (Ekberg and Lindh 2011).1 Expatriates are, in 
general, dependent on their contracts with private companies.
Other parts, such as social assistance or the state-financed guaranteed pension 
(garantipension) exist to protect those who have earned little or no income during 
their lives. A state-financed guaranteed pension is based upon income, civil status 
and the length of residency in Sweden. In order to receive the maximum guaranteed 
pension (8254 Swedish kronor a month) a person must have resided in Sweden for 
40 years, between 16 and 64 years of age. In 2019, every third pensioner – 656,700 
people – received a guaranteed pension (Pensionsmyndigheten 2019), four out of 
1 Rules and regulations vary due to where the person comes from, in which country s/he has resided 
as an expatriate, etc. Since women in this study comprise such a heterogeneous group relative to 
their time abroad and their countries of residence, I cannot account for all possible scenarios in this 
chapter.
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five of whom were women. As we shall see, the guaranteed pension did not, in most 
cases, cover the situation for the expatriate wives interviewed.
It is, for ‘natural’ reasons, more difficult for those who immigrated later in life, 
to earn a pension equivalent to native Swedes within the system of the lifetime- 
income principle. Furthermore, immigrants do not have the right to a full guaran-
teed pension if they have resided in the country for less than 40 years. As Ekberg 
and Lindh (2011, 38) state, there are no simple conclusions to draw in studies 
between foreign and native-born pensioners but they point out that ‘the previous 
rules for calculating public pension [based on income from work over a 15-year 
period of time] were more favourable to immigrants than the recent rules [based on 
the sum of salaried work throughout a person’s entire life]’.2
Despite the strong focus on gender equality in working life, women continue to 
dominate the group of poor pensioners in Sweden as they only have 68% of men’s 
pensions on average (Statistics Sweden 2018, 86). In a pension system mainly based 
upon salaried work, the well-paid (often men) working full-time for their entire 
lives are rewarded, whereas those (mostly women) who work part-time or for por-
tions of their lives in poorly paid professions are disadvantaged. This arrangement 
has a significant meaning for women in general, who spend more time than men 
doing household work, are more likely to have part-time jobs within the public sec-
tor and have structurally lower wages, earning an average of just 76% of men’s 
wages on a yearly basis (Statistics Sweden 2018); it is of particular importance for 
the expatriate wives interviewed here.
9.4  Fieldwork in an All-Women’s Network
The study is based on qualitative interviews, participatory observation and visual 
methods with women who returned to Sweden after living a shorter or longer period 
of time abroad. The data are drawn from 46 semi-structured and in-depth interviews 
with returning Swedish migrant women and participatory observation on 25 occa-
sions over a period of 8 months of fieldwork in four different cities in Sweden dur-
ing 2014 and 2015.3 The women were also asked to draw a map of their social 
networks, which served both as a basis for discussion and to give an overview of 
their (perceived) social locations.4 Most of them had joined various networks for 
2 Author’s translation.
3 The interviews were carried out by post-doc Lena Sohl, hired on the project ‘To reintegrate 
Swedishness: The policy of belonging among repatriating Swedish migrant women’.
4 All material has been rendered anonymous, includes both names of the informants, local chapters, 
as well as businesses and other information that could be used to identify the informants. The 
project was approved by the Central Ethical Review Board in Linköping. It follows ethical guide-
lines and principles for societal research through informed consent, anonymisation and confiden-
tiality within research. Contact information has not been stored together with the transcripts. The 
women have consented to audio recordings and publication of their transcribed interviews. They 
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Swedes returning ‘home’ but they were mainly recruited through the Swedish 
Women’s Educational Association (SWEA) in Sweden, via participation in SWEA’s 
activities and via a snowball method, whereby one informant suggests others. 
SWEA is a broad international network with around 7000 members worldwide. 
Although it started as a network for accompanying spouses abroad, some of the 
largest local branches today are found in Sweden. This is not surprising, since 
returning Swedes have been one of the single largest immigrant groups in the coun-
try for many years.5 Originating from the SWEA network resulted in a group domi-
nated by expatriate wives.6 The informants were between 33 and 80 years old and 
had been living in around 30 different countries, in some cases for as long as 
45 years.
Participant observation was carried out in SWEA’s local chapters and networks 
in Sweden at lunches, after-work meetings (despite the fact that most of them were 
not working) and during cultural activities such as theatre visits. Although the tran-
scribed interviews constitute the primary source of analysis, participant observation 
has offered contextualisation of the interview material and a way to create contacts 
and trust in the interview situations. This type of ‘crystallisation’ facilitates the per-
spective of a research question from different angles in order to reach a more coher-
ent picture of a phenomenon or to discover contradictions within the material 
(Barbour 1998; Richardson 2000). Potential informants were encouraged to contact 
researchers voluntarily without being selected by the chairman or other gatekeeper, 
although this procedure also raises questions about what characterises those who 
voluntarily choose to participate (Morgan 1998). Certainly, the interviews revealed 
a general willingness (and, perhaps, need) to speak about issues related to (salaried 
and non-salaried) work, gender equality and Swedishness.
The fact that the majority of the women had been expatriate wives rather than 
women with their own careers, coincides with previous studies of Swedes abroad 
which show that significantly more men have moved abroad due to (their own) 
employment than have women (Solevid 2016). During the interviews, questions 
were asked about migration histories, the reasons behind moving home again, rela-
tionships (to their spouses), employment, housing, finances, feelings of ‘belong-
ing’ – both abroad and in Sweden – and about their life situations having returned 
to Sweden. Through close reading of the transcriptions, some common themes and 
variations of them within and between the interviews have been identified 
(Mason 2002).
The majority of women were in their 60s and 70s at the time of the interviews 
and maintained a relatively privileged lifestyle following their position abroad as an 
have been able to choose, throughout the process, whether or not they wanted to answer the ques-
tions or discontinue the interview.
5 This has recently changed after the large wave of immigration due to the war in Syria. In 2018, 
the largest groups of immigrants were those born in Syria (14,387), Sweden (12,805) and 
Afghanistan (8093) – see www.scb.se
6 A few did have a career of their own; however, they are not the focus of this chapter. See Lundström 
(2018) for a more detailed comparison between these groups.
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‘international’ upper-middle or upper-class female. Their lives abroad had been 
dominated by taking care of the children, domestic work, representation and hospi-
tality in the form of social events and dinners, acting as employers for their domestic 
workers, volunteering (often in connection with children’s activities or school) and 
participation in the various social activities arranged by SWEA or other social clubs. 
A small group of women had their own international careers, working mainly for 
Swedish or international companies or organisations. The age of the women and the 
fact that they were interviewed after their return to Sweden means that the perspec-
tives in their stories shift – while they look back at their time abroad, they describe 
their lived present in Sweden. The analysis is thus based on the statements being 
shaped by the interview situation as such, as a form of situational knowledge in rela-
tion to time and space (Haraway 1988).
In many ways, migration did not interrupt the women’s structural privileges 
linked to race or class. However, as the interviews show, this group of white Swedish 
women holds a central position in maintaining (white) male transnational privilege 
within the family structure and men’s social positions in the new society. At the 
same time, these family-related privileges also maintained the women’s gendered 
dependence on their husbands, abroad as well as back in Sweden on return.
9.5  The Transnationalisation of Social Inequality 
The majority of women in this study have – like many other immigrants – been 
located outside of the Swedish labour force for large periods of their working life, 
due to the lack of childcare, work permits and other circumstances during the time 
abroad. These conditions significantly affected their (right to a) pension upon return. 
As stated, this group of (returning) expatriate wives are not representative of poor 
pensioners but they equally diverge from the Swedish self-image of a gender-equal 
society in which women participate in the labour force on equal terms with men 
(Suter 2019).
One way to situate the women in this study is to proceed from Weiss’ (2005) 
discussion on the transnationalisation of social inequality, in which migrants are 
positioned in varying ways depending upon their ties and access to ‘weak’ or 
‘strong’ welfare states. Since migrant populations are located in more than one 
nation state, Weiss highlights how labour markets, cultural capital and reciprocal 
relations are increasingly transnational. One aspect of this transnational relationship 
is that ‘people often remain socially or symbolically attached to places after they 
have physically left them’ (Weiss 2005, 713) – in this case to the Swedish wel-
fare state.
Weiss (2005) distinguishes the following three social positions in a transnational 
world society; the transnational upper classes, the middle layers and the lower posi-
tions. These actors have significantly different positions within transnational migra-
tion, defined by their dependencies and affiliation to different nation states and 
welfare systems. The women interviewed, who belonged to what Weiss calls the 
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transnational upper classes, described themselves as more or less financially inde-
pendent and, thereby, to a greater extent, independent of the strong Swedish welfare 
state, as they were not dependent on the guaranteed pension, unemployment bene-
fits or other economic support, yet had access to basic services such as health care 
as Swedish citizens.
For the middle layers – who are more ‘dependent on the national welfare state 
they are affiliated with’ – gaps in the strong Swedish welfare infrastructure were 
more worrisome (Weiss 2005, 714). They underscored (and at times rediscovered) 
their dependency on and their trust in the Swedish welfare state, as they often kept 
their Swedish citizenship while abroad as a guarantee for the future. Many of them 
believed that they, as Swedish citizens, had rights to a guaranteed pension in Sweden 
and were often unaware of the requirement of residency in the country. Both cases, 
however, tend to include a great measure of dependency relative to their husbands. 
While the women themselves often requested family-oriented political solutions to 
issues of income redistribution and pension, the chapter raises the connections 
between the women’s condition and broader political issues within the framework 
of welfare policies and redistribution.
9.6  Leaving Working Life – And Losing Swedish 
National Identity?
Expatriate life involved a different turn compared to those remaining in Sweden. 
In the absence of work, life seemed passive and ‘dull’ for many of the informants. 
This reflects the fact that the choice to work or not rarely seemed to be an entirely 
individual choice. Rather, it was a question of work permit, childcare and practical 
circumstances, as 38-year-old Ulrica explained:
Everyone wanted to work but nobody did because you are expected to be at home and take 
care of the children and that is a full-time job in itself. […] You were expected to be a house-
wife. […] As a woman, I was not accustomed to standing behind my husband. I had a hard 
time with that and I was annoyed by it too. […] The woman should be there and take care 
of the children and that is absolutely fantastic in many ways; without the women, the men 
could not have done their things. […] Which is good but, well, I had a hard time with it and 
I actually had a hard time with it the whole time.
Leaving professional life is an issue that traverses gender, national identity, the 
division of labour and heterosexuality. Expressions such as ‘You are expected to be 
at home and take care of the children’ reflect Ulrica’s view of what a woman is 
required to do or be – unclear by whom – even if it is contrary to Swedish percep-
tions of gender equality. In other words, as the family moved out of Sweden, Ulrica 
saw herself being ‘expected’ to give up her job and become ‘a housewife’, thus fill-
ing the void of national childcare. While the welfare-state infrastructure was a foun-
dational pillar for women’s participation in the labour force, the women in this study 
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have been those retreating to the home when these services are no longer available. 
Despite their age differences, the women had an overwhelmingly consistent picture 
of their expected duties in the expatriate family.
The women’s new roles abroad were described as a prerequisite for the men’s 
lives and careers but, at the same time, they carried a feeling of subordination. On 
the question of whether the women felt that they had sacrificed something during 
their stay abroad, they often mentioned the lack of a professional life.
The idea of gender equality in Sweden – in terms of work and dual-earner house-
holds – has been intimately associated with a form of national identity or belonging, 
in addition to a political system (Keskinen et al. 2009); the relationship between 
gender equality and Swedishness proved to be central to the women’s reasoning 
about work and expatriate life. Having a job and a professional identity was indeed 
described as a crucial part of the Swedish national identity itself. Since migration is 
not a clear before-and-after experience but reflects on-going emotional journeys, 
national ideologies are not something so easily left behind (Ryan 2008). As first- 
generation migrants, they carried with them specific national discourses of gender 
equality. The interviewed women both identified with and contested the Swedish 
gender-equality ideology. It was clear that they – as expatriate wives – did not live 
up to a gender-equal Swedish lifestyle.
When the women visited Sweden during the summer, many of them became 
aware of the fact that they were not able to transfer the role of an expatriate wife – 
and someone globally privileged – to a Swedish norm of salaried labour, as experi-
enced by Edith (67):
When you were home during the summer, you felt a little bit like an alien […] Everyone 
talked about their job and job-related things and so on and you… Well, of course you could 
talk about ... But it felt so silly to talk about… No one was interested in hearing that, 
because you were expected to talk about job and day-care and all that […] So this sense of 
a professional identity disappeared.
Being stuck between your ‘job and day-care’ seems to be the obvious and ‘nor-
mal’ life puzzle for women with young children in the Swedish dual-earner house-
hold. For Edith, living a life outside of salaried work appeared to be just ‘silly’. Elsa, 
70 years old, on the other hand, explains that she has never ‘been up for a career’ and 
that she ‘liked to be home and putter’ – ‘I don’t like to be stressed and I like to do 
what I want’. The tendency to reduce care work to “puttering” was also central to the 
rhetoric of liberating the homemaker during the 1960s (Carbin et al. 2017). Other 
women argued that, for the first time in their life, they were allowed to see what life 
could be like outside the realm of salaried employment. For 70-year-old Elise the 
adjustment to becoming an expatriate wife was dramatic in a positive way:
When we moved to Luxembourg, I was actually at home first, which was just incredible, 
when suddenly one could choose, when one was not forced to do something. […] I thought 
it was nice, if I may be completely honest.
For Elise, the feeling that it was ‘nice’ not being ‘forced to do something’ was 
associated with the sting of a guilty conscience, a feeling of traversing Swedish 
norms that were taken for granted. Nevertheless, although expatriate wives 
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sometimes appreciated life outside salaried work, this economic dependency would 
follow them through life.
9.7  To Be a Homemaker: On Subordination and Dependency
Becoming a ‘homemaker’ as part of the role of an expatriate wife was often the 
result of circumstances surrounding residency abroad. Without state-subsidised 
childcare or a working visa, in a heterosexual marriage that provided the husband 
with a salary as the breadwinner of the family, in combination with wife-related 
duties and mothering, the ‘stay-at-home mum’ became the solution and the prereq-
uisite for the stay abroad as well as for the husband’s career, as 75-year-old Maj 
explains:
I mean, I’ve been an accompanying spouse to my husband and that involves a lot of work. 
There was a lot of representation, both at official occasions and at home and there were 
cocktail parties and dinners and… […] You have to go through with it. […] It might sound 
glamorous to say we had cocktail parties and dinners. […] But there is a lot required to pull 
that off.
In addition to representation, Maj describes life as an accompanying spouse as a 
time-consuming duty: ‘You have to go through with it … There is a lot required’ (cf. 
Arieli 2007; Fechter 2010; Hochschild 1969). Family life in the Swedish gender- 
equality system – based on salaried work – and the conditions for life in an expatri-
ate family thus look fundamentally different. As Fanny, 69 years old, puts it: ‘In 
Sweden you are expected to work, in Brazil you are expected to be at home’. Some 
women perceived it to be a ‘luxury’ to be able to live on one salary. While the expa-
triate wife was in a privileged position abroad, in a community mainly populated by 
white women dedicated to various gendered duties, it was at the same time associ-
ated with dependence and subordination, as Fanny continues:
I had a red line over my name [in the visa], with the word dependencia [dependent] written 
across it, which means I was financially dependent. So when Amanda [her daughter] would 
turn 12, she would get such a dash too. And then I said, ‘She shall never experience having 
a red line over her name’, so that was one of the reasons why I was pushing for us to 
go home.
For Fanny, the position as ‘dependent’ became painfully tangible and impossible 
to live with when her daughter was given the same status of dependencia as she had 
herself. In connection to this, her own situation became unbearable and she was now 
‘pushing’ for a move back home again. For others, financial dependence led to a 
feeling of inequality that was incompatible with a Swedish identity. Tora, 64 years 
old, says that:
[When I] came to Germany and wanted to start a contract for a cell phone, I couldn’t do it, 
because I was an accompanying spouse [without an income of her own]. It was very hard 
for me. It was incredibly hard. […] I did not think about it until I realized that ‘Oh dear, here 
you are like a ...’ One belongs to the husband in a completely different way, which I do not 
like of course. […] In that sense, I am very Swedish and I want to deal with things myself 
and be free and I do think, in a way, that people should work.
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Abroad, the women felt limited and curbed in their new position. Tora discovered 
that she was unable to take on a cell phone contract for herself, which became ‘evi-
dence’ of her subordinate position. The women’s new lives as caregivers in the 
expatriate heterosexual family also highlight the interrelations between gender, 
power and globalisation, in which ‘the success of global capitalism [is] fundamen-
tally based on sexism’ (Fechter 2010, 1281). Structurally, while men have promi-
nent roles in (masculinised) transnational companies, women manage the ‘household 
service’ in the (feminised) home (cf. Hearn 2015).
Virtually all the female interviewees described the role of the expatriate wife as 
associated with a sense of subordination in some way. There was a tension between 
the fact that they carried with them national ideals of a dual-earner household model 
based upon gender equality and salaried labour while, at the same time, practically 
dedicated themselves to unpaid (and perceived as) ‘insignificant’ care work. The 
feeling of inequality, subordination and incompleteness was something that the 
women handled in different ways. Hilda, 67, explains that ‘Thankfully I like cook-
ing, and that was the only way I could show that I was good for something […] but 
I would rather have had a job that provided a pension’. Others pointed out that gen-
der equality could be upheld by equating different gendered tasks (as an alternative 
dual-earner model). Still others did various types of non-profit work in order to not 
appear as dependent wives, especially before they had children. Their strategies 
show how women in different ways managed the inequality that framed their lives. 
It was also common to hire an external person, often a migrant woman, to take care 
of the domestic work, in order to feel less dependent on one’s husband and appear 
less ‘un-Swedish’ (e.g. Lundström 2012, 2013, 2014).7
9.8  ‘What Do you Do all Day Long?’
The women strongly identified with Swedish gender-equality ideals and the feel-
ing of gender inequality was therefore posed in contrast to Swedish norms and val-
ues. As Alva, 80  years old, points out, ‘all’ women work now, ‘there are no 
housewives anymore’. It was also difficult to explain to other Swedes what they 
occupied themselves with during the day, as Ellen, 59, shows:
People say, like, ‘You mean you’re not working [gasping] … but what do you do all the 
time?’ […] It’s pretty strenuous for two people working full-time and having young chil-
dren and manage everything […] I don’t think I would have had four children if I had lived 
in Sweden, I do not think so, it would probably have been enough with two, I think.
Basically, Ellen describes care work as something occupying all her time. This 
raises the issue of both working women’s ‘second shift’ and the work carried out by 
7 The international division of labour has been analysed by a number of researchers (Ehrenreich 




women in public childcare. Had she needed to have a salaried job in Sweden, she 
would probably have chosen to have fewer children. However, care work, as such, 
was not seen as credible work by ‘Swedes’, according to the women. Nathalie, 
53 years old, recalls an occasion in Sweden when the question of her professional 
life came up:
I thought I was someone; but apparently, I am not any longer since everyone else is trying 
to make me to understand that I am not. […] Identity issues mean much more than you 
imagine, because there are so many who comment on my life, in one way or another, when 
you come home [to Sweden] […] I don’t think that anyone asked me what I did for a living 
during those two years [abroad]. Here we are so damn quick to ask ‘So what do you work 
with then?’ and that is not a positive question – in fact, [what job one has] it is not interest-
ing at all.
Not being able to account for a (professional) life when meeting Swedes was a 
new experience for Nathalie, who did not come across such questions during her life 
as an expatriate wife. In her account, Sweden appears to be a country where one is 
required to have a job and a professional identity in order to ‘be someone’, in con-
trast to her life as an expatriate wife in Malaysia. For Nathalie, the lack of a profes-
sional identity was a matter of existence. She felt that she ‘shrunk’ without a job in 
Sweden. ‘I wonder, who am I now?’ she says. In this way, the norm of salaried work 
is a forming system that both augments and shrinks people depending on their loca-
tion in it. Clara, 43, also describes the summers in Sweden as occasions when she 
experienced an ‘inferiority complex’:
It came every summer, every time you went back to Sweden, it came… this inferiority 
complex [...] which I know many others identify with too. During the summer when you… 
come home to Sweden on holidays, for example, people ask ‘What do you do all day long?’ 
because what I did all day, there is no one in Sweden who can come to terms with that, 
because it is just luxury, so they say, ‘You have no job, you are just floating around’.
It is clear from the quotes that care work itself was not itself considered a job by 
people in Sweden. It is something that is done without being done. What does Clara 
actually do ‘all day long’ without salaried work? The women thus find themselves 
with the feeling of actually performing a job but without a professional identity. At 
the same time, it is a fact that women are the ones who perform ‘the second shift’ in 
addition to their salaried employment (Hochschild 2003). In this way, expatriate life 
seemingly presupposes that there are one (or more) women who conduct household 
work, childcare and representation as their (unpaid) work.
However, the women’s stories show that Swedish norms of gender equality tend 
to become subordinated to gender norms within the framework of the heterosexual 
family in expatriate contexts.8 Although the women feel subordinated and less valu-
able in their roles as expatriate wives, ideas about Swedishness and gender equality 
become secondary in relation to the expected ideals of gender and heterosexuality 
in practice, in the sense that the dual-earner household model no longer functions as 
8 The women interviewed who had a career of their own often tuned down the importance of their 
work in relation to their husbands’ (Lundström 2018). They also hired services carried out by a 
third party, like many expatriate families do when the women do not work (Lundström 2014).
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the dominant ideal. Only gender appears to prevail from the gender-equality con-
tract. Indeed, there seems to be a conflict between the absence of a professional 
identity and explicit ideals of gender equality and Swedishness, although not 
between mothering and implicit norms of heterosexuality and gender. Apparently, 
the expatriate wives found themselves snapped back in time between the choice of 
being a Swedish gender-equal woman or a mother in line with heterosexual gen-
dered norms.
The reasons for returning to salaried work in Sweden were not only economic in 
nature but a matter of identity and a sense of independence for this group of women. 
Solveig, 69 years old, explains that ‘Many people asked me when I started: “Why 
are you here ... you do not have to work?” It doesn’t have to do with that. […] You 
have to feel good about yourself’. Sabine, 68, did not want to accompany her hus-
band without being sure of her work still being there for her when she came back:
Yes, it was very important, because I have never been unemployed, so I absolutely wanted 
my job. […] I wanted to be independent as well. […] I mean, that you are a person of your 
own, with one’s own profession. And not just a housewife. But having your own job, your 
own thoughts, and your own colleagues and not in need to… It was something that my 
mother inculcated in me: ‘Make sure you have your own profession so that you won’t 
become dependent on your husband’.
Having a job is here linked to a sense of independence and having ‘your own 
thoughts’ and ‘your own colleagues’. A professional identity is still associated with 
being a worthy human being in a broad sense and, even further, with a Swedish 
national identity. This logic reflects both the dual-earner household model and the 
primacy of the work ideal. In order to be ‘someone’ and mean ‘something’, one 
must have a salaried job. This reasoning became painfully clear upon returning 
to Sweden.
9.9  Back to the Future in the Swedish Welfare State
Although most women saw the opportunity to move abroad as a positive experi-
ence that would enrich their lives in many ways, they later realised that they would 
encounter new situations – in the present as well as in the future. At first, the ques-
tion of profession and salaried work appeared to be a matter of identity but, arriving 
back in Sweden, the issue of provision in the Swedish welfare state became an 
economic issue. The Swedish welfare system did not function in the way they had 
imagined it would. However, the choice to return did entail an existential dimension 
in relation to both gender equality and national identity, as Clara, 43, found:
Subconsciously, it was important to move back to Sweden. I felt like I slowly disappeared, 
it sounds like a big word, but your identity as Swedish ... Women are expected to work ... 
We are expected to be equal, and to work…
Clara’s choice to return to Sweden was rooted in a sense of disappearing as a 
person abroad. When her professional identity  – and thus her identity as 
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‘Swedish’ – was lost, she felt that she ‘slowly disappeared’. Returning to Sweden 
further exposed the women to the practical questions of income, pension and basic 
security that they had been able to take a break from during their stay abroad. They 
were now confronted with the Swedish welfare system that did not account for their 
position as expatriate wives in between different national systems, most overtly 
with regard to the pension system – which is based on having lived and worked in 
Sweden (or elsewhere).9 They were confronted anew with their positions as hetero-
sexual subjects in a position of dependence. If they had previously perceived their 
time abroad as expatriate wives as a parenthesis in their lives, they now learned that 
their migrant history would also define their future. As Laila, 55, puts it: ‘I had 
imagined that there was some sort of basic sum of 7,000 [guaranteed pension] 
something, for everyone, but that was not the case. If you haven’t worked in Sweden, 
you won’t get a [guaranteed] pension, and after all, I hadn’t’.
Back in Sweden, it was difficult to re-integrate into society. Nathalie, 53, 
describes how she had to re-evaluate the meaning of her citizenship:
You had to start thinking about things that I had never thought of before. In the past, I had 
really felt safe, everything had been arranged, and all of a sudden, it was like… I almost 
panicked when I realized that I have... I have nothing. If something were to happen, then I 
would be completely alone, without help from anyone. So you feel a little... Not being 
welcome home, but a sense of... ‘Well, if you are so stupid as to go abroad, then you can 
have this too’, a little bit like that… Pretty much so in relation to both authorities and sys-
tems and people and…
If Swedish citizenship constituted a kind of assurance abroad, with the feeling 
that someone would take care of you when you return home, coming back and real-
ising that no one had prepared a place for you was therefore a shocking insight. In 
her encounter with the national welfare state, based on salaried labour in the dual-
earner model, Nathalie found that she was left ‘completely alone’ with a sense of 
panic. Fanny, too, explains that it was ‘quite difficult’ to come back, encountering a 
welfare system not merely based on Swedish citizenship. As Solveig explains, those 
who ‘lived for many years abroad do not have a good pension when they come 
home … and one’s self-confidence is not exactly at its height. […] So, when you are 
faced with the shock of maybe not getting a job […] then we sacrifice our experience’.
9.10  Family-Oriented Privileges and Gendered Dependency
It is important to point out that the women were located in privileged positions 
relative to many other migrants, since their husbands in many cases actually could 
support them. Yvonne, 62 years old, explains that:
9 Pension rules depends upon which country a person has resided and worked in, as well as whether 
or not s/he has refugee status.
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I never worried about that, but I do know that I don’t have any pension to talk about, basi-
cally nothing but we have thought about that in the family, so I will probably manage 
anyway...
Not having a pension ‘to talk about’ does not seem to worry Yvonne. Without a 
pension of one’s own, the women remained dependent on their husband’s pensions 
(or allowances) and their good will. Birgit, 77 years old, explains that she does not 
worry too much about it either:
My husband has a good pension, he has a great pension, but if he should pass away or pass 
on as you say, then I must ... I won’t be able to live in this house, for example [...] No, it 
won’t work, so in that case I have to sell everything. But that’s the way it is for most people.
Without her husband’s support, Birgit no longer sees herself being able to afford 
the house she lives in. As for 75-year-old Maj, safety is conditional on her marriage 
and the fact that her husband was alive:
I do feel safe because of our private savings, quite frankly. But if I were alone ... then I’d 
need to have some saved capital to live on, because I can’t live on this pension.
Maj and Yvonne present themselves as independent subjects, relative the nation 
state, due to their private assets and savings. Like the transnational upper classes in 
Weiss’ (2005) analysis, they perceive themselves as relatively independent with 
regard to the welfare state. However, regardless of their (perceived) independence 
from the state, their provision was in most cases dependent on their continued mar-
riage. Hence, such safety was often conditioned by their husbands and/or their pos-
sible generosity.
Through their husbands, Yvonne, Birgit and Maj, like other women, had access 
to significant economic and social privileges. Their white upper-middle-class privi-
leges were, however, as Phyllis Palmer (1989, 16) formulates it, ‘integrally linked to 
their subordinate relations with white men’. Family-related privileges thus maintain 
their class and racially structured positions, yet through a gendered dependency, in 
the present, as well as in the future. Nadja, 46, explains this:
I have had no private pension savings in Sweden over these 11 years, so it is like a hole that 
is very noticeable, really […] as an effect of our mobility.
In addition to the feeling of insufficiency, there was an underlying concern for a 
possible divorce. Ellinor, at 61, realised that she could not afford a divorce: ‘I don’t 
have the resources’. The women who had divorced were obliged to ask other family 
members for financial help. Forty-year-old Stella’s dependency on her husband only 
became apparent after their divorce:
We had a joint pension fund so that half of the money ... but when we divorced, my part was 
frozen [until retirement age], so I have it, but I can’t draw on it – the money is still there.
Sigrid, 54, says that when she looks back on her stay abroad:
I regret it, because it is more fun to work as a civil engineer, you make money and have a 
fun job but, at the same time, I have had a very good life with our children and we always 




Sigrid reflects on what she sacrificed while being at home with ‘our children’ and 
concludes that she gave up ‘money’ and ‘a fun job’. Today, Sigrid is divorced and 
has moved away from her husband; she explains that ‘I have no right to the salary, 
but I still get [an allowance] thanks to his good will’ – precisely, the kind of depen-
dency that the Swedish welfare state is structured to avoid.
Their location between heterosexual family norms and working ideals affected 
the women’s political views. The issue of individual taxation, which has been a mat-
ter of course for Swedish policies of gender equality, was perceived as a hindrance 
for them. Elisabeth, 45 years old, now argues that ‘it might not be so bad with joint 
taxation, [it is] actually a kind of work to take care of a family and children’. Signe, 
70 years old, on the other hand, thought that ‘perhaps it should be more natural to 
be at home and take care of young children for a longer period of time’. Suddenly, 
the Swedish gender-equality policy and dual-earner model appeared as an individ-
ual loss for them, as Elise, 70, says:
We did not get any pension credits when we moved […] but if you live in a country where 
you get at least part of your husband’s pension… That is impossible to say in Sweden. Then 
people go mad […] ‘But what if you have lived your whole life together, shouldn’t you 
share your pension?’
From their perspective, men should not be able to choose whether or not they 
share their income and pension with their spouse. Without the right to a guaranteed 
pension then a generous spouse, a family fortune, an inheritance or a loan became 
the salvation for women. In the light of these circumstances, these women perceived 
a joint (family and marriage-based) taxation system to be more advantageous. When 
looking at the family as a unit, ‘the income pooling […] enables the household to be 
perceived as a unit with unitary interests, despite the very different relationships to 
production of its separate members’ (Hartmann 1981, 374). However, are pension 
issues and income distribution in relation to gender and migration merely a fam-
ily issue?
9.11  Conclusions
This chapter has examined the experiences of returning migrant women and their 
negotiations of gender (in)equality, work and national identity in expatriate families 
caught between different market-based systems abroad and the national welfare 
system in Sweden. In many ways, the women’s work enabled their husbands’ 
careers and expatriate life and family. The women were thus located between a het-
erosexual family norm (in which women continue to take the primary responsibility 
for children) and the Swedish model of gender equality (in which women and men 
are co-equal individuals in a dual-earner household relative to the services that the 
welfare state provides). Upon migration, the ideals of the dual-earner household 
model were not transferred into new contexts and situations. When the welfare state 
withdrew, the women in this study had to fill the void.
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On the one hand, the women said that they were ‘expected’ to be flexible actors 
in a global market and, at least indirectly, willing to give up a career for their hus-
band’s jobs in Swedish (or transnational) companies abroad. On the other hand, 
redistribution in the national welfare state is organised on the principle of residency 
and labour conducted within the country. As a solution to this situation, the women 
requested a policy of joint taxation, organised to fit their roles as global actors in a 
heterosexual family norm.
Could their situations be perceived differently? The outcomes of Swedish 
gender- equality policy continue to disadvantage female pensioners, who work part- 
time to a greater extent than do men. At the same time, immigrants have difficulty 
in receiving an acceptable pension  – and living standard  – during their time in 
Sweden (Ekberg and Lindh 2011). These women’s stories reveal the shared vulner-
ability of both these groups and problematises ‘taken-for-granted’ conflict lines 
between Swedish citizens and migrants.
If the guaranteed pension is a basic protection, questions raised are perhaps why 
residency should matter for the care work (in this case) that is carried out. If the 
opportunity (for Swedish men) to move and work abroad (for Swedish or interna-
tional companies) is dependent on unpaid care work (conducted by women as ‘trail-
ing spouses’), it may be reasonable to ask what the principles of redistribution 
should look like. In this case, there are both similarities and differences between the 
various immigrant groups. While Swedish citizens (foreign- or native-born) resid-
ing in Sweden are entitled to a guaranteed pension, regardless of whether they have 
worked or not, Swedish citizens living and working abroad are generally left to 
agreements with a private employer. Which parts of the welfare system should (for-
eign- or native-born) Swedish citizens then be entitled to and on what principles 
should these rights and distribution be based? For Swedish citizens with an immi-
grant background, the question arises as to how to adjust their lives retroactively. 
How can those who migrated to Sweden later in life have the opportunity to have a 
full working life in accordance with the principle of a lifetime income?
Expatriate wives certainly make a choice when they move abroad with their hus-
bands. Yet their experiences clearly challenge Sweden’s ideal of gender equality, 
where men and women share salaried work. This raises a number of questions for 
further research: Why do women continue to sacrifice their careers for their hus-
bands’ careers and what does this reveal about gender norms in Sweden in relation 
to political ideals of equality? What is expected from citizens and actors in a glo-
balised labour market and economy and how should a national welfare system 
adjust to these requirements? Who benefits and who is disadvantaged in the current 
globalised labour market?
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Chapter 10
(Im)mobility Patterns among Polish 
Unemployed Migrants in Iceland 
Navigating Different Welfare Regimes
Anna Wojtyńska and Unnur Dís Skaptadóttir
10.1  Introduction
In the autumn of 2008, Iceland was hit by a severe financial crisis that lead to a 
period of economic recession. The construction industry was one of the first sectors 
to be seriously affected, with many bankrupt companies and extensive layoffs. At 
the time, foreign citizens constituted 37% of the total number of workers in this sec-
tor, the majority coming from Poland (Statistics Iceland n.d.-a). The contraction of 
the economy resulted in an outflow of foreign workers from the country; however, 
it was not as extensive as commonly anticipated at the time (Eydal and Ottósdóttir 
2009; Garðarsdóttir 2012). Firstly, the demand for foreign workers did not disap-
pear with the financial crisis, because some sectors had become dependent on 
employees from abroad. Secondly, some migrants, despite losing their jobs, decided 
to continue living in Iceland. The unemployment rates among foreign citizens 
jumped from 1.3% at the end of July 2008 to 12.4% at the beginning of 2009. At this 
time, the unemployment rate among Polish citizens was as high as 18%, peaking in 
March 2011, when it reached 23.6% (Directorate of Labour n.d.).
In this chapter, we seek to answer the question of why so many unemployed 
Poles decided to stay and even bring their families to join them in Iceland, despite 
stagnation in the economy and the scarcity of available jobs. Based on interviews 
with unemployed Polish migrants, we examine how they negotiated and adapted to 
the social risks and changing circumstances encountered in the countries of emigra-
tion and immigration, as well as the way they navigated the available ‘resource 
environments’ (Levitt et al. 2017) emerging in conjunction with the different wel-
fare regimes. We particularly examine the European Union (EU) regulations for 
social-security protection vis-à-vis national welfare-protection policies regarding 
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unemployment in Iceland and Poland and their possible ramifications for the mobil-
ity and (im)mobility of foreign workers in Iceland. Furthermore, we highlight some 
problematic interactions between the internationalisation of the labour market and 
concomitant transnational livelihoods, EU social policy and the welfare-assistance 
environment of member states. In so doing, we apply a critical approach to the com-
monly assumed high flexibility and geographical mobility of migrant workers, 
which tends to overlook counterfactors that influence different forms of staying put.
10.2  Intra-European Labour Mobility
The mobility of people, including the free movement of labour, constitutes one of 
the fundamental rights of EU (and EEA) citizens. It comprises one of the four pillars 
of the EU internal market, along with the free movement of goods, services and 
capital. The strong emphasis on unrestricted geographical mobility present in cur-
rent EU policy reflects dominant (neo)liberal ideologies which typically equated 
mobility with the values of freedom and universalism (Adey 2017). The unrestricted 
cross-border movement of labour has been portrayed as one of the central mecha-
nisms promoting intra-EU economic and social integration. The formation of the 
EU’s common labour market was seen as a means to increase productivity, which 
would subsequently lead to an improvement in living conditions and working stan-
dards in the whole region (Verschueren 2015) and, in this, way enhance social cohe-
sion across the member states (Engbersen et al. 2017). Therefore, the mobility of 
workers has been actively promoted, encouraged and enabled on many levels of EU 
policy. The European Job Mobility Portal (EURES) was launched to help to dis-
seminate information about job vacancies and connect job-seekers with employers 
in different EU states, as well as to assist with work placements. In a way, cross- 
border work-related mobility became part of job activation measures, because 
unemployed individuals are often advised to move abroad and follow employment 
opportunities in other member states. Moreover, the EU operates various pro-
grammes to stimulate people’s mobility, such as the exchange of students, academic 
staff, artists and specialists.
Simultaneously, one important objective of the EU policy has been to diminish 
possible impediments to the free cross-border mobility of EU citizens. Since an 
inability to move acquired social entitlements earned in one EU member state to 
another could prevent individuals from undertaking work in another EU/EEA coun-
try, the European Union Benefits Scheme was implemented to guarantee the trans-
fer of social-security rights between member states (d’Addio and Cavalleri 2015). 
This portability of social-security rights – albeit to different degrees – applies, for 
example, to health-care services, old-age and disability pensions, parental leave 
payments as well as unemployment benefits. In the case of unemployment benefits, 
the scheme is based on two key principles: the aggregation principle and the export-
ability principle (Alcidi et al. 2017). The aggregation principle ensures that time 
worked in any of the member states will be counted when granting access to 
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social-security entitlements. The exportability principle allows for acquired rights 
to social security to be moved from one nation state to another within the EU. This 
is an important step towards improving social protection accessibility for EU (and 
EEA) citizens. However, the impact of the EU Benefits Scheme on mobility might 
be slightly different from that intended due to considerable discrepancies between 
member states in the scope and capacity of formal social protection. Firstly, as 
d’Addio and Cavalleri (2015) showed, the EU Benefits Scheme plays a minor role 
when people make decisions about searching for employment in another EU/EEA 
state. Secondly, as they further pointed out, it may even have a negative impact if it 
involves movement from a more-protective to a less-protective welfare environ-
ment. Additionally, it may discourage the return migration of unemployed migrants 
coming from countries with relatively weaker economies and insecure labour mar-
kets, as we discuss further in this chapter.
EU enlargement and the common labour market have undoubtedly contributed to 
the major growth in contemporary intra-EU mobility. According to the annual report 
of the European Commission, based on Eurostat population statistics, in 2017 there 
were 17 million EU-28 movers in the EU, of whom 12.4 million were in the 
working- age group of 20–64 years (Fries-Tersch et  al. 2018). The report further 
indicates that the stocks of EU-28 movers are heavily concentrated in a handful of 
member states, with Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, France and Spain hosting 
74% of all movers. At the same time, Romanian, Polish, Portuguese, Italian and 
Bulgarian nationals made up to more than half of all EU-28 movers. Clearly, the 
labour demand in West European countries, combined with the continued wage and 
living condition disparities between Central, Eastern and parts of Southern Europe 
on the one hand and Western and Northern Europe on the other, drives a large part 
of intra-European migration. This further indicates that, for many Eastern European 
citizens, migration can be a strategy to cope with labour-market deficiencies in their 
home countries, rather than stemming from a desire to live abroad. In this sense, 
migration is a way to broaden migrants’ resource environment beyond a single 
nation state. A transnational way of living helps individuals to deal with social risks 
in the home country and secure socio-economic welfare needs for themselves and 
their families, now and in the future (Levitt et al. 2017). Significantly, since many 
East European migrants are concentrated in the low-wage service sector of Western 
European markets, freedom of mobility, instead of reducing social inequalities, may 
instead reproduce them even further (Engbersen et al. 2017).
Classical economic theories commonly assume an adjustment capacity of migra-
tion flows based on the expectation that, in general, workers will follow available 
job opportunities (Kahanec et al. 2016). Accordingly, it is anticipated that migrants 
will respond to economic recession in the countries where they are working by mov-
ing either back to their countries of origin or onward to countries with better eco-
nomic prospects. These expectations, however, have often proved misleading or 
have not been confirmed empirically. Building on examples from six European 
countries that were intensively recruiting workers in the post-war period to stimu-
late economic growth, Stephen Castles (1986) showed that what was originally 
intended as a temporary guest-worker system eventually led to family reunification 
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and permanent settlement. Similarly, the recent global recession did not result in 
mass return migration, partly due to the global character of the recession and the 
adverse economic and employment situation in the countries of origin (Awad 2009; 
Castles and Vezzoli 2009). Yet, staying in the host country might not always be pos-
sible, especially if migrants are deprived of social assistance or if their legal resi-
dence depends on their employment. If they are not ready to change to clandestine 
residence, they may be compelled to leave the country in the event of losing 
their jobs.
The current discourse of mobility as desirable and a privilege tends to overlook 
the fact that many people around the world might prefer to pursue more settled lives. 
The results of a large cross-country survey demonstrate that only 14% of the world’s 
adult population wish to migrate to another country (Esipova et  al. 2011). 
Additionally, as Diana Mata-Codesal (2015, 2275) argued ‘staying put is not a 
passive- by-default situation’ – on the contrary – it may be a valuable asset and a 
desirable choice for some households, depending on their access to socio-economic 
resources. However, with the grand narratives of modern times being characterised 
by fluidity and mobility, the social sciences have tended to normalise movement, 
simultaneously casting immobility as predominantly involuntary and enforced 
(Schewel 2019). Kerilyn Schewel (2019) argued instead for an aspiration/capability 
framework in migration studies, which allows a more comprehensive approach to 
(im)mobility. As there are many reasons why people move, there are also multiple 
reasons why people choose to be sedentary. Modifying Carling’s (2002) aspiration/
ability model by applying it to a concept of capability, Schewel (2019) suggests that 
we should look separately at individuals’ aspirations and capabilities not only to 
explain mobility but also to highlight why people do not undertake internal or cross- 
border migration and also – as we do in this chapter – to explain why some migrants 
decide to stay or even settle in the destination countries.
Although perceived as voluntary, labour migration is often impelled by confined 
possibilities in the country of origin. At the same time, patterns of mobility, its 
length and character, typically depend on migration policies and formal impedi-
ments to movement or settlement. For instance, circular migration, the back-and- 
forth travelling that predominated among Polish migrants in the aftermath of the 
systemic change in Poland, were often conditioned by restricted access to labour 
markets in Western European countries and the limited possibilities of acquiring 
legal residency there (Okólski 2001). Therefore, EU enlargement and alleviated 
residential constraints for EU citizens moving within the EU (EAA) area opened up 
new prospects for Polish citizens, as they now had more freedom to leave, to stay 
and to return, depending on their aspirations and available options. Researchers 
studying post-accession migration from Poland have observed that, despite being 
intended as temporary, staying in another country often turns out to be prolonged or 
even permanent (Drinkwater and Garapich 2015). Likewise, the EU Benefit Scheme 
may encourage and/or facilitate migrants’ settlement, as we show in the case of 
Polish migrants in Iceland.
 Generally,  EU policy seems to encourage more temporary forms of labour 
mobility, despite resulting in the growing vulnerability of migrant workers’ rights. 
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Since employment protection remains, to a great extent, a matter for member states, 
it generates unfair competition between workers and leads to social dumping 
(Verschueren 2015). For example, the posting of workers, which falls under the 
mobility of services, undermines migrants’ residential rights and access to welfare 
systems in the host countries. At the same time, as Verschueren (2015) has demon-
strated by taking examples from recent cases brought to the EU Court of Justice, the 
current trend in EU practice is to favour freedom of commerce, even at the cost of 
workers’ security. Therefore, migrants’ mobility and flexibility may be largely 
framed by EU and member states’ policies on the one hand and employers’ recruit-
ment practices on the other. It may be imagined, desired and imposed by neoliberal 
governance rather than being a desired condition by many foreign workers. Labour 
migration is predominantly driven by employers’ need for cheap and supplementary 
labour in times of increased productivity – labour which can be easily disposed of 
during economic stagnation or downturn. Hence, migrants tend to be at greater risk 
of layoff and expulsion, which only perpetuates their temporary status.
This image of the flexible and temporary nature of migrants’ work informs and 
further reinforces social boundaries that deem migrants as not belonging, thereby 
limiting their access to welfare services – which are traditionally distributed on the 
basis of national membership and fashioned to respond to the needs of sedentary 
populations (Anderson and Hughes 2015; Righard 2008). This assumed and implicit 
equation of migrants with temporary labour is also revealed in some academic dis-
course which regards migrants’ attempts to exercise their rights to social security on 
levels equal to those of the local population as ‘welfare shopping’ or ‘welfare tour-
ism’ (see the introduction to this volume).
10.3  Methods
The chapter draws on data from ethnographic research on the position of immi-
grants in Iceland, data which both authors have been collecting for over a decade 
and which have focused on employment-related migration to Iceland. However 
most of the data analysed in this article come from the project ‘The participation of 
immigrants in civil society and labour market in the economic recession’, carried 
out in 2011, about 3 years after the outbreak of the economic recession in Iceland in 
the autumn of 2008 (see Wojtyńska et al. 2011). The project applied both quantita-
tive and qualitative methods, which included an internet survey among registered 
unemployed foreign citizens on the one hand and interviews with foreign citizens 
and representatives of various service-providers on the other. The survey, which was 
conducted online and sent to all registered unemployed migrants, rendered 516 
responses, which was a sizable sample given that, at the time, there were about 1860 
foreign citizens registered as unemployed in Iceland. More than half of the answers 
came from Polish citizens, followed by Lithuanians (12%) and Latvians (3%). The 
interviews were conducted both in two focus groups and individually. One focus 
group consisted of Polish migrants only and was conducted in the Polish language. 
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Another consisted of individuals of different nationalities of whom the majority 
came from Lithuania and the interviews were conducted in English. Altogether a 
group of 15 immigrants were interviewed, 11 men and four women. Almost all the 
men interviewed had worked in construction before losing their jobs, while the 
women had been employed as cleaners or in low-income service jobs. In this chap-
ter, we focus primarily on the narratives of Polish migrants from the interviews, 
occasionally supporting our arguments with data from the survey.
10.4  The Financial Crisis, Unemployment and (Im)Mobility 
Patterns Among Polish Migrants in Iceland
Until recently, immigration to Iceland was relatively low and immigrants did not 
exceed 2% of the total population until 1998 (Statistics Iceland n.d.-b). A process of 
privatisation and deregulation of the economy in the early 1990s brought brisk eco-
nomic growth, seen particularly in the major expansion of the construction industry 
in the early 2000s. This created substantial shortages of workers on the labour mar-
ket and led to increased immigration to the country (Skaptadóttir 2011). Besides 
construction, foreigners were employed mostly in low-income jobs in the service 
sector, such as cleaning, shop assistance and less-skilled jobs in health care – for 
instance caring for the elderly in nursing homes. Many were employed in manufac-
turing, particularly in food production. Consequently, in January 2008, immigrants 
accounted for 9% of the total population and constituted a tenth of the Icelandic 
labour force. Polish migrants were by far the largest migrant group – or about 40% 
of all immigrants registered in Iceland in 2008 – making up 3% of the total Icelandic 
population (Statistics Iceland n.d.-b). At the time, the unemployment rates among 
Polish citizens were negligible and, on average, lower than those of the overall 
population. In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, this changed consider-
ably, when unemployment rates reached 18% among Poles in 2009, twice as high as 
the rate for Icelandic citizens (8.2%) (Directorate of Labour n.d.). The sudden con-
traction of the economy following the financial crash slowed down immigration to 
Iceland and a number of Polish workers who had lost their jobs left the country, 
either returning to Poland or moving to other countries – for example to Norway – 
where they hoped to find new employment. In 2009, for the first time since 1992, net 
migration between Poland and Iceland was negative (-1583 persons), with more 
men than women leaving the country (Statistic Iceland n.d.-b). The scale of the 
outflow could, however, have been larger, since the official statistics include only 
those persons who were officially registered as residing in Iceland but omit those 
who have a so-called temporary personal ID number (utanþjóðskráar kennitala), 
which applied to a number of posted workers. Yet although many Poles left the 
country, their emigration and that of other foreign citizens was not as extensive as 
anticipated by the general public or as presented in the media at the time.
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There were many reasons, including non-economic motives, which influenced 
the decisions of foreign citizens who became unemployed in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis to stay in Iceland (Skaptadóttir 2014; Þórarinsdóttir et  al. 2009; 
Wojtyńska and Zielińska 2010). For instance, some had already settled in Iceland, 
brought their families with them or entered relationship with Icelandic citizens. 
However, even those who saw their migration as temporary tended to evaluate their 
options, based not only on the situation in Iceland but also on their prospects in 
Poland. In their analysis of post-crisis mobility patterns among Polish migrants, 
Janicka and Kaczmarczyk (2016) conclude that the considerable income disparities 
between Poland and Western European countries still encourage outward popula-
tion flows from Poland and can deter return migration (with average monthly sala-
ries in Poland amounting to about half of those in Germany or the United Kingdom). 
Measured by GDP, Poland is usually presented as one of the countries not affected 
by the global economic recession in 2008. However, as argued by Maciejewska 
et al. (2016), the crisis in Poland had a ‘silent and crawling’ character. In response 
to the global financial crisis, Polish policymakers focused on expanding the flexibil-
ity of employment in order to continue attracting foreign investment and maintain-
ing economic growth. Thus, the measures taken by the government to prevent a 
recession did, in fact, put downward pressure on wages, social security and the 
labour market and promoting, instead, insecure and precarious employment. 
Moreover, the unemployment rate in Poland increased to 13.4% in 2012 and even 
reached 20% in some regions (GUS 2014; Wojnar 2012).
Consequently, the reasons that pushed many Poles away from their home country 
became even more acute during the recession, thus significantly restraining return 
migration. Many of the Poles we interviewed in Reykjavik doubted whether they 
could get any job at all, let alone a job which they would find acceptable and which 
would allow them to meet their needs. Moreover, many believed that the situation in 
Iceland would soon improve, while often expressing great scepticism regarding the 
situation in their home country and frequently indicating that there is a ‘permanent 
crisis in Poland’. Therefore, even though they had lost their jobs, they felt more 
economically secure in Iceland, especially if they were eligible for welfare- 
protection benefits.
Since Iceland opened its labour market to citizens of the new EU member states 
in May 2006, the migration of Poles to Iceland has been regulated by general EU 
rules governing the intra-EU mobility of labour, including its social-protection 
schemes. Polish citizens who have been granted legal residency are incorporated 
into the Icelandic welfare system after a 6 month stay in the country. Their unem-
ployment rights are, however, linked with their membership in labour unions. After 
12 months of full-time employment, they earn the right to full unemployment ben-
efits. However, a person is already entitled to partial benefits after working in 
Iceland for a minimum 3 months in an at least a quarter-time position.
Although the capacity of the Icelandic welfare scheme is more limited than those 
in the other Nordic countries (Ólafsson 2005), it can still be described as generous 
compared to that in countries like Poland. Moreover, during the financial crisis, 
growing unemployment was recognised as one of the central issues to be addressed. 
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In response to the crisis of 2008, rights to unemployment benefits in Iceland were 
extended, first to three years and then to four years in 2010. After 1 January 2015, 
unemployment benefits were shortened to two and a half years or 30 months. For 
the first 3 months, benefits are wage-related and calculated as 70% of the average 
income based on the 6-month period ending 2 months before a person becomes 
unemployed (Directorate of Labour n.d.). After 3 months, unemployed individuals 
are paid a flat amount in basic benefits. In 2011, when the interviews on which this 
discussion builds were conducted, the basic benefits were about ISK 160,000 (EUR 
973), amounting to 52% of the median salary in Iceland at that time. The benefits 
are about ISK 280,000 (EUR 2032), which corresponded to about 70% of the 
median salary in 2018 (own elaboration based on Statistics Iceland n.d.-a).
In comparison, in the past decade, Poland offered six to 12 months (180–365 days) 
of unemployment benefits (Pątek 2017). In 2011, the amount of unemployment 
benefits during the first 3 months equalled 22% of the average gross salary and 18% 
in the following months (own calculations based on GUS 2014). In 2018, the ben-
efits were PLN 847.8 (EUR 197) for the first 3 months (17% of the average gross 
salary) and PLN 665.7 (EUR 154) in the following months (14% of the average 
gross salary). Based on EU regulations, immigrants can move their acquired rights 
between member states. However, Poles are eligible to receive benefits at the 
Icelandic level for only three consecutive months, after which they are subject to 
Polish unemployment arrangements. Thus, moving unemployment benefits from 
Iceland to Poland would clearly compromise the household income and economic 
situation of Polish migrants and their families to a considerable extent. At the same 
time, their employment possibilities in Poland, like those that motivated their emi-
gration in the first place, would remain limited.
Finding work in Poland would not necessarily secure an adequate financial situ-
ation, as aptly illustrated by the case of Krystyna (pseudonym), a middle-aged 
Polish woman, whom we interviewed in 2010  in Iceland. When she lost her job 
there at the beginning of the economic recession, she decided to return to Poland. 
She took a manual job in a small factory in her native town, where she said she was 
paid PLN 5 per hour (about EUR 1.5 at that time). In an interview, Krystyna recalled 
the moment when she received her first salary for this job. She said it had felt like 
being on the edge of a nervous breakdown, concluding: ‘I cannot keep working for 
so little money’. She quit her job in Poland and went to Sweden for 2 months where 
she earned money picking berries. ‘It was only a summer job, but one needs to live 
somehow’, she said, explaining her decision to move from Sweden back to Iceland. 
After she returned to Iceland, she worked for 3 months before becoming unem-
ployed again. However, this time she chose to stay in Iceland and use her right to 
unemployment benefits.
Typically, migration has been applied as a strategy to compensate for the defi-
ciencies of the local labour market and its capacity to provide enough income to 
secure the welfare of the household. Many Poles used the wages earned in Iceland 
to provide for families who lived in Poland. While earlier studies on Polish migra-
tion showed that remittances were chiefly used for everyday expenses and to cover 
unexpected additional costs like house renovation (Kaczmarczyk 2004), they were 
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also used to meet other inadequacies of the Polish social-welfare system – in par-
ticular, old-age pensions or access to higher education. Some of our informants 
mentioned that they wished to work in Iceland to secure their retirement benefits or 
to support their elderly parents (cf. Krzyżowski and Mucha 2014). Another recur-
rent topic in the interviews was the need to finance children’s education – almost 
half of all university students in Poland need to pay for their education (Natalli 
2015). In 2013, the average university fee was around PLN 8100 (EUR 1955) per 
academic year. Based on the data from a survey among fifth-year students in the 
Economics Department of Szczecin University, Wojciech Jarecki (2012) concluded 
that a considerable portion of students’ budgets comes from parents. Since not all 
parents are able to support children with the salaries they earn in Poland, some 
choose to seek higher wages abroad.
The need to facilitate the education of his children was very prominent in the 
narrative of Stanisław, a man in his 50s, who had been working for a year in the 
Icelandic construction sector before he became unemployed. At the time of the 
interview, he was actively looking for a job but, because the financial crisis had 
resulted in contraction in the building industry, there were no openings in his field. 
As Stanisław explained, he had come to Iceland mainly because he wanted to earn 
money for his daughters’ education. He said, ‘I don’t know if it will secure a job for 
them in the future, but it is better to sweep floors with a diploma than without one’. 
Although he did not intend to settle in Iceland, he concluded ‘I came here with a 
very specific purpose – to educate my children – and I will stay here until I reach my 
goal’. He elaborated on his decision to stay in Iceland despite the economic reces-
sion in the following way:
To be honest, I now consider Iceland my second fatherland, because it gave me what Poland 
did not give me. (…). A good life for me and my family. I mean a normal life, because this 
is not about abundance but about earning enough to last from the first to the last day of the 
month; for the basics – food, a flat and the education of my children. (…). [After the crisis], 
it is worse here. The prices rise, inflation is very high. But still, there are normal relations. 
I can even save about 400–500 euros per month. This is money I would never earn working 
in the town I come from. (…). I would like to go back, but I am terrified that then my chil-
dren would not be able to study.
Given that peoples’ decision to move from Poland to Iceland was commonly 
motivated by a need to improve their or their families’ financial situation (the over-
all welfare of the family remaining in Poland), staying on benefits could still help 
them to meet this goal and fulfil their financial and care responsibilities towards the 
family. The cases of Krystyna and Stanisław demonstrate that many of the Polish 
migrants who became unemployed still felt financially more secure in Iceland than 
they would be by returning to Poland. Ironically enough, because migration was 
mostly driven by the availability of jobs in the low-wage sector of the Icelandic 
economy and many migrants were paid at or below the minimum-wage level 
(Friberg et al. 2013), they did not experience a major deterioration in their monthly 
income after transferring to unemployment benefits.
Interestingly, the financial security that Stanisław equated with the ability to lead 
a ‘normal life’ (Dzenovska 2014) engenders a sense of belonging that makes him 
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call Iceland his second fatherland. Although he wished to return to Poland at some 
point, as he mentioned in the interview, he expressed his disappointment at his 
native country apparently failing to fulfil its duty to ensure decent survival. This also 
shows that attachments are built not only on the basis of social and cultural affinity 
but also on a sense of security – being able to provide for oneself and one’s family – 
or to fulfil one’s aspirations for a good (‘normal’) life.
The financial crisis, combined with the Icelandic social-protection environment, 
had certain implications for the mobility patterns of Polish migrants. As already 
mentioned, many of them, especially single men, left the country during the reces-
sion but others still considered the situation in Iceland more favourable than the one 
they could expect back in Poland. Losing a job and having fewer job opportunities 
did not simply mean return migration – it even, to some extent, seems to have under-
pinned family reunification and hence more settled migration. The sudden and siz-
able decrease in the value of the Icelandic króna against the Polish złoty (and the 
euro) affected the value of migrants’ savings and the remittances they were sending 
to Poland. A survey, conducted in 2010, showed that 30% of the unemployed 
respondents were living in divided households and that 38% reported sending 
money to their country of origin (Wojtyńska 2012). This was a considerably lower 
percentage compared to findings from a survey of remittances conducted right 
before the crisis (in 2008), when 56% of respondents were engaged in this practice 
(Jónsdóttir et al. 2009). One reason for the smaller number of people making trans-
fers to Poland is the reunification of families following the financial crisis; another 
explanation is the inability to save enough money to send to Poland, which was 
mentioned by 39% of the unemployed respondents in the above-mentioned study. 
Consequently, some of the Polish migrants we interviewed explained that, with the 
lower value of the wages earned in Iceland, it was too expensive for them to main-
tain two households and continue a transnational way of life, so they brought their 
families to Iceland.
10.5  Mobile Workers Facing the National Logic 
of Welfare Regimes
Engbersen et al. (2017, 344) argue that ‘the heterogeneity and diverse temporalities 
of intra-EU mobility set new challenges for the European destination regions and 
cities’. Many Polish migrants are undecided about their future, adjusting their strat-
egies and mobility-versus-settlement patterns in response to the changing economic 
situation and the available resources in the sending and receiving countries. While 
living in Iceland, many maintain social linkages with and care responsibilities 
towards family – frequently children or aging parents – and/or relatives who stay in 
Poland, as we described in the section above. Even if they were unemployed, some 
migrants had a better likelihood of meeting these responsibilities if they remained 
in Iceland. At the same time, state welfare policies, which are largely organised 
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according to national and sedentary logic, do not accommodate this transnational 
nature of migrant lives (Righard 2008). National ideology informs not only formal 
eligibility rules but also the practices and attitudes of the welfare-service personnel 
responsible for allocating both state- and third-sector-provided services.
Increasingly, the internationalised labour market, including intra-EU labour 
mobility, typically entails the formation of transnational social fields that span mul-
tiple nation states. This means that the living realities of transnational migrants typi-
cally cross national borders. Being socially embedded in different localities, 
migrants engage in back and forth travelling, regularly visiting their families or rela-
tives living in Poland. Although part of their free time, visits are primarily under-
taken in response to family and care obligations, which might be even more acute in 
cases where there are divided households (Wojtyńska and Skaptadóttir 2020). 
However, the rules regarding eligibility for unemployment benefits in Iceland may 
require modification of the mobility practices common among migrants prior to the 
crisis. A person registered as unemployed is generally defined as someone who is 
active in the labour force and, as such, is actively searching for work and available 
to accept any job offers presented by the authorities. However, job-seeking intrinsi-
cally implies looking for work in Iceland. The unemployed person must also be 
ready to participate in various meetings, courses and activation programmes spon-
sored by the Icelandic Directorate of Labour, which requires that the person is pres-
ent in Iceland when the employment office contacts him or her.
The employment office utilises different methods to control whether or not a person 
meets these obligations. Job-seekers need to ‘report’ monthly to the Icelandic 
Directorate of Labour. This reporting can be done on-line but it must be done in Iceland 
and the Directorate of Labour checks IP numbers to trace the location of the computer 
the job-seeker uses to register. This of course does not mean that people cannot travel 
abroad while unemployed but that they are required to notify the office whenever they 
intend to leave Iceland; this period is then categorised as holiday and reduces the 
amount of benefits. If people do not report their travel or are discovered reporting from 
abroad, they risk losing their unemployment benefits – as a result, migrants may be 
constrained from visiting their families in Poland to avoid this happening.
These rules apply equally to Icelandic and foreign citizens. Nevertheless, they 
conflict with the nature of transnational living pursued by many migrants by reduc-
ing a migrant’s visits home for solely leisure activities and penalise each trip to 
Poland in some way. Moreover, foreign citizens are apparently subjected to addi-
tional scrutiny, precisely because of their transnational practices and the greater 
likelihood of travel abroad. As one employee of the Icelandic Directorate of Labour 
told us in an interview: ‘We contact people at a short notice to make sure they stay 
in Iceland. We don’t want to sponsor holidays in Poland for them’. Consequently, 
unemployed foreign citizens registered with the office are occasionally called in for 
sudden and unexpected checks, as Ola, one of our informants in her 30s, explained:
I remember, I once got a notification. I had just registered that I was going on holiday from 
unemployment, since I was going to Poland. I had holidays from the 9th [of the month], and 
on the 5th [same month] I had to come to the office, just [a few days] before my flight. I got 
this message at 8 o’clock in the evening of the day [before] they wanted me to come; I had 
to come at 1 pm the next day.
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Due to their EU citizenship, Polish migrants are entitled to Icelandic public-
welfare services but they still encounter various social boundaries when seeking 
formal assistance. Robert, another of our participants, cited his experience of irregu-
lar and often hostile attitudes on the part of office workers at the Directorate of 
Labour. Robert lost his job in a bakery right before completing the 3 years’ employ-
ment that would have allowed him to turn his temporary contract into a permanent 
one. He complained that he felt information had been repeatedly withheld from him 
and that he had been misinformed about regulations or changes in the rules regard-
ing unemployment arrangements; this had ultimately put his eligibility at risk (it 
cost him his right to benefits). In general, an unemployed person has the right to 
combine paid work with unemployment benefits but he needs to notify the 
Directorate of Labour so that the amount of benefits can be reduced proportionally. 
According to the information which Robert received at the initial meeting with the 
Directorate of Labour, it was alright to notify the office afterwards. However, when 
he delivered his payslip regarding the additional work he had undertaken, it turned 
out that he should have done so before the work was performed. He concluded:
I don’t understand this, why they never tell us when they implement some new rules. (…). 
I am not sure, but maybe they just wait until you make a mistake and lose benefits. Then 
they are happy to have one less person to support. It is true. They just treat us [foreign work-
ers] as a commodity.
Robert also felt that he does not receive enough assistance from the office when 
looking for work, being treated differently to – in his opinion – the Icelandic unem-
ployed who, he claims, are more likely to receive alerts about new job openings.
We observed similar resentment among some of the charity workers whom we 
interviewed in our research. There are various third-sector organisations that pro-
vide food and other assistance for people in need and many unemployed Poles were 
told to seek help from them in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Since Poles were 
often informed about this assistance at the Directorate of Labour office, many con-
sidered this part of the state provision for the unemployed. Not all migrants had 
worked long enough in Iceland to earn the right to full benefits and, with reduced 
payments, some faced considerable financial hardship. The sudden increase in for-
eign citizens among the clients of charities was met with scepticism by some charity 
workers, as illustrated by the following quote:
Yes, after the crisis, these people began to be visible already in 2008 and it was men… men 
who were imported, literally – and that is a problem. There are many problems resulting 
from this because they have lower wages than Icelandic men.
In the eyes of many charity workers, migrants were often reduced to the status of 
temporary labourer and their low wages were seen more as a ‘problem’ than as an 
explanation for why they might be seeking help. Although there are no formal crite-
ria for clients to receive assistance, some charities began asking Polish citizens to 
present confirmation of their registration as unemployed with the Directorate of 
Labour (ironically reinforcing migrants’ idea that charities were part of the services 
for the unemployed). One charity introduced different waiting lines for Icelandic 
and foreign citizens. These new forms of scrutiny were clearly designed to control 
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and restrict access to their services. The distrust on the part of charity workers, who 
often did not see migrants as rightful clients, clearly reflects existing social bound-
aries that define migrants as less than full members of Icelandic society (cf. Rice 
and Wojtyńska 2018).
The attitudes of service workers towards unemployed foreign citizens – both as 
revealed in our interviews and as perceived by the Polish migrants themselves – 
clearly indicated that there were certain ideas about deservingness. The rhetoric of 
eligibility is based less on formal membership of a group and more on a subjective 
notion of someone belonging to a ‘community of value’, one ‘comprised of people 
who share common ideas and (exemplary) patterns of behaviour expressed through 
ethnicity, religion, culture or language’ (Anderson and Hughes 2015, 2). It would 
seem that the prevailing image of migrants as mainly temporary labour defines them 
as not fully belonging to Icelandic society and thus not entirely deserving of social 
assistance unless they demonstrate a readiness to integrate.
Likewise, the nation-centred logic informs a large share of the activation pro-
grammes and courses offered by the Directorate of Labour, services which are 
mainly focused on improving Icelandic language skills and knowledge of Icelandic 
society. Hence, they focus on integrating migrants into Icelandic society as mea-
sures to help them to find employment. While intended to improve migrants’ 
employment possibilities by making migrants fit the demands of the Icelandic 
labour market, such activation programmes indirectly instigate migrants’ perma-
nent settlement. This again shows how the organisation of a national welfare system 
tends to be at odds with migrants’ mobile practices, the intra-European labour 
mobility regime and the neoliberal demand for flexible labour (Righard 2008). 
Moreover, Icelandic courses  – even if undoubtedly helpful for those willing to 
improve their language skills – can also be perceived as another way to ‘discipline’ 
the foreign unemployed. They are obligatory and, if a person misses class, benefits 
are suspended until the absence is explained. If the absence is not explained, the 
benefits are deducted.
10.6  Conclusion
The growing demand for migrant workers within the intra-European common mar-
ket under neoliberal governance fosters a greater cross-border mobility of people, 
resulting in individual living realities stretching across different nation states. While 
work abroad provides opportunities for socio-economic betterment, transnational 
households typically emerge in response to low-wage and insecure employment in 
the destination countries. Many migrants conceive of their work abroad as a tempo-
rary strategy – this imagined temporality is often reinforced by employers’ recruit-
ment strategies, migration policies and social boundaries that often deem migrants 
as not belonging. Conversely, as the last financial crisis showed in the case of Polish 
migrants in Iceland, people adjust their mobility and settlement patterns in response 
to social risks in their countries of origin, as well as conditions in the countries of 
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destination, in that way negotiating between aspirations and available opportunities 
(Schewel 2019). Despite losing their jobs, many of the unemployed Polish migrants 
still found better social protection for themselves and their families in Iceland com-
pared to what they could expect if they had chosen to return to Poland. Given their 
EU membership, immobility rather than return migration gave them access to a 
combination of state and third-sector social-support arrangements in Iceland. This 
shows that, counter to its initial intention, the EU Benefit Scheme may contribute to 
a more permanent stay, especially in the context of migration from less- to more- 
generous welfare states. However, this is not the only contradiction inherent in con-
temporary labour migration.
Our study also demonstrated an ambiguous relationship between migrants’ 
alleged temporality – which was largely framed by employers’ recruitment strate-
gies – and migrants’ actual practice, which resulted from efforts to fulfil their wel-
fare responsibilities. Furthermore, there is an apparent tension between a 
transnational way of living (whether desired or enforced) and the national logic of 
welfare provision in member states. Organised by ideas of sedentariness, national 
membership and social cohesion, welfare states take little account of the transna-
tional character of migrants’ lives. This is revealed on many levels, for instance in 
formal eligibility rules and in institutional practices and attitudes on the part of 
social-welfare-service personnel, all of which may hinder access to social protec-
tion. It also becomes apparent in the rhetoric of deservingness, where foreign citi-
zens and mobile individuals (because of their assumed temporality) tend to be 
disregarded as legitimate beneficiaries of support.
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Chapter 11
Puzzling Social Protection across Several 




While research on social protection in transnational families mainly focuses on 
arrangements between the origin and receiving countries, few studies address how 
this occurs across multiple countries. In an era of increasing mobility and 
transnationalisation, flows of people and resources are not limited to bipolar 
movements between origin and destination but also entail complex, fluid and 
circular patterns (Baldassar and Merla 2014; Cortes and Faret 2009; Fréguin-Gresh 
et al. 2015) with onward and multiple moves (Toma et al. 2015). The 2008 global 
recession left a clear mark on some of these mobility configurations (Mas Giralt 
2016; Ramos 2018), with readjustments and reversibility of flows (Moreno-Márquez 
and Álvarez-Román 2017), resulting in more complex transnational social- 
protection (TSP) arrangements.
It is possible to identify at least two reasons for the limited number of studies on 
TSP arrangements across multiple countries. First, this kind of study is quite 
demanding in terms of time, means and energy, as a comprehensive understanding 
of TSP practices requires both a fine multi-sited ethnography and the awareness of 
contextual specificities (Palash and Serra Mingot 2019; Toma et al. 2015). Secondly, 
the analytical process is challenging because it requires tracing and capturing more 
complex and dynamic provision flows in their various directionalities and intensities, 
P. Palash (*) 
CNRS, TELEMMe, Aix Marseille University, Aix en Provence, France 
e-mail: polina.palash@univ-amu.fr
V. Baby-Collin 
CNRS, TELEMMe, Aix Marseille University, Aix en Provence, France 
Institut Universitaire de France, Paris, France
e-mail: virginie.baby-collin@univ-amu.fr
178
while also being able to assess their different nature, levels and temporal readjust-
ments (Fréguin-Gresh et al. 2015; Schier 2016).
Among the few studies on the management of an extended TSP space by trans-
national families, the main framing seems to apply to its optimisation and profit-
ability (Bryceson 2019; Ma Mung 1999; Ong 1999; Trémon 2011). This framing 
appears to echo the assumptions of the ‘welfare magnet hypothesis’ or ‘welfare 
tourism’, implying the opportunistic use of different welfare systems by migrants 
(Borjas 1999; Fernandes 2016). Other studies, however, show that families enlarge 
their TSP space to address basic social-protection concerns in times of crisis. Yet, 
they also show that migrants, rather than accumulating resources, are exposed to job 
precariousness (Fréguin-Gresh et al. 2015; Mas Giralt 2016; McIlwaine and Bunge 
2019; Ramos 2018) and a more challenging organisation of social-protection con-
cerns across borders (Schier 2016; Serra Mingot and Mazzucato 2019).
Ecuadorian transnational families have recently experienced a reconfiguration of 
their TSP arrangements between Europe and their origin country as a consequence 
of the 2008 recession (Mas Giralt 2016; Moreno-Márquez and Álvarez-Román 
2017; Palash and Baby-Collin 2018; Ramos 2018). Since the beginning of the 
sustained outmigration from their country of origin at the end of the 1990s, pushed 
by the financial default linked to the dollarisation in Ecuador, Spain became the 
main destination for some 479,117 Ecuadorian citizens as of 2009, the greater part 
of whom naturalised as Spanish citizens (Iglesias Martínez et al. 2015). Apart from 
favourable naturalisation schemes in Spain, Ecuadorians  – like other Latin 
Americans – can also benefit from an Agreement on Social Security, guaranteeing 
the portability of their pension rights between Spain and their country of origin 
(OISS 2019). Although many Ecuadorian migrants managed to reunite with their 
kin in Spain, many have also experienced downward social mobility and gendered 
employment segmentation, concentrating mainly in construction, agriculture and 
hotel and domestic services (Iglesias Martínez et al. 2015).
After 2008, however, the global recession destabilised their life in Spain, due to 
soaring structural unemployment and the burst of the real-estate bubble. This 
implied a reconfiguration of their migration projects, with some deciding to return 
to Ecuador (Moreno-Márquez and Álvarez-Román 2017) while others choosing to 
migrate to other destinations, making use of their newly acquired EU citizenship 
(Iglesias Martínez et al. 2015). Accordingly, the number of Ecuadorians in Spain 
dropped by 14% to 411,897 individuals by 2019 (INE 2019).
Estimates on the return migration from Spain to Ecuador range between 65,000 
and 85,000 individuals overall, which is perhaps not as high as one would expect, 
given the incentives of return schemes of both sending and receiving governments 
(Moreno-Márquez and Álvarez-Román 2017). Despite improvements in social 
policy over recent decades, Ecuador still presents important challenges, with low 
pensions and welfare benefits with respect to the cost of living and inefficiencies of 
the public healthcare system (Naranjo Bonilla 2014). For these reasons, a 
fundamental source for ensuring social-protection needs in Ecuador is migrants’ 
financial transfers from abroad, which are often deployed to pay for private, more 
efficient services (e.g. Palash and Serra Mingot 2019).
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England has become one of the main destinations for the secondary migration of 
Ecuadorians from Spain. Although Ecuadorians have been present in the UK since 
the 1970s, many of them have been invisible in the statistics due to their 
undocumented status. Established ethnic networks and the more-stable labour 
market served as the main incentives for this onward movement. However, as it 
turned out, Ecuadorians in the UK are subject to an even greater downward mobility 
than in Spain, with both men and women mostly relegated to the precarious cleaning 
sector (McIlwaine and Bunge 2019).
In terms of formal social protection, the liberal Anglo-Saxon welfare system 
contrasts with the Spanish Southern European familist one (Hemerijck et al. 2013), 
and there are no social security agreements between the UK and Ecuador. Although 
not as severely as it occurred in Spain, the British welfare provision has been subject 
to austerity measures, resulting in the inhospitable and exclusionary Brexit context 
(e.g. Mas Giralt 2016). Secondary migration from Spain to the UK has therefore 
implied a reconfiguration of TSP arrangements among Ecuadorian families, 
encompassing at least three countries with their specific social-protection systems. 
Therefore, this contribution seeks to fill the gap in the literature regarding the 
management of social protection by transnational families across multiple countries. 
How do Ecuadorian families organise their TSP arrangements across multiple 
countries? Does this management of TSP mainly imply opportunities or constraints 
for families facing recurrent contextual destabilisation? In order to account for both 
the individual and family perspectives, as well as their interactions with the specific 
contexts, we integrate a socio-spatial approach and a circulation framework, 
applying the concepts of care circulation (Baldassar and Merla 2014) and circulatory 
capability (Fréguin-Gresh et al. 2015).
We draw on two emblematic cases out of 36 transnational families in which TSP 
arrangements are managed across several countries. After outlining the theoretical 
framework, we describe our research methods in more detail. This is then followed 
by a presentation of the case studies and their discussion. We end our argument with 
several concluding remarks.
11.2  Managing an Enlarged Transnational 
Social-Protection Space
In an increasingly mobile and interconnected world, concerns over social protection 
have increasingly extended across national borders. Transnational social protection 
(TSP) refers to ‘the policies, programmes, people, organizations, and institutions 
which provide for and protect individuals […] in a transnational manner’ (Levitt 
et al. 2017, 6). Despite living in different countries, transnational families – who 
represent an increasing social reality – often pursue welfare and social-protection 
goals which stretch beyond borders (Bryceson 2019; Bryceson and Vuorela 2002). 
Their TSP arrangements ‘from below’ relate to cross-border strategies sustained by 
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network members living across different countries to cope with risks and cover 
needs related to areas such as income and livelihood, health, care, education and 
housing (Amelina et al. 2012; Palash and Baby-Collin 2018).
Although the migration literature mainly focuses on migrants’ economic trans-
fers addressed to secure the social-protection needs of their families back home, 
scholars using a transnational lens have recently acknowledged the role of ‘reverse 
remittances’ (Mazzucato 2011). These mainly relate to services, such as those 
linked to the care of migrants’ children left behind, to properties and, to a lesser 
extent, to goods and money. In effect, in the context of the recent global recession, 
evidence shows that precarious migrants in Europe may rely on ‘reverse economic 
flows’. These include economic remittances from migrants’ families back home and 
migrants’ own financial means transferred from their origin countries in order to 
ensure their social-protection needs (Palash and Baby-Collin 2018).
Thus, TSP provisions are not limited to economic unidirectional transfers but 
imply a care circulation, as the ‘reciprocal, multidirectional and asymmetrical 
exchange of care [that] fluctuates over the life course within transnational family 
networks subject to the political, economic, cultural and social contexts of both 
sending and receiving societies’ (Baldassar and Merla 2014, 22). This encompasses 
extended family networks bound in mutual engagements and responsibilities shaped 
by social norms and working over large timeframes (Palash and Baby-Collin 2018; 
Palash and Serra Mingot 2019; Serra Mingot and Mazzucato 2019).
Transnational families combine diverse means from their multi-localised 
‘resource environments’, originating from diverse sources such as the family and 
other informal networks, the state, the market and the third sector (Levitt et  al. 
2017). However, these social-protection environments may also imply constraints – 
linked to national migration, welfare and employment regimes and conditions  – 
which often motivate cross-border arrangements (Fernandes 2016; Trémon 2011). 
Moving forward with the conceptualisation of resource environments by Peggy 
Levitt and her colleagues (Levitt et  al. 2017) and considering space as ‘socially 
produced’ (Massey 2005), we propose the concept of ‘transnational social-protection 
space’. This refers to the space of interactions between the actors engaged in social- 
protection practices and related social-protection environments. We intend such 
space to be anchored in specific places which shape and are shaped by the practices 
of its actors, thus territorialised (Baldassar and Merla 2014) and implying 
negotiations of belonging, exclusion, appropriation, conflicts or cooperation. This 
may relate to welfare and social-protection concerns (Rosignoli 2019; Serra Mingot 
and Mazzucato 2019), depending on diverse factors such as socio-economic and 
legal status, age and gender (Levitt et al. 2017).
Moreover, TSP arrangements are not limited to the ‘classic’ TSP space between 
the origin country and one destination country only but sometimes span across 
several countries. This is shown in only a few focused studies, such as those on 
Sudanese families between their origin country, the Netherlands, and the UK (Serra 
Mingot and Mazzucato 2019), and on Nicaraguan families between Nicaragua, 
Costa Rica, the United States and Panama (Fréguin-Gresh et  al. 2015). As both 
studies highlight, this involves a complex coordination between network members 
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and more composite and multi-directional flows of people and resources linked to 
multidimensional social-protection areas. This shows that, in the globalisation era, 
flows of people and resources are more complex, circular and fluid (Cortes and 
Faret 2009). Navigating a TSP space depends on different ‘circulatory capabilities’ 
(Fréguin-Gresh et al. 2015), shaped by both the external contextual conditions and 
the inner family needs and logics (Palash and Serra Mingot 2019).
Research on the management of an extended TSP space by transnational families 
tends to frame it as profitable. For example, Bryceson (2019) distinguishes between 
‘multi-transnational’ families (spanning over more than two countries) which, in 
comparison to ‘bi-transnational’ families (involving only two countries) are 
advantaged through their skills and education, providing transnational socio- 
economic opportunities. Several empirical studies on Chinese transnational families 
are in line with this perspective, assuming a more strategic use of an enlarged TSP 
space. Among these, Ma Mung (1999) points out their optimisation of spatial 
resources through geographic dispersion. Trémon (2011) and Ong (1999) elaborate 
respectively on ‘flexible parenthood’ and ‘flexible citizenship’, understood as 
migrants’ opportunistic strategies to secure resources in other countries through an 
advantageous naturalisation. Such framings appear to echo the assumptions of the 
‘welfare magnet hypothesis’ or ‘welfare tourism’ (Borjas 1999; Fernandes 2016) 
about migrants’ use of welfare-related resources in Western countries, although 
sometimes challenged by evidence (Fernandes 2016; Giulietti 2014).
Several other studies, however, contradict the framing of the successful and 
profit-seeking behaviour of transnational families dispersed across multiple 
countries. For example, members of Nicaraguan families originating from poor 
rural areas, who migrate to several destinations to improve their situation, experience 
job precariousness and informality (Fréguin-Gresh et  al. 2015). McIlwaine and 
Bunge (2019) elaborate on the ‘onward precarity’ of post-crisis moves by Latin 
American migrants from Spain to the UK who, in their trajectories and despite the 
privileges of holding Spanish citizenship, instead accumulate vulnerabilities (see 
also Ramos 2018). Even German middle-class families face difficulties in the 
organisation of their transnational life in and outside the EU with respect to national 
regulations and welfare (Schier 2016). This contribution builds on and expands 
these discussions, using the specific case of the TSP space of Ecuadorian families 
spread across Ecuador, Spain and the UK.
11.3  Research Methods
We draw on a multi-sited fieldwork ethnography conducted over 14 months between 
2015 and 2016 with Ecuadorian families in Spain (Barcelona), England (London), 
and Ecuador (including Quito, Guayaquil, Milagro, Cuenca, Baños, Ambato and 
Santo Domingo). The management of TSP has been studied among 63 families 
whose members were living in Ecuador and at least one European country (Spain or 
the UK). These TSP practices appeared to be spanning over at least three countries 
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(Ecuador, Spain, the UK and/or other countries) in 36 families out of these 63. We 
base our analysis on two emblematic cases, whose members have been interviewed 
both in Europe and Ecuador, through a matched sample technique.
Research participants were recruited in Europe through multiple gatekeepers and 
snowball sampling with diverse starting-points, including associations of 
Ecuadorians, community events, places frequented by the community members in 
Barcelona and London and personal contacts. The sample included mainly working- 
age migrants, both men and women, aged 20–60 years old, encompassing both low 
socio-economic-status migrants (employed in unskilled jobs, often due to downward 
social mobility) and, to a lesser extent, professionals in high-skilled jobs. Most of 
them had a legal status in Europe, holding Ecuadorian-Spanish dual citizenship. In 
terms of family structure, the sample included couples, with or without children 
and, to a lesser extent, single parents or single-member households.
The families’ socio-economic status is considered globally, including the situa-
tion of family members in both Ecuador and Europe, since these are often interre-
lated. This is observable over time, for example for migrants with economically 
self-sufficient families in Ecuador who better resisted downward social mobility in 
Europe, accumulating more assets (e.g. property) over time and reflecting better 
social protection conditions overall. Likewise, the socio-economic status of families 
in Ecuador evolved over time – related, for example, to migrants’ implications in 
eventual support from abroad. Thus, we distinguish between two main socio- 
economic status categories: lower and higher socio-economic-status families. The 
first and most numerous group included migrants employed in low-skilled jobs in 
Europe, with dependent family members in Ecuador. On the other hand, a smaller 
group included migrants who were better integrated socio-economically in Europe 
and who better resisted downward mobility, often working in qualified jobs (at least 
up to the 2008 recession). They generally had self-sufficient families in Ecuador and 
were distinguished by the availability and use of reverse economic flows from 
Ecuador.
Interviews were conducted by the first author (Polina Palash) in Spanish in 
respondents’ homes, neighbourhoods, bars and, more rarely, at job sites in informal 
settings. They lasted between one and several hours and were partly recorded, partly 
registered by note-taking during or after the meetings. Discussions encompassed, 
on the one hand, TSP practices between migrants and their scattered family members 
and, on the other, their access to extra-familial resources of social protection (state, 
market, third sector or other social networks). Interviews with families were 
supplemented by participant observation of various duration made during 
community events, in respondents’ homes or, more rarely, at their workplaces.
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11.4  Balancing TSP Between Here, There and Beyond
The complex management of social protection concerns across multiple countries is 
differently managed by the two types of families defined above, as Juan’s and 
Ramon’s cases illustrate.
11.4.1  Juan’s Family
I first met Juan (61) at an NGO at which I was volunteering in London and after-
wards we also met several times in bars and a restaurant in the Elephant and Castle 
shopping centre area, known as one of the most popular gathering places for Latino 
migrants in London. ‘They call me the eternal traveller’, Juan told me. In Quito, 
where he completed a university degree in business administration, Juan was a 
department head in a multinational enterprise, while his wife Luisa was a professor 
at a prestigious college. Due to the crisis in Ecuador and before moving to Spain 
with his family, he also worked for a period in the US in the late 1990s.
They migrated to Spain in 1998, where Juan found work as a breeder, while 
Luisa created an informal kindergarten for the children of workers living in their 
neighbourhood. After some years, they reunified with their two children, previously 
cared for by Juan’s in-laws. In 2008, both children returned to Ecuador for study 
and personal reasons. Juan and Luisa remained in Spain, supporting their children’s 
private university studies in Quito, while coping with a worsened labour situation in 
the aftermath of the 2008 crisis.
Because they also suffered emotionally from the separation from their children, 
the couple decided to return ‘back home’ in 2011. At their age (over 55), starting a 
life anew in Quito proved to be difficult, since they could not find a job. Moreover, 
Luisa had a health issue and the medication she needed was expensive in Ecuador. 
Fortunately, they were helped by their siblings who sent them more affordable 
medicines from Spain. Although their adult children had jobs, their salary, amounting 
to about US$ 400 a month, was not enough to afford the cost of living in Quito.1
In response to these hardships, Juan decided to return to Spain, this time alone, 
where he soon found out that the labour situation had even become worse. His 
children could not move with him because they did not hold Spanish citizenship, 
while his wife could not join him because of her illness.
Having family ties in London, he decided to move there in 2011, helped by a 
cousin who found him a job as a cleaner. Although this income made it possible for 
Juan to support his family in Quito, his job situation was challenging. Having to 
combine several partial jobs in the cleaning sector, he was busy the whole time 
1 The basic food basket in Ecuador has recently been estimated to be around US$ 700, while the 
basic salary in 2018 was US$ 386. See http://www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec/canasta/; http://www.
trabajo.gob.ec/ministerio-del-trabajo-establece-salario-basico-unificado-2018/
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going from one job location to the next, often in neighbourhoods located far apart. 
He lived in an overcrowded flat with 11 strangers and found this exhausting at his 
age. Juan had lived in these conditions for 3 years before he returned for another 
period to Quito in 2014.
However, it proved hard to earn a living for him and his children in Ecuador so, 
when he ran out of money, Juan returned to Europe. Resettling again in London, 
where I met him in 2016, proved to be difficult. He combined several flexible jobs 
in the cleaning sector, including working at night and at the crack of dawn. Regarding 
housing, he was initially allowed to stay in his cousin’s house but soon had to find a 
place of his own while being on a very tight budget. Moreover, in order to receive 
his salary in his British bank account, he needed to have proof of residence, which 
was hard to obtain when living in shared flats. His salary was blocked by the bank 
and, due to all these problems, he became homeless and slept on London buses, 
which was how I met him at the NGO.  Juan’s fragmented work schedule was 
exhausting and sometimes he simply fell asleep at work at the end of a shift, which 
was not allowed and risked him losing his job. As he explained:
I am living on the street… I have nowhere to live. Now I also have the problem that if I don’t 
have proof of residence, how can the enterprise pay me?
He sometimes had a shower and a meal at the home of his cousin where he also 
stored his belongings but he could only be there occasionally, as she was sharing her 
place with several other people. Contacting several organisations for homeless 
people in London proved useless, as they were overcrowded. Juan was not used to 
asking for support for such basic needs:
I have worked my whole life since the age of 12. I never, in any country where I have been, 
received any support, apart from unemployment benefits in Spain, which was money that I 
was due.
In England, housing benefits were mainly provided to families with children and, 
more generally in times of Brexit, welfare entitlements were increasingly restrained 
even for EU citizens. Amidst his misfortune, some money was sent from Spain to 
Juan by his brother, despite the latter’s own economic difficulties. Moreover, his 
family in Spain also continued to support Luisa in Quito by sending her medication. 
Like other respondents in the UK, Juan was dissatisfied with the public healthcare 
services in London so, when his economic situation improved slightly, he preferred 
to travel and consult his usual doctor in Spain. As the Spanish healthcare provision 
is formally conditional on permanent residence, his brother helped to keep Juan’s 
residence registration in his house in Spain. The downside of this was that, as he 
explained, it meant that his brother could no longer receive child benefits. 
Nevertheless, the two brothers managed to organise this arrangement for a period 
and, in return, Juan helped his brother by hosting him and his older son, who 
periodically worked in London. As it turned out, they found it hard to adapt to 
London life in such precarious and costly conditions and preferred to live more 
permanently in Spain regardless of its depressed economy.
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Some months later, I met Juan’s family in Quito. His wife talked about him with 
tears in her eyes, worried about his problems. Their present financial situation was 
insecure, while their retirement plans in terms of their pension entitlements were 
uncertain. Although over time Juan had put in many years of contributions (18 in 
Ecuador, nine in Spain, and four in the UK), it was unclear how or whether they 
would be able to gain access to them on retirement. Juan was short by just a couple 
of working years of the 30 years of contributions required to retire in either Ecuador 
or Spain. If he retired in Ecuador, where the retirement age was 60, the low pension 
of less than US$ 400 would not cover his monthly expenditure, estimated to be 
almost double that amount. In Spain, the pension would be higher but still modest 
with respect to the basic cost of living. In any case, he would still have to work until 
the age of 67, whether in Spain or in Ecuador, in order to be entitled to the total sum 
of his contributions through the existing social-security agreement between the two 
countries. Nonetheless, he had difficulty finding work in either Spain or Ecuador, 
whereas working in the UK implied wasting his old-age contributions. Indeed, 
because of the lack of any social-security agreement between these two countries, 
his pension contributions were not transferrable to Ecuador. Moreover, in the 
context of the Brexit negotiations, he ran the risk of losing even their portability to 
Spain. To address this, Juan was thinking about getting his Ecuadorian pension at 
the age of 60, which was just a few years away. This would mean travelling to 
Ecuador to sign the required document confirming his supposed presence, as 
pension benefits are conditional on local residence. Nevertheless, he also knew that 
it would not be enough and this is why he would prefer to reunite his family in 
London. However, because his children did not have EU citizenship, this was not 
possible. Another solution proposed by his wife was to pay voluntary contributions 
out of his own pocket into the Ecuadorian social-security system2 while working in 
Europe, until he reached the Spanish minimum pension age. If things were to get 
better in Spain, he might then be able to export these Ecuadorian contributions to 
Spain. This situation was a brainteaser for Juan. Certainly, the whole family would 
find it easier to have all the resources and members gathered in one place.
11.4.2  Ramón’s Family
Although with a similar background in Quito, the situation of Ramón was less des-
perate. I came into contact with him through another respondent whom I had met in 
Spain and who had a similar socio-economically privileged profile. We met in the 
city centre and another time in his house in Barcelona. Before migrating to Spain in 
2 This scheme allows migrants to accumulate working contributions through monthly payments to 
the Ecuadorian social-security system, which can later give access to a retirement pension. Thanks 
to the Social Security Agreement with Spain, these contributions can be exported and totalised in 
Spain. However, payments to this scheme, about US$ 78 a month, represents a burden for migrants 
(Herrera and Paredes Grijalva 2017).
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2001, Ramón was a general director of a multinational company in Quito. In 
Barcelona, he worked as a specialised workman for the same company and, before 
the crisis, he managed a tourist campsite in a large city in the Catalonia region, also 
investing in a property in Barcelona, where he lived with his wife and two teenage 
children.
Nevertheless, the crisis destabilised the quite successful integration of his family 
in Spain and, due to financial difficulties, his spouse returned with their two children 
to Quito and their marriage broke up. Before their return, he occasionally paid for 
his father’s private healthcare treatment in Ecuador; this latter was lucky enough to 
be entitled to a retirement pension of US$ 320 which, however, was not enough to 
afford local living costs, which were twice as high. Now he also had to think about 
how to ensure the living expenses of his nuclear family, including the education of 
his two children in Quito. Although his children were in Ecuador, it was not an 
option for Ramón to return there since, at his age, it would be hard to adapt to the 
Ecuadorian job market and his future pension would be as low as his father’s. Still, 
in contrast to other Ecuadorians who faced more labour informality in Ecuador and 
Europe, Ramón had a good situation as far as his future pension was concerned, 
with about 13 years of working contributions in Spain and seven in Ecuador. Thanks 
to the existing agreement between these two countries, his working years could be 
added together in one of these two countries in order for him to access his pension.
However, Ramón struggled with periods of unemployment and precarious flexi-
ble jobs –he was self-employed as an Uber driver in Barcelona at the time of the 
interview. Meanwhile, he also had the burden of paying the mortgage on the property 
he had invested in before the crisis.
In Quito, Ramón owned two properties which were rented out and which, con-
trary to the Spanish real-estate trend, had benefited from a rise in value in recent 
years. Although he would prefer to avoid using this money which ensured the 
financial support of his family in Ecuador, his situation obliged him to transfer this 
money to Spain. At the time of the interview, he was waiting for US$ 6000 to be 
brought by his father, a 2-year rental income, in order to avoid being expropriated 
by the bank because of his insolvency in Barcelona. Nevertheless, partly transferring 
this income, which also ensured the needs of his family in Quito, created tension in 
his transnational family, with Ramon’s sense of guilt linked to his support duties.
Another solution to cope with the stagnant labour situation in Spain was spend-
ing periods of time working abroad, which was made possible thanks to his Spanish 
citizenship. In 2014, he spent some months working in the UK, where he had his 
extended family. With the help of a relative, who was a manager in the cleaning 
sector, Ramón worked for a period in this field. However, this kind of work even 
implied stronger downward social mobility for Ramón and the little money he 
earned in cleaning was not enough to pay for his living costs in London. As he put 
it, ‘So what’s the point of going there to work and spend all you earn and have 
nothing left?’
The salaries and quality of life of his compatriots in the UK were degrading and 
he himself was no longer young enough to easily adapt to such conditions. He argued:
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I rather would seek to have the chance to work and have savings for the future, otherwise I 
don’t see any sense. I prefer to remain in this country [Spain], where I know I have made 
contributions to the social security [system], I have my guarantees and Spanish nationality 
and I hope that things will change. But this waiting [for a job] causes me to despair because 
I am one of those people who are very active and dynamic.
Nevertheless, earning a living in Barcelona while having the pressure of paying 
his mortgage was hard and, apart from moving money from Ecuador, Ramón had to 
think of other solutions. He travelled to the US to explore the labour situation in 
Miami, where he had friends and where he believed that more opportunities were 
available in better-paid customer care jobs. However, this necessitated speaking 
English, which Ramón did not do, as well as investing substantial financial means 
in order to settle in the US. Furthermore, Ramón realised that the healthcare system 
there was not as inclusive as that in Spain, when he had an emergency and was 
asked to pay US$ 700 to be attended to.
In effect, despite the effects of the crisis, the Spanish healthcare system and the 
fact that he could combine his working years in Ecuador and those Spain, still 
represented important resources for Ramón’s social-protection issues. However, he 
had to cope with the economic and real-estate crisis in Spain. Unfortunately, he 
could not save his property which he was forced to return to the bank, losing all the 
money invested in it. Still, Ramón could rely on the income from his properties in 
Ecuador, shared with his family in Quito, which provided an economic basis 
allowing him to look for other options.
11.5  The (Im)Mobility of People and Provisions 
in a TSP Space
These two cases illustrate stories of migrants who were affected twice by economic 
downturns – first in their home country and later in Spain – and whose migratory 
and social mobility trajectories turned out to be less successful and profitable than 
those reported in studies on a profitable management of TSP across several countries 
(Ma Mung 1999; Ong 1999; Trémon 2011; see also Bryceson 2019). For most 
families in this study, the motivation for extending their TSP space was prompted by 
a second crisis which they faced in Spain. More than being strategic and premeditated, 
their onward move to the UK served as a coping strategy motivated by contextual 
constraints in the previous country of residence. Today, the inhospitable Brexit 
context entails further insecurities for such migrants, in addition to the age-related 
vulnerability they face. As such, they struggle to address the risks of coping with 
new difficulties. For these reasons, the expansion of migrants’ TSP space reflects a 
compensatory adaptation to constraining environments marked by repeated 
contextual destabilisation.
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11.5.1  Differential Circulatory Capabilities
A useful conceptualisation for the analysis of extended TSP space management is 
Sandrine Fréguin-Gresh and her colleagues’ (Fréguin-Gresh et al. 2015, 19) notion 
of ‘circulatory capability’, which has three dimensions: ‘the capacity, knowledge 
and will of circulating and making circulating resources in a family mobility space’.
First, the capacity to circulate and make resources circulate is strongly influ-
enced by migrants’ and their families’ socio-economic status and specific environ-
ments. However, in a TSP space encompassing multiple countries, this is more 
complex, involving particular challenges to migrants’ capacity to ensure support for 
their scattered family members. Vulnerable families have to engage in a balancing 
act of allocating limited resources. In fact, when their limited resources are stretched 
across an extended TSP space, actors may fall short in supporting dependent family 
members across several countries, as occurs for Juan, who is obliged to periodically 
suspend support. This is different for privileged migrants like Ramón, who can rely 
on his financial means in Ecuador and whose scattered family members are less 
vulnerable.
Apart from ensuring the needs of their family members, migrants’ capacity 
relates to their own social-protection needs as well, particularly the issue of old age. 
Managing social-protection issues across several countries, which do not always 
include social security agreements, implies a fragmentation and possible loss of 
entitlements, as experienced by Juan (see also Palash and Serra Mingot 2019). By 
contrast, Ramón can rely on economic resources in his origin country to maintain 
his situation in Europe (Palash and Baby-Collin 2018) and he has more freedom of 
choice with respect to managing his present and future social-protection concerns.
Migrants’ capacity to manage TSP also depends on their legal status and citizen-
ship. For example, holding EU (Spanish) citizenship influences Juan and Ramon’s 
spatial mobility and transnational family life, as we saw earlier. Juan’s children, 
who returned to Ecuador, could not join him in the UK, as they did not have Spanish 
citizenship. However, his case also demonstrates that, when migrants are stuck for 
economic reasons, as was Juan in England, having EU citizenship may lose its value 
as a resource. This can be the case when migrants facing precariousness cannot 
ensure their basic social-protection concerns through state provisions (e.g. Mas 
Giralt 2016).
Furthermore, migrants’ age and life course also shape their capacity to manage 
social-protection issues. In fact, it is even more challenging for elderly migrants to 
adapt to foreign contexts, in particular with respect to their labour integration. 
Juan’s predicament, ending up as homeless, sleeping on London buses and facing 
even more fragility in his social-protection situation due to his age, is telling.
Secondly, the dimension of knowledge can be linked to actors’ migratory experi-
ence and the knowledge acquired through multiple migrations (Ramos 2018), in 
terms of the mobilisation of social networks, coping practices, integration and the 
environmental specificities. Having acquired knowledge, however, may not be 
enough for migrants to manage their TSP space when again, like Juan, migrants’ 
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capacity to earn a decent living is affected. Although he considers the healthcare 
system in Spain to be better, he is stuck in the UK because of his precarious job 
situation and, therefore, cannot travel to access healthcare in Spain. The access to 
mobility allowed by his citizenship is strongly affected by the financial constraints 
required to move.
Migrants’ awareness of the quality of particular resources in specific welfare 
systems is often intentionally linked to ‘welfare magnet’ and ‘welfare tourism’ 
framings (Borjas 1999; Fernandes 2016). For respondents in this study, however, it 
is not so much the knowledge of welfare resources in the UK which can be accessed 
thanks to the Spanish citizenship which motivates their onward moves but the hope 
of ensuring their employment and the chance of relying on family networks in 
London (see also Fernandes 2016; McIlwaine and Bunge 2019). Nevertheless, 
employment is not the same as ‘opportunity’, as Ramón acknowledges: the high 
living expenses have to be subtracted from the low wages of low-skilled jobs in 
London, while working contributions may not always be exportable in an enlarged 
TSP space. Concerning welfare provision, in the context of Brexit and austerity 
measures it presents shortcomings for migrants such as Juan, who consider public 
healthcare in England inefficient and who ensure that their medical needs are met 
travel back to Spain (see also Serra Mingot and Mazzucato 2019). Moreover, access 
to social benefits can sometimes be restricted in the destination country (see also 
Mas Giralt 2016) and instead reserved for families with children. As the onward 
migrants in our study are mostly either those with adult children or those who 
migrated without their children to the UK, they do not fall into this category.
Finally, another component of circulatory capability is will. Because the will of 
migrants is challenged by their capacity to be involved in providing support to 
scattered family members, this gives rise to negotiations on which family members 
or social-protection domains should be given priority. In this respect, domains like 
healthcare and basic income are often regarded as a priority, while stronger TSP ties 
tend to develop between nuclear family members, as well as between migrants and 
their elderly parents. However, in an enlarged TSP space the will to be engaged in 
support may be put to the test even more for precarious migrants. In fact, the options 
of Juan, during his periods of extreme precariousness in London, are limited, no 
matter how hard he wants to provide for his relatives. By contrast, Ramón has more 
options to support himself and his relatives. Still, the fact that he has to transfer 
money from Ecuador to Europe, money which, at the same time, ensures the welfare 
of his nuclear family in Quito, involves tensions in his family. Clearly, this also 
occurs in low-income families, affecting their relationships as well as their 
expectations and future reciprocity.
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11.5.2  The Diffuse Circulation of Support as a Compensatory 
Adaptation to Constraining Environments
To understand family systems in an extended TSP space, Baldassar and Merla 
(2014) formulated the useful concept of the ‘care circulation framework, which 
pertains to circular complementary reciprocity mechanisms shaped by time. 
Borrowing this perspective, we observe in our study a diffuse circulation of support 
(e.g., Palash and Baby-Collin 2018). Such a mechanism is extended in terms of the 
family members involved (without following direct reciprocity logics), timeframes 
and multiple countries over which indirect reciprocity takes place. In such TSP 
systems, flows of people and resources circulate multi-directionally and provisions 
are influenced by contextual circumstances, such as economic destabilisation and 
family members’ needs shaped by their lifecourse. They adopt flexible readjustments 
with the passing on of support responsibilities and the reversal of varied provisions, 
as a form of social reproduction across space and time. Their flexibility is more 
adaptive than strategic because it is meant to compensate for constraints and risks, 
rather than implying an accumulation of resources (Trémon 2011). This cross- 
border socio-spatial adaptation also secures families’ social-protection concerns. 
This relates both to their precarious integration in the labour market in the countries 
where they are located and to the challenge of having adequate welfare coverage in 
Europe and in their origin country.
Inequalities mark the management of social protection across borders (Lafleur 
and Vivas Romero 2018) and, when the TSP space is enlarged, these become even 
more significant. In this respect, the two sections that follow provide a comparative 
analysis of the distinct situations, logics and ways of managing TSP across several 
countries by families with different socio-economic statuses, in their complexity of 
spatial and temporal readjustments. These directly influence migrants’ social 
mobility trajectories, the interaction between families and their environments, the 
intra-familial support and relational interplay and the perspective on TSP 
management as a whole.
11.5.3  Low Socio-Economic-Status Families: Thick 
Reciprocity and (Inter-)Dependence
For migrants whose families have been severely affected by recurring crises, man-
aging TSP across several countries is largely a forced decision. It is motivated by 
the scarcity of resources in the usual TSP space and by urgent family needs such as 
a basic income or unexpected expenses to cover (e.g. healthcare, housing issues). 
As Juan’s case illustrates, this may imply an accumulation of vulnerabilities and 
result in downward social mobility  – a specific kind of ‘onward precarity’ 
(McIlwaine and Bunge 2019). Families of this type are more in need of state provi-
sions which, in the austerity era in Europe, are compromised while, in Ecuador, 
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they are still quite limited. These families are more often obliged to find work on 
the informal market, which penalises their social security rights, while the 2008 
crisis also caused major losses for those who had invested in the pre-crisis real-
estate market in Spain.
At the intra-familiar level, these families are marked by great (inter-)dependence 
and intense and generalised reciprocity ties, marked by thick density and branching 
of the diffuse circulation of support encompassing the diverse and extended family 
members. Although the available resources are not abundant, families combine and 
adjust them in synergic functioning, in multi-directional resource flows requiring 
complex coordination (Fréguin-Gresh et al. 2015; Palash and Serra Mingot 2019; 
Serra Mingot and Mazzucato 2019). This is illustrated by Juan’s family, whose 
members across the three countries try to combine a range of resources to ensure 
their diverse needs. Diverse provision by family members in the different countries 
encourages other provision at other points in time.
Nevertheless, such symbiosis implies a delicate balance. In other low-income 
families with mostly dependent family members, migrants experience even greater 
pressures, which affect their protective and relational ties. In fact, when needs and 
constraints are predominant with respect to resources to be distributed and if, for 
diverse reasons, there is a low degree of collaboration between scattered family 
members, TSP ties have to be interrupted, due to their unsustainability. Migrants are 
obliged to establish priorities within their TSP space, often having to restrict it to its 
previous configuration between two countries and to focus on closer family members 
for whom they have stronger moral responsibilities – specifically their children and 
parents.
Overall, the management of TSP across several countries is barely affordable for 
this type of family and, sometimes, this even involves a risky game, with both their 
present and their future blurred by uncertainties.
11.5.4  High Socio-Economic-Status Families: Thin 
Reciprocity and Autonomy
For privileged families, managing TSP across several countries is different. 
They may more freely decide to enlarge their TSP space in order to sustain or 
accumulate resources linked to social protection  – either for a period or in a 
more durable way. In fact, Ramón decided to extend his TSP space in order to 
preserve or increase his key resources linked to income and housing. Migrants 
in this category better resist downward social mobility, because they have man-
aged to accumulate capital to uphold their economic situation, despite having 
had to face two economic recessions. Their family members also have less need 
for support, which helps them to consolidate assets in both the origin and the 
receiving countries. They manage to cope better with the risks produced by the 
recession in Europe through their ownership of properties in Ecuador, the value 
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of which has increased while the job situation in Spain has worsened. This is 
reassuring for Ramón, who receives an income from his rented properties in 
Ecuador. Moreover, owning a property in the country of origin represents a 
security net for the future, as prospective state pensions might only cover part of 
one’s living expenses. This is different for migrants of lower socio-economic 
status engaged in property construction back home. In fact, in the aftermath of 
the 2008 crisis, many have had to pursue their investment projects slowly or to 
suspend them due to other more urgent priorities (Palash and Serra Mingot 
2019). Instead, migrants who have better access to an international supply of 
specific resources linked to social protection are less dependent on state provi-
sions and have greater freedom to choose a particular standard of living in the 
countries concerned.
Their greater independence and autonomy can also be observed at the intra- 
familiar level. TSP ties have generally been rather thin over the lifecourse and 
mainly draw on organisational provision or reverse remittances from Ecuador to 
Europe. Migrants’ involvement focuses mainly on occasional financial support for 
their elderly parents back home, motivated by filial moral obligation rather than by 
serious risk. Such is the case for Ramón, whose father in Ecuador is part of the 
privileged segment of the population who is entitled to a retirement pension. 
Accordingly, the circulation of support in these families is less diffuse, with fewer 
reciprocity ties and multi-directional resource flows than for underprivileged 
families. The greater autonomy of members of these more privileged transnational 
family networks also appears to imply less relational tension with respect to 
expectations and responsibilities of support. However, as experienced by Ramón, 
moving money from ‘back home’ is never a glorious act for migrants (Palash and 
Baby-Collin 2018).
Overall, their management of an enlarged TSP space implies fewer risks and 
constraints but, in the context of recurrent crises, remains more often adaptive than 
fully strategic. This seems to apply to Ramón, whose better economic situation 
enables him to manage his TSP between the two main countries (Spain and Ecuador), 
which prevents the dispersal of the social-welfare contributions he has made  – 
which would have otherwise occurred had he moved to another country. In sum, 
unlike vulnerable families, privileged families can better manage their present and, 
at the same time, make plans for the future.
11.6  Conclusions
The results of this study contribute empirically, theoretically and conceptually to the 
literature on migration, transnational families and TSP in a number of ways. First, 
social protection arrangements in transnational families may encompass multiple 
countries, going beyond the conventional bipolar consideration of the dynamics 
involved between the country of origin and country of destination. Migrants’ spatial 
trajectories often involve multiple migrations mainly motivated by income scarcities 
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linked to repeated economic crises, giving rise to more complex transnational ties 
and their organisation. Moving forward with the conceptualisation of resource 
environments by Levitt and her colleagues (Levitt et  al. 2017), and considering 
space as ‘socially produced’ (Massey 2005), we conceptualise the TSP space, 
encompassing actors’ practices to ensure social protection needs in specific 
environments and involving resources and constraints, as being subject to 
transformation over time. In contrast to studies which frame transnational families 
as extending their usual TSP space to take advantage of resources in other countries 
and accumulate assets, we show that the realities for families hit by recurring 
contextual destabilisation may be quite different. Rather than reflecting an 
opportunistic strategy, enlarging their TSP space actually represents a compensatory 
reactive adaptation to constraining environments. In fact, most of our informants 
who expanded their TSP space by migrating to the UK appear to have experienced 
progressive downward social mobility, involving the accumulation of vulnerabilities, 
risks and constraints. Secondly, integrating a circulation framework to the application 
of a socio-spatial approach o their TSP arrangements in transnational families and 
understanding the related logics and (im)mobilities, we identify a mechanism of 
diffuse circulation of support. Such a TSP system from below is extended in terms 
of the family members involved, not necessarily following a direct reciprocity logic, 
the timeframes over which such indirect reciprocity takes place and an enlarged 
TSP space encompassing multiple countries. Families dynamically adjust their 
resources and constraints through flexible socio-spatial adaptations, resulting in 
multi-directional financial, material and organisational provision in order to ensure 
intertwined areas of social protection. This implies the passing on of support 
responsibilities and the reversal of varied provisions as a form of social reproduction 
across space and time. This is shaped by external conditions linked to specific 
environments and internal family dynamics related to emerging needs along the 
lifecourse and the relational ties of the people involved. Such a coping flexibility 
mechanism is more adaptive than strategic, as it compensates for constraints and 
risks in their usual environment rather than implying an accumulation of resources.
Families manage their TSP space differently, according to their socio-economic 
status. In the greater majority of vulnerable families there is a thick reciprocity, a 
more complex synergy of multi-directional flows of resources between extended 
family members and their greater (inter-)dependence. However, this implies a 
delicate balance between scarce scattered resources and significant risks. This 
obliges family actors to prioritise certain social-protection areas and the family 
members in need or to suspend TSP ties if they become unfeasible, which may 
negatively affect their family relationships. In contrast, in the smaller group of 
more privileged families with a more secure situation, there tends to be a thinner 
reciprocity and greater autonomy both among family members and with respect to 
state provision. Last but not least, by addressing welfare concerns, this study has 
shown that migrants’ social security rights linked to their old age are compro-
mised across several countries, due to the fragmentation of the portability of their 
working contributions, leading to their immobilisation. Moreover, our findings 
demystify the assumptions of both the welfare-magnet hypothesis and welfare 
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tourism. More than being motivated by British welfare-state provisions, migrants’ 
onward move to England is mainly related to better employment integration, as 
well as to the economic and real-estate crisis in Spain and the presence of migrants’ 
own family networks. For these dual EU Spanish-Ecuadorian citizens facing aus-
terity measures in Europe, family resources appear to be more crucial than welfare 
provision.
Although studies on TSP across several countries are complex, both in their 
realisation and in their analytical process, more evidence is needed, considering 
the current transnationalisation dynamics and recurring contextual destabilisa-
tion worldwide. In the post-crisis austerity era, even native EU citizens face more 
and more obstacles in accessing and maintaining circulating welfare entitlements 
across borders (Fernandes 2016; Lafleur and Mescoli 2018). When it comes to 
multiple receiving contexts and to subaltern citizens, going around in circles 
seems to imply even more risks, due to greater exclusions, marginality and 
uprooting. This may affect their territoriality ties and their claiming of 
social rights.
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Chapter 12
Beloved Land, Beloved Family: The Role 




Timor-Leste’s long history of colonisation and occupation has posed significant 
welfare challenges for the Timorese people. When this small, half-island nation 
nestled between Asia and the Pacific achieved independence in 2002, it became the 
twenty-first-century’s first new sovereign state. Since independence, the newly 
founded state, nascent market and prominent third sector have focused on consoli-
dating security and stability, alleviating poverty and laying the foundations for 
nationhood. Alongside these state-building efforts a budding pattern of migration 
has emerged, with increasing numbers of Timorese migrating to the United Kingdom 
(UK). An estimated 16,000–19,000 Timorese now reside in the UK, although exact 
numbers are difficult to calculate as most travel using Portuguese passports and are 
considered Portuguese citizens by the sending and receiving states (Wigglesworth 
2017). Although this burgeoning migration pattern has garnered little attention, it 
plays an increasingly important role in the welfare of Timorese families. This chap-
ter seeks to understand how these migrants’ welfare concerns shape their decisions 
about geographical mobility and vice versa.
Drawing on fieldwork conducted in Oxford and Peterborough in 2017, this chap-
ter adopts Levitt et al.’s (2017) welfare resource environment conceptualisation to 
study how Timorese migrants and their families piece together social protection 
from varied and disparate transnational sources. Levitt et al.’s (2017) theorisation is 
modified slightly to ensure that the analysis of family-based security regimes 
remains culturally situated. Adding the work of Ng et al. (2003) acknowledges that 
any conceptualisation of welfare is culturally embedded, paying special attention to 
how the role of family can be understood and valued differently across cultures.
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This chapter explores the role of labour markets, states and family-based welfare 
provisions in Timorese migration to England. It first explores economic protections 
by examining unemployment in Timor-Leste, employment in the UK and labour- 
market conditions in both locations. The role of the state is then considered, track-
ing Timorese mobility across welfare regimes. State responsibility, distrust, 
dependency and education in Timor-Leste are contrasted with the new provisions 
offered to migrants by Britain’s welfare state, including the social security, taxation, 
healthcare, legal and education systems. Arguing that Timorese migrants utilise the 
labour market’s economic protections and state-based welfare in support of their 
own, family-based protection frames, this chapter elucidates the culturally differen-
tiated ways in which migrants and their families piece together unique welfare 
solutions.
12.2  Theoretical Lens: Culturally Situated 
Welfare-Resource Environments
This book illuminates the need to understand social security as increasingly con-
structed beyond the nation state. To examine how welfare concerns shape Timorese 
migration to the UK, this chapter utilises Levitt et  al.’s (2017) ‘welfare resource 
environment’ framework. This heuristic tool posits that individuals ‘stitch together’ 
social protection parcels, drawing on combinations of welfare provisions from all 
the possible protections available to them. Studying how migrants piece together 
social protection from many disparate and transnational sources quickly becomes 
complex. Access to welfare is strongly influenced by an individual’s education, 
skills, resources, legal status, origin country, receiving country and social networks 
(Levitt et al. 2017, 11). An individual’s resource environment is also not fixed and 
static but fluid and dynamic – it changes through migration, which itself is often a 
social protection tool. The welfare resource environment conceptualisation helps to 
capture this inherent complexity, providing a framework for mapping social protec-
tion in an increasingly transnational world. Levitt et al. (2017) identify four poten-
tial sources of social protection: states, markets, social networks and the third sector. 
This chapter expounds upon the first three of these categories, exploring the role of 
the state in sending and receiving countries, as well as family. The markets category 
is expanded to consider economic protections more broadly, discussing the role 
which employment and labour-market conditions play in migrants’ welfare-resource 
environments. It does not investigate the third sector nor informal networks other 
than family in detail, as they are less prominent in the results. While they play mean-
ingful roles in welfare provision in Timor-Leste, this chapter maintains a focus on 
the strategies that come to the fore through migration.
However, the welfare resource environment theorisation needs slight modifica-
tion for the purposes of this chapter, to ensure that the analysis of family-centred 
informal security regimes is culturally situated. Levitt et al. (2017, p. 5) introduce 
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informal security regimes to ‘fill out’ the picture after consideration of state and 
market-based welfare provisions, describing them as especially common in devel-
oping countries where states may be weak or absent. This is certainly true to an 
extent in Timor-Leste, where 500 years of colonisation and violent occupation have 
created significant welfare challenges. The state and market fail to protect against 
social risk and the third sector can only reach so far. Yet family plays a key welfare 
role in Timor-Leste not only because the state and market fail to provide but also 
because it is a communal, collective society. This chapter suggests that informal 
security regimes do not dominate solely because other options are limited but 
because the cultural context places emphasis on interdependence.
Levitt et al. (2017, 11) also describe the ‘relatively unreliable and ephemeral’ 
nature of transnational sources that are not contractually guaranteed. They state:
Whereas laws contractually obligate states to provide for citizens, and whereas market 
forces ensure that the most purchased protections will be provided, there is no such security 
for those who rely primarily on social ties and third sector organisations, each of which can 
withdraw their resources at any time and without recourse for the migrant.
This statement reveals an ethnocentrism that is in stark contrast to the findings 
presented in this chapter. For Timorese migrants – who reside as Portuguese citizens 
in a country continuously unsure if, when or how it will leave the European Union 
(EU) – state support in the current climate is unreliable. With precarious positions 
in the labour market as low-skilled, often casual workers, economic protections tied 
to the market may be seen as somewhat ephemeral. This chapter demonstrates that 
for Timorese migrants in the UK, family is paramount to security. To see state and 
market-based welfare as more steadfast than informal security regimes is arguably 
a Western viewpoint. It is therefore imperative to ensure that any examination of 
informal and family-based welfare remains culturally grounded.
Special attention must be paid to how the role of family in migrants’ welfare- 
resource environments is viewed and valued differently across cultures. It is here 
that the work of Ng et  al. (2003) becomes useful, in their explanation that any 
understanding of wellbeing is embedded within clusters of cultural assumptions and 
values. Often based on culture-specific moral visions, these define what is most 
meaningful in a given cultural setting. Most relevant to this empirical case is that 
members of individualistic and collectivist cultures differ in their conceptions of 
self-hood and emotional experiences of wellbeing (Ng et al. 2003). Individualism, a 
moral vision that emerged in Western history from Renaissance humanism, reigns 
in the West. The person is seen as the primary reality and society is relegated to a 
derivative, second-order level of reality that is simply a collection of individuals (Ng 
et al. 2003). Happiness is gained through self-determination: internal control and 
behaviour regulation are prioritised and individual autonomy is an important part of 
psychological wellbeing. In contrast, in communal cultures interdependence is fun-
damental. Society is the primary reality, with the individual a part of society. 
Relationships with others are paramount, as is the ability to fulfil the responsibilities 
associated with these relationships  – happiness may be gained through meeting 
one’s obligations to others (Ng et al. 2003).
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With much research in this area conducted in Western contexts, the theories and 
measures developed have been understandably shaped by individualism. The wel-
fare resource environment theorisation is no exception, leaning as it does towards a 
focus on the individual. There is a need to comprehend not only how individuals 
piece together transnational social protection parcels but also how this connects to 
welfare at the collective level. It is vital to both maintain awareness of the cultural 
values and assumptions underlying existing approaches and to understand how col-
lective actors themselves conceptualise welfare. By utilising an extended version of 
the welfare resource environment framework, this chapter presents a nuanced 
understanding of the culturally differentiated ways in which migrants engage with 
labour market, state and family-based welfare provisions.
12.3  The Case: Timorese Migration to England
Timor-Leste’s turbulent history has created significant welfare challenges. 
Portuguese colonisation lasted over 400 years and was marked by repression and 
the exploitation of human and natural resources, leaving behind little in material 
benefits for local people (Carroll-Bell 2015). Timor-Leste gained independence 
from Portugal in 1975, but after a mere 9 days, Indonesia invaded. During the fol-
lowing 25 years of violent occupation it is estimated that a third of the Timorese 
population died. An independence referendum in 1999 led to the Democratic 
Republic of Timor-Leste officially coming into being on 20 May 2002. Despite 
significant resource investment since independence, Timor-Leste’s population of 
1.3 million still suffers some of the worst welfare indicators in the world. Timor- 
Leste’s life expectancy at birth (69 years) is still among the worst in the region, as 
are the mortality ratios for mothers, infants and children under five (Carroll-Bell 
2015; World Bank 2018). Around 40 per cent of the population is estimated to be 
living in absolute poverty, with 73 per cent living on less than two US dollars a day 
(Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2014).
Little information is available on migration trends and patterns in Timor-Leste, 
including limited quantitative data and scarce academic research (Almeida 2010). 
Yet migration is not a new phenomenon there and encompasses significant internal 
and international migration (Guterres 2007). The first major international emigra-
tion occurred during Indonesian occupation, with approximately 250,000 people 
fleeing to West Timor (Indonesia), Australia and Portugal – many staying on to build 
new lives. Since independence, economic reasons have replaced conflict as the main 
motive for international emigration. Most occurs intra-regionally, with major desti-
nation countries being Indonesia, Australia, the Philippines and Portugal (Almeida 
2010). Some pathways are promoted and sponsored through bilateral government 
agreements, including temporary labour-migration programmes in South Korea and 
Australia.
Alongside formal schemes, another pattern has emerged in significant numbers 
of Timorese working in Europe. Because citizens of former Portuguese colonies are 
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entitled to Portuguese citizenship if they were born during the period of Portuguese 
rule – and Portugal never recognised Indonesian sovereignty over Timor-Leste – a 
unique loophole exists that makes Timorese born before 20 May 2002 eligible for 
Portuguese citizenship. Some Timorese have taken up this opportunity, applying for 
Portuguese passports for the purposes of labour migration. The story then goes that 
in the late 1990s, a factory in Northern Ireland was seeking labour through existing 
migration routes from rural Portugal. A Timorese took up the offer and went to 
Dungannon. He told his friends, they told theirs, and a steady stream of Timorese 
looking for the mythical chicken factory have been arriving ever since (Peake 2014). 
Migration has subsequently expanded to urban centres across the UK, where an 
estimated 16,000–19,000 Timorese now reside (Wigglesworth 2017). Regarding the 
fieldwork locations for this research, the Timorese connection with Oxford began 
when asylum-seekers settled in the area during Indonesian occupation – an esti-
mated 2000 Timorese now live there (McWilliam 2015). In Peterborough, the first 
two Timorese migrants arrived in 2002 and approximately 500 people are now reg-
istered with the Peterborough Timorese Community Organisation.
Despite drawing little attention, this trend is worth taking seriously. The value of 
inward remittances makes labour Timor-Leste’s largest export after oil, having 
overtaken coffee. An estimated 43 million US dollars were remitted to Timor-Leste 
in 2017, with 63 per cent coming from the UK (Curtain 2018). As these data do not 
include cash remittances or transfers using the recently popular Moneygram, the 
figure is likely higher. Furthermore, increasing development is usually accompanied 
by increasing migration, as social and economic development amplifies people’s 
aspirations and capabilities to migrate (de Haas 2005). This is evident in both the 
emigration evolving alongside Timor-Leste’s post-independence development and 
the migration patterns of neighbours in South-East Asia and the Pacific. In Shuaib’s 
(2007) remittance study 85 per cent of respondents stated they did not know when 
their overseas remitters would return, suggesting that emigration could become per-
manent. Overall it is likely that the importance of migration as a welfare strategy for 
the Timorese will only grow.
12.4  Data and Methods
This chapter analyses 16 semi-structured interviews completed in Oxford and 
Peterborough in 2017, conducted in the Tetun language.1 I am a fluent Tetun speaker 
due to my past experience living and working in Timor-Leste. Interviewees were 
recruited using snowball sampling, making contacts in England through existing 
networks in Timor-Leste and social media. As personal relationships were instru-
mental in gaining access, informed-consent forms in Tetun were used to formalise 
1 Tetun is the lingua franca and national language of Timor-Leste. Timor-Leste’s constitution clas-
sifies Tetun and Portuguese as official languages, English and Indonesian as working languages 
and 18 local languages as national languages (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2010).
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the process and emphasise the role of the researcher and care was taken to manage 
the potential impact on relationships if respondents were unhappy with the process.
Overt participant observation was also undertaken, resulting in over 50 hours of 
informal conversations and extensive field notes. This included participation in 
community activities such as social night and football training, spending time with 
migrants in their homes and sharing meals together. As many more migrants wanted 
to be interviewed than was feasible, time was spent listening to those whom it was 
not possible to formally interview, allowing them to share their experiences. The 
field was further expanded by conversations with migrants in London, Manchester, 
Great Yarmouth, Bridgwater and Northern Ireland and by discussing interviewees’ 
prior internal migration during their interviews. Although fieldwork was conducted 
in England only, interviews covered respondents’ pre-migration life in Timor-Leste 
and the impact of their migration on those remaining in Timor-Leste – the results 
reflect this. Interviews were transcribed in Tetun and interview data and field notes 
coded using Atlas.ti software. Aligning with an emphasis on migrant perspectives, 
data analysis used an exploratory, bottom-up inductive approach. All interviewee 
names used herein are pseudonyms. The background characteristics of the inter-
viewee cohort are summarised in Table 12.1.
12.5  The Role of Labour Markets in Welfare Provision
Welfare concerns pertaining to economic protection, employment and labour- 
market conditions were the most prominent drivers in Timorese migration to the 
UK. In their discussion of welfare, Levitt et al. (2017) give examples of provisions 
such as private health insurance, contracted childcare, property investment and the 
protection of workers’ rights. Here the net is cast much wider, moving away from 
traditional definitions of market-based welfare to consider the role labour-market 
concerns more broadly play in Timorese migrants’ welfare-resource environments 
in England. Interviewees had vastly different experiences with labour markets 
before and after migration. Unemployment in Timor-Leste and Portugal, employ-
ment and a well-developed private sector in the UK and labour-market conditions 
across all locations profoundly shaped mobility, as migrants attempted to piece 
together economic security.
12.5.1  (Un)employment and Labour-Market Conditions 
in Timor-Leste
Unemployment and labour-market conditions in Timor-Leste were central forces 
in this migration phenomenon. Interviewees raised unemployment as a major issue 
in Timor-Leste, many claiming it is the main reason people are choosing to leave 
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their rai doben or ‘beloved land’. However, as most of the migrants interviewed had 
worked in Timor-Leste prior to migrating, unemployment tended to be discussed by 
interviewees – such as 66-year-old Joana – as a general migration determinant:
Why are so many people from Timor-Leste leaving and coming to England? Because 
there’s no work. So many people don’t have work. That’s why people are leaving in num-
bers you can’t joke about.
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Many asserted that education does not lead to employment in Timor-Leste. They 
described how they had observed young Timorese graduating from university with 
post-graduate or Indonesian degrees, only to be unable to find work. Indeed not one 
of the 16 interviewees had completed university, yet all but one (who migrated 
immediately after high school) had worked in Timor-Leste. Six had been non- 
professionals, with women in service-industry jobs and men in construction or secu-
rity. The remaining nine all had professional work in the development sector, in 
areas as diverse as child protection, emergency response, internal displacement, 
infrastructure rehabilitation, rural development, literacy, economic empowerment, 
disability, public health and violence prevention. Most had worked in both the pub-
lic and the third sector, demonstrating that tertiary qualifications are not required for 
employment in government, international NGOs or UN agencies. It should be noted 
that the work experience of interviewees is not representative of Timor-Leste’s pop-
ulation, indicating that migration may be selective.2 That unemployment was so 
often raised as a migration determinant by migrants who had themselves been 
employed (including immediately prior to migration) also suggests that the decision 
to migrate might have occurred at a family or collective level.
Even with employment, labour-market conditions in Timor-Leste were pertinent. 
Salaries were low across all sectors and work in the development sector in particular 
was often contract-based. Many described their salaries as insufficient to cover their 
living costs or basic household needs. A monthly government salary of US$ 200 
might cover food and transport but making it last the whole month is difficult, given 
the expense of many children, large extended families and cultural practices of giv-
ing. One interviewee described working in a government ministry where salaries 
were not only low but often 3 or 4 months late. For those with families engaged in 
agricultural work, money was even scarcer. One man described how coffee farmers 
could work intensively for months, only to receive 25 US cents per kilo of coffee. A 
family who sells a lot might receive 200 or 300 US dollars but, as the year’s only 
income, ‘All you can buy is rice’. Work and the chance to earn a decent salary were 
simply the greatest factors in the decision to migrate. One interviewee joked about 
his friends in the LGBTQ+ community in Timor-Leste who assumed that he 
migrated due to family and societal pressure over his sexuality; laughing, he 
explained that, in reality, he was just looking for money. As another so succinctly 
put it, ‘Money is the reason we want to live here’.
The four earliest migrants, who have now been in the UK for between 12 and 
15 years, had migrated via Portugal. They initially migrated for both political and 
economic reasons and reported being required to travel to Portugal to apply for 
Portuguese citizenship. Although familiarity with the former coloniser and net-
works of extended family and friends connected them to Portugal, language was not 
a factor determining migration. The Portuguese language skills of these four 
2 Those engaged in subsistence farming and fishing (27 per cent of Timorese aged 15–64) and those 
who are unemployed, not seeking work or in unpaid or informal work (42 per cent of those aged 
15–64) are not represented in the interviewee cohort (La’o Hamutuk 2015).
C. C. Millar
205
interviewees ranged from fluency to no Portuguese at all.3 They stayed in Portugal 
for between 5 months and 4 years, before being recruited for factory work in 
England. They described learning via word of mouth about employment agencies 
that organised factory work in the UK, providing accommodation and airport pick-
ups and lending cash to be repaid once the migrant started work. All four named 
unemployment and labour-market conditions in Portugal as determinants for their 
onward migration to the UK. Portugal’s high unemployment rates, low salaries and 
the kind of work available (such as cleaning) were mentioned. One man concluded 
that ‘There are more and better opportunities in England than Portugal’ and that 
Portugal is ‘also not a well-developed country’. Thirty-five-year-old Maria said:
In Portugal there is no work. The land is in crisis, there is no work. Friends say ‘Ahh, go 
already to England. In England there is work’.
12.5.2  Employment and Labour-Market Conditions 
in England
In England, half of the 16 interviewees were working in factories – either in produce 
or supermarket packing factories in Peterborough or in automotive manufacturing 
in Oxford. Another four worked in warehouses and delivery for online shopping and 
logistics companies, one at a café, one in hospital catering, one had not returned to 
work after maternity leave and one was retired from factory work. Other work 
(either interviewees’ past jobs or the work of Timorese migrants not formally inter-
viewed) included meatpacking, hospitality, hotel and supermarket work. Migrants 
often mentioned whether they worked through employment agencies or as perma-
nent contract staff. Agency work was considered less desirable, as ‘flexible’ sched-
ules meant shorter shifts, no guarantee of full-time hours and smaller pay packets. 
Many started with agencies before moving to contracts. This was employer- 
dependent: for example, several Peterborough interviewees had successfully moved 
to ‘permanent contracts’ with a local produce packing factory, whereas those in 
automotive manufacturing in Oxford remained with agencies for many years. 
English-language skills varied, with fluency rare among interviewees. Like initial 
migration via Portugal, language did not appear to be promoting migration to the 
UK. However interviewees were aware of its importance in the labour market, not-
ing that many Timorese were unable to ascend workplace hierarchies due to their 
insufficient English.
Interviewees were generally positive about labour-market conditions in England. 
Parents were pleased that they could work nights or weekends, so that they could 
look after their children or rotate childcare with their partner. Interviewees enjoyed 
3 Portuguese is mainly spoken by older and highly educated Timorese. Those educated during 
Indonesian occupation speak Indonesian alongside Tetun and local languages, while younger gen-
erations favour learning English as an additional language (East Timor Government 2012).
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working alongside other immigrants in multicultural workplaces, describing how 
people came from all over the world to the UK, where work was available to those 
who wanted it. This overall positivity did not mean that migrants were willing to 
accept just any conditions. Some moved jobs (or changed shifts) for a pay-rise or 
‘lighter’ work, to gain new skills or due to dissatisfaction – such as discomfort with 
cash-in-hand restaurant work and the future problems which employer tax avoid-
ance could bring. Many worked long shifts, typically between 8 and 12 hours. They 
admitted that it could be tiring and boring or, as one factory worker said, ‘When the 
line spins, my head also spins’. Yet interviewees overwhelmingly iterated that it was 
worth it for the money, with difficulties disappearing once paycheck hit bank 
account. Wages in England were described as those with which one could transform 
one’s life. England’s comparatively abundant labour market enriched migrants’ 
welfare-resource environments, offering new economic protections and a better 
quality of life, as Alitu, a 32-year-old man, confirmed:
Compare England with Timor. Because here, you have work. That’s it. Therefore, you have 
money. You have money, you have life. If you don’t have money, what are you going to do? 
That’s all it is.
One new and novel element of migrants’ welfare-resource environments in the 
UK was a well-developed private sector, which interviewees repeatedly noted they 
had not been exposed to in Timor-Leste. Only four had worked in the private sector 
before migration: three in small businesses and one labouring with a road- 
construction contractor. Since migrating, all 16 had worked solely in the private 
sector. Interviewees also observed the existence of Portuguese restaurants, 
Lithuanian supermarkets and halal butchers in their neighbourhoods, noting that the 
Timorese seemed to be the only immigrant community without businesses. This 
exposure certainly exerted influence, with the potential to shape future mobility. 
Around half of the interviewees discussed the idea of starting a business in Timor- 
Leste, with most imagining small businesses such as a corner kiosk or building a 
rental property. One woman described her dream of creating her own business and 
providing employment for others. While working at a produce packing factory, she 
studied how it ran, researching how the company was built in her spare time. These 
experiences were connected back to work, with a well-developed private sector seen 
as a source from which the key protection mechanism of employment could be 
derived.
12.6  State-Based Welfare Provision
State-based welfare provisions, or lack thereof, were also shaping Timorese mobil-
ity to England. States provide social protection through numerous institutions, oper-
ating at multiple levels of government, from supranational to subnational (Levitt 
et al. 2017). In this section an exploration of state responsibility, distrust, depen-
dency and education in Timor-Leste is contrasted against migrants’ experiences 
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with social security, public services, taxation, healthcare, legal protection and edu-
cation in England.
However, it is important to first note the vital role that citizenship and the supra-
national EU play in this case. As all interviewees arrived in the UK on Portuguese 
passports, access to social protection is clearly tied to citizenship and residency 
status. Portuguese citizenship offers a path to the EU and England and is integral to 
the multi-state protection parcels that Timorese migrants piece together. For 
66-year-old Joana, who had migrated via Portugal, this was clear:
Portuguese government opened the path for us to come… work in England. Portuguese 
government is the one that gave it to us. Portuguese government opened the door for us 
from Timor to come to Portugal, make our passports, make our identification cards.
Because Timorese migrants are considered Portuguese citizens by the sending 
and receiving states, there are no official statistics pertaining to Timorese living in 
the UK and little bilateral institutionalised support for migrants. Furthermore, with 
Brexit looming, the future of this trend is uncertain. At the time of this research, 
Timorese communities had appeared in the Republic of Ireland in response to the 
Brexit referendum and may materialise elsewhere in the EU should this pathway be 
restricted. According to more recent anecdotal reports from networks in Timor- 
Leste, the queues outside Dili’s Portuguese embassy – fondly known as the ‘pass-
port shop’ – continue to remain long.
12.6.1  State Responsibility, Distrust, Dependency 
and Education in Timor-Leste
Interviewees described the state in Timor-Leste as a central presence in their 
welfare- resource environments, with overwhelming responsibility for looking after 
its people. Providing for vulnerable groups like the unemployed, the elderly, the 
disabled and the poorest of the poor was seen as a priority for the state, alongside a 
perceived responsibility to provide employment. Some migrants felt that these pro-
tections have not materialised and the alleged failure of the Timorese state to look 
after its population was a recurrent theme in interviews. One woman said that the 
state ‘doesn’t give work to people, doesn’t look after people’, while a young man 
claimed that the state does not want to ‘open up work’ for school leavers because it 
is disinterested – that it instead ‘just closes its eyes to these things’. Interviewees 
spoke of sluggish development since independence, acknowledging that the pov-
erty, unemployment and violence of 15 years ago still exist today. Development 
activities funded by overseas governments, which are conspicuous in Timor-Leste, 
are also a form of multi-state, transnational social protection. Some interviewees 
thought that the Timorese government was uninterested in or incapable of ade-
quately providing for people without assistance from international organisations. 
Sabino, a 33-year-old man, stated:
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I don’t really accept like, handing back to government… because if you hand it over to 
Timor, development will fall. Everything will go really bad.
These discussions elicited a sense of distrust of the state in Timor-Leste. Poor 
public administration and high government expenditure were lamented, with exam-
ples like constant overseas ‘study trips’ by Timorese leaders to learn about systems 
implemented elsewhere providing no benefit. One man described a 2016 govern-
ment forum on disability rights being held in venues inaccessible to people with 
disabilities, exemplifying the government’s perceived tendency towards talk with-
out action. Corruption was cited as a barrier to the state’s implementation of ade-
quate welfare protection – a barrier so large that interviewees were unable to fully 
conceptualise how the state might develop social-security mechanisms or public 
services without dealing with it first. Nepotism was considered to be a particularly 
pervasive subset of corruption. Many described finding employment without family 
connections as difficult, particularly in government offices. One interviewee recog-
nised that reducing nepotism is challenging given Timor-Leste’s small population, 
large families and cultural norms around helping ‘your people’. Interviewees 
bemoaned the fact that if political leaders are corrupt then the people also do as they 
wish, with an ‘If he can do it, so can I’ mentality. Nepotism and cronyism reportedly 
restricted access to state-provided education and healthcare. Examples included stu-
dent places at the national university being based on whether the applicant had fam-
ily working there, or as 22-year-old Marco described, entry to Dili’s national 
hospital:
Every time in Timor you go to like the hospital… there is always security there. Perhaps 
sometimes you go they don’t let you in, you don’t get in. Then their family come, and they 
open up straight away.
Migrants’ welfare concerns not only shaped their mobility – migration in turn 
shifted perspectives on the role of state-based welfare in Timor-Leste. Some inter-
viewees raised dependency as an issue, claiming that their viewpoints had changed 
since migrating. One woman thought that the majority of Timorese are now over- 
dependent on the state and third sector, simply waiting for the government to pro-
vide employment. She described how she and other migrants were now thinking 
that taking responsibility for improving welfare themselves might be more effective 
than waiting for the state. Migration and remittances were seen as one way they had 
taken development (at least at the household level) into their own hands.
Education featured prominently in Timorese migrants’ decisions about mobility. 
Pre-migration, most interviewees had completed senior high school, except for two 
women whose education had ended at primary and junior high school. None had 
completed university, although four had started. Almost half of the interviewees 
(both sexes, all ages) raised financial obstacles when discussing why their education 
ended, with many expressing sadness that their families could not afford their edu-
cation’s continuance. Factors like the death of a parent or having numerous siblings 
often exacerbated economic barriers. War and conflict had prohibited those in their 
30s and 40s from continuing their education, while younger interviewees discussed 
starting university but losing interest upon seeing graduates unable to find work. 
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Others claimed that they made the decision on their parent’s behalf, not wanting 
family to take on debt when there were already many mouths to feed. As education 
is not currently a prerequisite for employment in Timor-Leste, but employment is 
vital for the provision of basic needs, some interviewees relinquished further educa-
tion to prioritise the basic welfare of themselves and their families. This was some-
times mirrored in the decision to migrate. A number of interviewees were first-born 
children or had many younger siblings and chose to forego further education and 
migrate so that their siblings could continue schooling. Twenty-two-year-old Marco 
explained his decision:
I looked based on economy, in the household, maybe if like I’m the only one, ok I can go to 
school. But there are also my siblings, so I made the decision and said to my mother ‘Leave 
it, I’ll look for work’. … If I was alone in the household I could make the decision for my 
parents to go into debt so I can go to school, but we’re so many in our household. So I made 
this decision to come here to work, to look after my siblings… for me to go to school, I 
can’t make my parents suffer more.
12.6.2  Welfare Systems in England: Social Security, Taxation, 
Healthcare, Law and Education
As in Timor-Leste, migrants saw the state in the UK as responsible for looking after 
its people. Interviewees were impressed that the state could provide welfare protec-
tions to its large population. One claimed that the government does not leave people 
‘suffering in darkness’ as in Timor-Leste – in England, ‘the poor are not too poor’. 
The perceived responsibility of the state to provide employment surfaced again, 
with importance placed on the idea that the state ‘gave people work to do everyday’.
Interviewees depicted positive experiences with Britain’s social-security system. 
Parents described receiving child benefits, often seen as their taxes being paid back 
to them. Sixty-six-year-old pensioner Joana described the support she receives:
Now I receive retirement money. The government gives me money. I receive. The govern-
ment gives me a house to live in. The government gives me everything ah, free. I don’t pay 
for anything. I don’t pay for the house, don’t pay for electricity, don’t pay for water, don’t 
pay to go to the doctor, don’t pay to get glasses, don’t pay to get the bus, everything for 
me, free.
A single parent recounted his experiences with the welfare system during his 
fight for sole custody of his daughter, the victim of domestic violence perpetrated by 
her mother. He described how the mother’s name was replaced with ‘Government 
of the UK’ on his daughter’s birth certificate, his municipal public housing and how 
his daughter cannot leave the UK without a social worker before the age of 18. He 
saw this experience as overwhelmingly positive, as did others who described the 
provision of public housing, money or assistance if someone is sick or unemployed 
as a government looking after its people. One interviewee described home visits by 
child services as the government kindly checking to see if a family is OK. Migrants 
praised good governance and professional, uncorrupted bureaucracy. The list of 
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lauded public services was long: parks and gardens, libraries, sports fields, acces-
sible paths and jobs for vulnerable people. Local government provided interpreters 
for Portuguese-speakers and funding for Peterborough’s Timorese Community 
Organisation.
Migrants recognised that the UK’s taxation system was what allowed for many 
of these public services. They explained the insurance number system, how tax was 
taken out of pay, how everyone (not only the big companies) pays tax and how local 
governments cover the cost of services like rubbish collection by collecting rates. 
Workers thought that Timor-Leste could use a proper taxation system, recognising 
the mutual benefits for both the state and the population, such as quality state- 
funded healthcare. Thirty-three-year-old Sabino said:
About health, health is important. Because the hospital, like here… you work, you pay tax, 
you go to the doctor, everything is free. Because you’ve already paid tax, from your pay, 
your salary. In Timor, you work, there’s no tax, you’ll have to pay for medicine, you’ll pay 
for everything.
Women described their positive maternal and child healthcare experiences in 
England, while others utilised access to state-provided healthcare for family mem-
bers. One interviewee flew her mother to England for GP treatment, indicating the 
limitations of Timor-Leste’s basic medical care.
Interviewees were also in awe of the UK’s legal system. They admitted having 
no idea about the kinds of laws existing in England pre-migration and that the learn-
ing curve had been steep to varying degrees. Interviewees recounted both minor 
instances of learning to abide by the law first-hand (such as being pulled over for 
driving without a licence, going to court and paying a fine) and more serious inci-
dences resulting in Timorese men serving prison sentences. The effective imple-
mentation of and respect for legal protection was particularly important. Interviewees 
said that although Timor-Leste has a legal system, it is not strong. They described 
their amazement upon realising that England’s legal system is effective, the general 
population respects the law and that they could walk around freely. As one woman 
put it, ‘In Timor, people aren’t really scared of the police. But here people are scared 
of the police like they are of God’. While perhaps not traditionally identified as 
components of welfare, Timorese migrants were adamant that safety, stability, 
peace and security are protections underpinning all others. The ability to live a life 
free of fear and violence is vital for wellbeing in any other form.
Education was also a key facet of migrants’ welfare-resource environments in 
England. Conversations included educational opportunities for migrants themselves 
(like training courses) but focused on the education of children. England’s educa-
tion system loomed large in the minds of the nine interviewees who were parents, as 
being educated in England was seen as a way to avoid a life of suffering and increase 
future opportunities. One couple migrated while pregnant so that the child could be 
born, raised and educated in England. Education was also shaping future decisions: 
for those with children in England, wanting their child to be educated in the UK was 
the single greatest factor in their plans for the future. However, parents were moni-
toring Timor-Leste’s education system, expressing that they would prefer to be in 
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Timor-Leste if the quality of education there increased. Citing inadequate facilities, 
the distance to schools in rural areas, the problematic issue of curricula being in 
Portuguese rather than Tetun and the frequent use of corporal punishment, they 
noted that this is unlikely to occur in the near future.
12.7  Family-Based Welfare Provision
Family, friends, neighbours, co-workers and others all constitute networks of social 
ties that offer welfare protections outside the state, market or third sector (Levitt 
et al. 2017). Often the very raison d’être for labour migration around the globe, 
family in particular shapes individual aspirations for and actual practices of mobil-
ity. Through migration, transnational actors provide for non-mobile individuals and 
vice versa. Family is part of a migrant’s resource environment, for example by car-
ing for children remaining at home. The migrant’s transfers of remittances, knowl-
edge and connections are simultaneously fundamental to the family. Even for those 
who have never left their home village, welfare provision is increasingly 
transnational.
This final section first explores the role of family in Timorese migration to 
England, demonstrating how migrants utilise increased access to labour-market and 
state-based protections in service of their own, family-based welfare regime. The 
results are then connected back to the central theoretical notions, in a discussion that 
aligns the focus on family with interdependence in communal cultures and contrasts 
it against migrants’ experiences with independence. It is concluded that the eco-
nomic and state-based protections offered to Timorese migrants through mobility 
are valued for their contribution to a framework founded on relationships and 
responsibility.
12.7.1  The Role of Family: Migration Determinants, 
Remittances and Return
Family plays an integral role in this case. Family-based welfare systems reign 
supreme in Timor-Leste, with extended families providing housing, childcare 
(including informal adoption), cash, employment, healthcare, education, labour and 
capital to one another. Twenty-two-year-old man Alex described this safety net:
Like in Timor-Leste you would never become homeless, because family will always help, 
look after you. Even if you don’t have any money, you don’t have a house, but your family 
has a house. You go and sleep there. Eat there, eat for free, drink for free.
Family’s prominence translated into the decision to migrate, with supporting 
immediate and extended family undeniably at the forefront. Siku, a 28-year-old 
man, and Estela, a 45-year-old woman, stated respectively:
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Yeah this decision [to migrate], sometimes to look after your family… you know the 
Timorese system. You can be grown up but you still need to look after your mother 
and father.
To more or less sustain my nieces and nephews, that’s my dream.
Interviewees often said that family was their first priority, with remittances a 
clear example of this. Remittances were most often sent to parents and siblings but 
also to nieces, nephews, children and spouses. The frequency and amount varied, 
with newer, younger arrivals sending up to GBP 800 every month. Others remitted 
once every 3 or 4 months, while those who had been in the UK longer (often with 
their own children in England) sent GBP 100 twice a year or only when families in 
Timor-Leste had a specific need. The most frequently mentioned uses of remit-
tances were food and siblings’ education (including tuition fees, transport and living 
costs for those studying in Dili or Indonesia) followed by the education of nieces 
and nephews. Some families purchased protections from the market in Timor-Leste 
by building or fixing up houses to live in or by building a small rental property in 
order to secure an income stream.
The impact of remittances was also discussed in terms of family – indeed it was 
often hard to move away from the topic! When asked about migration’s economic 
impact on themselves as individuals, interviewees spoke of the house they had built 
(which their family lives in) or their feelings of satisfaction (gained from paying for 
their siblings’ education). Many reported improvement in their families’ welfare, 
although the impact ranged from ‘really big’ to seeing remittances as ‘just vegetable 
money’ allowing improvement ‘little by little’. Some noted that meeting their sav-
ings goals in England was difficult, due to family needs in Timor-Leste and the lia 
tradition, which obliges people to give money and resources at death, marriage and 
other cultural rituals. Wages and benefits accessed via the labour market and the 
state in the UK, when remitted home, thus form a key part of the transnational pro-
tection parcels which migrants and their families piece together.
Reflections regarding return migration also centred on family. Although no inter-
viewees spoke of having clear plans for the future, rumination revolved around fam-
ily considerations. For those with some desire to return to Timor-Leste, it was 
usually to be with family. A good life in Timor-Leste was described as living with 
family in a safe, peaceful environment, with the ability to provide for them. 
Connection to place, culture, food, weather, belonging and a desire to contribute to 
development also featured. Interviewees frequently mentioned how much they 
missed their family and how intensely sad or anxious not being physically close 
made both migrants and those at home. Migrants often wondered aloud how they 
could have left parents, partners, siblings and children. As one interviewee explained, 
‘You know how it is in Timor… when we’re apart from each other, we always miss 
each other’.
Those who discussed staying in the UK raised the same motivation – family. As 
noted previously, it is here that children become an important factor, with parents 
seeking future protection against social risk for their children by prioritising quality 
education. Interviewees with children in the UK sometimes expressed a personal 
desire to return to Timor-Leste but insisted that their child/ren should be educated in 
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the UK first. When asked about her desires for the future one mother declared ‘My 
children will finish school. Then I’ll go to Timor’. José, a 45-year-old man, simi-
larly said:
I think a lot about going to Timor. I want to go to Timor… but first I will develop my family. 
When my family, my children all have success, are all in university… I can begin to give it 
a try in Timor.
Although interviewees discussed return migration, existing evidence suggests 
that they are more likely to stay, particularly once they have children in the receiving 
country. As Castles (2004) describes, the primary labour migrant is usually a young 
person intending to return once savings targets are reached  – this is evident in 
younger, more-recent Timorese arrivals who discussed staying overseas for 3–4 
years but who ultimately want to return home. Castles (2004) explains that difficulty 
in achieving savings targets may lead to a prolonged stay, in turn encouraging fam-
ily reunion or formation. Here we see Timorese migrants who have been in the UK 
for 5–10 years and have formed families in England or brought children over from 
Timor-Leste. Although parents in this cohort anticipated return to Timor-Leste, 
‘Once migrants’ children go to school in the new country, learn the language, join 
peer groups and develop bicultural or transcultural identities, it becomes very diffi-
cult for the parents to leave’ (Castles 2004, 209).
In earlier sections it was suggested that decisions may be occurring at a family 
level, as interviewees were frequently professionals hailing from a context with 
high unemployment and/or had younger siblings for whom they purported to have 
foregone further education and migrated. Even if not technically household deci-
sions, family is clearly central to the choices made by individuals. This is seen in the 
decision to migrate to support family, or to remain overseas until savings goals are 
met or siblings in Timor-Leste have finished school or university. It is clear that 
Timorese intergenerational care arrangements, in combination with the welfare pro-
visions offered through migration, are influencing both present and future mobility. 
The results also showed a mother flown to the UK from Timor-Leste to visit a doc-
tor, a child deliberately born in England in order to access quality healthcare and 
education, parents delaying or relinquishing return migration so that their child/ren 
could be educated in the UK and remittances providing protections for extended 
networks of relatives in England and Timor-Leste. All exemplify how Timorese 
migrants in England utilise migration – and the protections it brings – to support 
their own, family-based welfare systems.
12.7.2  Interdependence and Independence in Culturally 
Embedded Welfare Provision
The central role which family plays in Timorese migrants’ welfare-resource envi-
ronments aligns with the emphasis on interdependence in communal, collectivist 
cultures. Interdependence does not mean that people lack concern about their own 
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personal value or that all relationships are focused upon equally (Ng et al. 2003). 
The ‘demands’ of others do not necessarily impinge on self-need – rather, participa-
tion in social relations creates fulfilment. In communal societies people indirectly 
pursue the happiness of their loved ones, and meeting one’s obligations in turn 
brings happiness (Ng et  al. 2003). This is clear in Timorese migrants’ decisions 
about mobility, the importance of their ability to provide for family and their satis-
faction when this is possible. The intensity of homesickness experienced also aligns 
with the sensitivity of individuals in collective cultures to their relationships. Even 
the discussions surrounding the difficulty of reducing nepotism in Timor-Leste ref-
erence the very cultural norms that underpin informal and family-based protection 
regimes. The individual is inherently connected to others, making kinship, social 
obligations and belonging fundamental (Carroll-Bell 2015).
Living in England migrants were immersed in a Western context: here distin-
guishing between interdependence and independence is a useful heuristic. While in 
communal societies the cultural imperative is to be an interdependent self, in the 
West it is to be an independent self (Ng et al. 2003). Independence does not equal 
selfishness or lack of sociality but is, instead, a complex set of relationships, institu-
tions and social practices providing people with choices, thereby creating opportu-
nities for happiness through self-determination (Ng et  al. 2003). Interviewees 
discussed their experiences with financial self-sufficiency, learning to manage their 
own time, independent decision-making and travel. Earning, managing and living 
off one’s own money was a novelty, with paying rent and budgeting to buy smart 
phones, clothes and cars being new experiences for most. They experienced 
immense improvements in the quality of housing and food – one interviewee was 
delighted that his body had become paler and fatter since migration because he now 
worked inside and ate meat. Travel was also a benefit of self-governance and taking 
holidays for reasons other than cultural events, funerals and family responsibilities 
was a new experience for some interviewees. The increased feelings of indepen-
dence which Timorese migrants experienced is unsurprising, given that self- 
determination, autonomy, internal control and regulation of behaviour are important 
in the Western conceptualisation of selfhood (Ng et al. 2003).
While migration altered Timorese migrants’ access to the economic protections 
of the labour market and state-based welfare, the focus nonetheless remained on 
family and interdependence. Most interviewees noted the benefits of individualism 
but said that they just did not subscribe to it themselves. Some described individual-
ism in European society as negative, while others were clear that it was part of life 
in the UK but not desirable for Timor-Leste. State-based protections and employ-
ment were valued most for what they provide the family. England’s healthcare and 
education were valued not only for their benefit to the individual migrant but also 
for how they serve immediate and extended families. The availability of work, a 
highly lauded facet of migrants’ welfare-resource environments in England, was 
valued because it increased a person’s capacity to provide for family. Employment 
was valued because it facilitated household-level development and strengthened 
family life, overriding any gains in individual financial independence and self- 
governance. While younger interviewees were more likely to mention their 
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newfound ability to buy consumer items or to travel, they also remitted larger per-
centages of their salaries. Despite living for up to 15 years in a context where the 
cultural imperative is independence and self-determination, interviewees gained 
individual wellbeing by pursuing the welfare of their loved ones.
12.8  In Conclusion
This chapter has shown how welfare concerns shape Timorese mobility to England 
and vice versa, with migration itself being a welfare strategy. In Timor-Leste, 
resource environments exhibited a scarcity in market and state-based provisions, 
with immediate and extended family playing an integral role in insuring against 
social risk. Unemployment, labour-market conditions and limited state protection 
influenced decisions about mobility for migrants as both individual and collective 
actors. Migration to the UK – facilitated by access to Portuguese citizenship and the 
EU  – brought employment opportunities, improved labour-market conditions, a 
safe environment and the accoutrements of the British welfare state in social secu-
rity, healthcare and quality education.
However, interviewees were adamant that more than the provisions offered by an 
employer or the state, the greatest opportunity migration provided was the capacity 
to improve life for themselves and their family. Although some sections focused on 
state responsibility, this indicates that migrants do not necessarily seek full state 
provision. Rather, they seek a baseline level of economic and social security, per-
ceiving the state’s role as protecting fair conditions, providing equal rights and 
enabling people to enjoy and build upon fundamental welfare protections. The 
changes to welfare-resource environments that migration facilitated altered the 
social protection parcels that Timorese migrants could piece together, empowering 
them with the capability to transform themselves and their families.
Understanding how migrants and their families give life meaning is vital to the 
study of global social protection. By using an extended version of Levitt et  al.’s 
(2017) welfare resource environment framework and querying the perspectives of 
migrants from communal Timor-Leste living in a Western context, this chapter 
sought to demonstrate that how people conceptualise welfare is culturally situated. 
It was found that Timorese migrants in England utilise migration – and the eco-
nomic and state-based protections it brings – in service of their own, family-based 
systems. Mobility between welfare contexts allowed access to new sources of wel-
fare, enabling migrants to fulfil their responsibilities to family and in turn ensure 
their own wellbeing. Timorese migrants valued increased access to the labour mar-
ket’s economic protections and state-based welfare for the ways they supported a 
family-based framework founded on interdependence, relationships with others and 
responsibility. By querying the geographical mobility of Timorese migrants in 
England in light of their welfare concerns, this chapter has illuminated the contex-
tual and culturally embedded ways in which migrants engage with the protections 
offered by labour markets, the state and family.
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Chapter 13
Securing Old-Age Pensions Across 
Borders: Sudanese Transnational Families 
Across the Netherlands, the UK and Sudan
Ester Serra Mingot
13.1  Introduction
In recent years, the media, public opinion and political discourses have fed the idea 
that intra-European migrants are increasingly relying on the welfare states of their 
host EU country (Giulietti and Wahba 2012). Whereas some studies claim that the 
more-generous welfare states act as a migrant magnet (Borjas 1999; Enchautegui 
1997), others do not find such clear-cut relation (Levine and Zimmerman 1999; 
Talleraas 2019). Yet, the so-called ‘welfare migration’ (Giulietti and Wahba 2012) – 
or the likelihood of migrants moving to countries with more-generous welfare sys-
tems  – has become a topic of political and public concern and has influenced 
important European political processes such as Brexit (Blauberger and 
Schmidt 2017).
Recently, a few qualitative studies have pointed to the ‘onward movements’ of 
some new migrant groups of refugee background – e.g. Somalis and Iranians – from 
countries with some of the most ‘generous’ welfare states such as the Netherlands, 
to the UK, where social welfare is less generous1 (Ahrens et al. 2016; Bang-Nielsen 
2004; Haandrikman and Hassanen 2014). Many of these ‘onward movers’ first 
arrived in Europe as refugees and then moved to the UK after gaining citizenship of 
the first country of settlement, which grants them access to all the welfare benefits 
of that particular state, just like any other citizen. Yet, many decide to move to the 
UK as EU labour migrants, with all the restrictions this implies (see Broomfield 
1 In particular, when we look at the social-security domain of state-provided pensions, the generos-
ity of the various EU states is quite different, so that a retired worker in the UK will receive a state 
pension (together with other benefits) worth around 29% of their previous earnings while, in the 
Netherlands, this goes up to 97% (OECD 2017).
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2014). Thus, from a welfare perspective, moving to the UK seems to be paradoxical 
at best.
In fact, despite the empirical evidence confirming these movements, this type of 
‘onward mobility’ is still surprisingly poorly understood, leaving many questions 
unanswered. For example, little is actually known about these onward movers (e.g. 
age, marital status, gender), whether the movement stops there or what role the dif-
ferent welfare benefits – e.g. healthcare, unemployment or pensions – play in this 
move. Against this backdrop, this chapter explores the links between these ‘onward 
movements’ of EU citizens of refugee background and the particular social- 
protection arrangements in the domain of old-age pensions. This contribution 
unravels the considerations underlying the decisions of Sudanese migrants when 
moving to certain places to address social-protection needs, specifically those 
related to old age. To do so, this chapter draws on the life stories of members of dif-
ferent Sudanese transnational families, spread across the Netherlands, the UK and 
Sudan. In so doing, it highlights the socio-cultural embeddedness of old-age provi-
sions and the ways in which mobility and resources are combined to cover for old- 
age needs. Rather than looking at the individual migrant, this research takes the 
extended family as the main unit of analysis. It shows that the different mobility 
arrangements in which Sudanese migrants engage have the double intergenerational 
aim of providing for their elderly parents back home on the one hand and securing 
their own pension on the other.
The chapter contributes to the current debates on migration and social protection, 
questioning the some of the assumptions about so-called ‘welfare migration’ 
(Giulietti and Wahba 2012). As I show, despite the availability of formal social- 
protection institutions in the first EU country of settlement, the informal circulation 
of resources within transnational families is deeply embedded in the practice of 
reciprocity and norms of social exchange rooted in the sending country. Analysing 
social protection from a transnational lens allows us to move away from nation 
states as the main ‘containers of everything’ (Serra Mingot and Mazzucato 2018). 
Welfare states thus become just one of the many resources that can be mobilised to 
provide generalised reciprocity and organise the old-age pensions of the different 
family members.
This chapter is based on data collected during 14  months of multi-sited and 
partly matched-sample ethnographic fieldwork with Sudanese migrants and their 
families across the Netherlands, the UK and Sudan (2015–2017). The Sudanese 
case is relevant for two main reasons. First, the Sudanese are a relatively small and 
new migrant group in Europe. This is important because new migrant groups face 
different migration and receiving contexts (Grillo and Mazzucato 2008) which 
might affect the ways in which they engage in the different social-protection prac-
tices. Second, in terms of legal status, the Sudanese are a highly heterogeneous 
group, including asylum-seekers, (un)documented migrants, refugees and citizens. 
This inevitably impacts on the rights of these different groups to access formal 
social protection.
The chapter is organised as follows. The next section provides a literature review 
on some of the current debates on migration and social protection, focusing on the 
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specific aspect of old age and pensions. It then zooms in on what it means to grow 
old in the Sudanese context. After discussing the data presented in this chapter and 
the overall methodological aspects of this research, I present and address the two 
main analytical points – namely, the access and provision of pensions both for the 
migrants themselves and for their parents. The last section concludes by summaris-
ing the main findings and pointing out the importance of addressing transnational 
social protection (TSP) from the perspective of extended families, which allows 
them to move between multiple locations (beyond one sending and one receiving 
state) throughout different moments in time.
13.2  Mobile Populations in Immobile Welfare Systems
Nowadays, more and more people choose or are pushed to live across national bor-
ders, developing attachments and responsibilities in more than one nation state – for 
example, by caring for family members, earning their livelihoods or saving for their 
old age in different countries (Levitt et al. 2017). Yet, traditional welfare states and 
their national social-security systems have been created to cater for the needs of 
sedentary populations – citizens mainly living within the borders of the nation state. 
This becomes problematic for people with increasingly mobile lifestyles and 
responsibilities that span beyond a single country. For instance, when moving to 
another country, migrants risk losing any contribution made to the formal social- 
protection system in the sending country, while often having to wait several years 
before having access, if at all, to formal social protection in the host country 
(Sabates-Wheeler 2009). Even when welfare provisions in the receiving country are 
accessible, migrants must often provide for their families ‘back home’ (Stark and 
Lucas 1988), who often lack access to formal social protection (if any) in their ori-
gin countries.
Transnational mobility has indeed obscured the clear-cut division between who 
should be socially protected by the state and who should not. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that, in recent decades, different aspects of migration and social protec-
tion have increasingly caught the attention of researchers and policy-makers. To 
date, research and policy have largely focused on the individual migrant’s (lack of) 
access to the welfare state in the receiving countries in the Global North (Sabates- 
Wheeler and Koettl 2010; Sabates-Wheeler and Waite 2003; Van Ginneken 2013). 
This approach is problematic for two main reasons. On the one hand, it has perpetu-
ated the idea that the Western industrialised countries – and by default their welfare 
systems  – are the ultimate goal for any migrant. In so doing, they have largely 
neglected the role of other formal and informal social-protection institutions here 
and there – in both the receiving and the sending country. Although some of these 
studies acknowledge the important role of informal social protection, they mostly 
conceive of it in terms of filling the gaps of the formal system (Amuedo-Dorantes 
and Pozo 2006; Avato et al. 2010). Moreover, informal types of support are often 
addressed from a financial perspective, e.g. social networks in the receiving country 
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providing newly arrived migrants with financial help, or remittances which migrants 
send to cover the needs of those back home (Sabates-Wheeler and Waite 2003). On 
the other hand, the focus on the individual migrant in the receiving country has 
overshadowed a crucial element in the social protection of mobile populations – 
namely the role of migrants’ families ‘back home’. Indeed, even when welfare pro-
visions in the receiving country are accessible, migrants are often responsible for 
providing for their families ‘back home’ (Stark and Lucas 1988). In fact, interna-
tional migration does not necessarily sever the obligations between family members 
living apart (Baldassar et al. 2007). On the contrary, rather than an individual proj-
ect of income maximisation in response to emergencies, migration is often a family 
livelihood strategy to diversify income sources, face up to socio-economic con-
straints and guarantee the wellbeing of the different family members (Sabates- 
Wheeler and Waite 2003; Stark and Lucas 1988). Yet, the increasingly restrictive 
and changing migration and welfare regulations lead many migrants to develop a 
series of strategies that encompass formal and informal resources from different 
institutions – often located in different countries – to cover not only for their own 
but also for their families’ needs, now and in the future. Therefore, in order to 
understand such strategies, which combine formal and informal resources across 
borders, social protection is a more useful concept than social security or welfare, 
which are highly related to the support provided by the state. Social protection, on 
the other hand, is a broader concept as it includes different mechanisms of social- 
risk management provided not only at a public but also at a private, community and 
market level (Avato et al. 2009). For the purpose of this chapter, transnational social 
protection (TSP) is understood as the combination of provisions provided by the 
state (the social-security system), the market, the third sector and family and social 
networks to protect individuals and families against declining living standards aris-
ing from a series of basic risks and needs (e.g. employment, healthcare, housing, old 
age or education) across the borders of two or more nation states (De Neubourg and 
Weigand 2000; Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004; Levitt et al. 2017).
13.2.1  Growing Old Across Borders
One of the main dilemmas faced by adult migrants – as well as their elderly parents 
‘back home’ – is how to cope with the experience of growing old across borders 
(Zickgraf 2017). From the perspective of the migrants in the receiving country, their 
access to state-provided pensions might be limited or not enough. For example, 
research has shown that some benefits, such as contributory pensions, do not deliver 
comfort in old age for many non-European labour migrants, due to the higher unem-
ployment rates among this group and to the fact that many work in low- and unskilled 
positions, which deliver lower levels of pension (Dwyer and Papadimitriou 2006). 
A similar situation happens for people who enter a country as refugees over the age 
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of 40, since they often have to wait several years to find a job and, even if they do, 
are unlikely to secure a sufficient number of years’ employment to access 
contributory- pension benefits (Dwyer and Papadimitriou 2006). In addition, many 
of these migrants might wish to spend their retirement years ‘back home’, in which 
case the pensions built up in the host country might be lost, as they are not always 
transferrable.
In fact, the challenges attached to the aging of mobile populations have caught 
the attention of researchers and policy-makers alike, who have increasingly looked 
at aspects related to the accessibility and portability of pensions (Dwyer and 
Papadimitriou 2006; Holzmann and Koettl 2011). In an attempt to make the current 
social-security systems more mobile, a series of bilateral agreements have emerged 
in recent years to enable the portability of certain social benefits, especially pen-
sions and healthcare, from a receiving country to a migrant’s country of origin 
(Holzmann and Koettl 2011). Such agreements, however, face multiple challenges 
and only exist between a small number of countries (Van Panhuys et  al. 2017). 
Moreover, the extent to which migrants make use of the portability of state-provided 
pensions for old-age arrangements remains highly unclear. In fact, qualitative stud-
ies have shown that sometimes family-provided care – which might or might not be 
available in the migrant’s receiving country, since family members might be living 
somewhere else – is prioritised over the benefits of strong welfare states (Liversage 
and Mirdal 2017; Serra Mingot and Mazzucato 2019). Yet informal care might not 
be easily accessible, since family members might be scattered across the borders of 
more than one nation state, facing mobility restrictions.
Besides the problems related to the access and portability of their own pensions, 
migrants – especially those from countries with weak welfare systems – are often 
responsible for providing for their aging parents back home. In fact, although the 
geographical distance – coupled with shifting migration regimes and financial pos-
sibilities – affects the intergenerational contract, the latter continues to shape how 
family should be ‘done’ (Krzyżowski and Mucha 2014) throughout the different life 
stages, especially during old age. Growing old across borders, therefore, is a com-
plex multi-dimensional process that has an impact on the different family genera-
tions and is affected by multiple factors such as the legal status of the migrants, the 
more-or-less strict migration regimes of the different contexts in which the migrants 
and their families live, the gender of those giving and receiving care, the sociocul-
tural norms of the sending and receiving contexts or the financial resources of the 
families (Serra Mingot 2020a).
In order to understand how migrants make sense of and arrange their pensions to 
cover for their old-age needs (for themselves as well as for their aging relatives), it 
is important to look beyond the individual migrant in the receiving country and 
investigate how other non-state-provided resources are accessed and circulated 
across national borders. In this regard, as this chapter shows, mobility is a crucial 
element through which to fulfil personal and family old-age arrangements.
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13.2.2  Aging in Sudan
If you manage to migrate to Europe, or America, life is better, but you have no money... 
Sometimes I wonder why I spent 37 years of my life in the KSA [Kingdom of Saudi Arabia] 
and did not go to another country…
These are the words of Youssif2 (67), the father of Salim (31), one of my respon-
dents in the UK. I was very fortunate to meet Youssif in October 2016 because, by 
the time I conducted my fieldwork in Sudan, Youssif was in Egypt for healthcare 
reasons. He had undergone a cancer operation in Egypt, received chemotherapy in 
Saudi Arabia and continued with it in Egypt. He and his wife returned to Sudan just 
a couple of weeks before I left.
I met Youssif in their impressive three-storey house in a wealthy neighbourhood 
of Khartoum. He lived there with his wife, their younger son (who was about to start 
studying engineering) and their daughter with her three children (her husband 
worked in Iraq, so he mostly sent them money and visited them a few times a year). 
Since Salim and his older sister were working abroad, Youssif and his wife were 
renting two of the bedrooms in the house to some Chinese students. This was actu-
ally an important source of income during their old age. As we drank tea, Youssif 
told me about his experience as a labour migrant in Saudi Arabia. Like other 
Sudanese of his generation, Youssif had studied computer engineering in the UK, 
after which he had found a well-paid job in Saudi Arabia. When he could afford it, 
he married his wife, Munira, a Sudanese woman from Khartoum, who soon joined 
him abroad. His four children were born in Saudi Arabia but, when the eldest 
reached high-school age, his wife and children moved back to Sudan. This was (and 
still is) common practice among Sudanese labour migrants in the Gulf, since enroll-
ing in Saudi universities is prohibitively expensive, thus encouraging families to 
return to Sudan or move somewhere else so that their children can attend university. 
Going to high school in Saudi Arabia, however, makes it more complicated for the 
children’s future enrolment in Sudanese universities, entry to which depends on the 
score obtained in the Sudan School Certificate examination. Therefore, the most 
common solution for these families is for the wives and children to return to Sudan – 
either to the house that the migrant has managed to build over the years to provide 
security in their old age or to the husband’s family house  – while the husbands 
remain abroad working and only visit once or twice a year.
Youssif’s story illustrates one of the oldest and most common transnational fam-
ily arrangements in Sudan. It points to different aspects around which old age is 
organised, since the role of the state is clearly absent. Sudan, however, has a national 
Pensions Fund – one of the oldest in Africa and the Middle East – which covers the 
pension for those aged 60 with at least 20 years of formal contributions, the survi-
vor’s pension and disability pensions (Social Security Administration 2007). Yet, 
despite the apparent availability of a formal pension system, my fieldwork 
interviews and observations elucidated that often the pension received (if any) could 
2 Pseudonyms are used to ensure the informants’ anonymity.
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barely cover people’s monthly food expenses, let alone their housing costs or medi-
cal emergencies. Therefore, those respondents who received a state pension needed 
additional support to survive, especially during old age.
In Sudan, therefore, the lack of a sufficient state-provided pension leaves most 
elderly people dependant on their children and extended families, who are fully 
responsible for their different social-protection needs (Adam and Yousif 2016; 
Gasim 2010; Mokomane 2013). Thus, as in other countries with weak or non- 
existent welfare systems, the reciprocal circulation of care, money and other 
resources in Sudan within extended family networks are crucial for the family’s 
social protection and reproduction (Akuei 2005; Mokomane 2013). To cover for 
old-age needs, people in Sudan would follow different strategies. Sometimes, as in 
the case of Salim and Youssif, the migrants’ parents had worked in well-paid jobs in 
the Gulf,3 which had allowed them to save enough money to build a house. As 
Youssif’s vignette shows, often many generations live in the grandparents’ houses, 
so that financial and care duties are shared among family members. Renting some 
rooms or a small apartment within the family house compound was also a strategy 
followed by some families, which constituted an additional source of income to 
cover daily expenses. In some cases, besides building a house, the migrants’ parents 
had set up a small business, which was now run by some younger relative, from 
whom they received a monthly revenue.
These arrangements, however, did not apply to all families. For many elderly 
people in Sudan the main source of financial security was the remittances sent by 
their children. Especially for healthcare emergencies, remittances are often the 
main – if not the only – resource. In recent years, the declining standards of public 
hospitals and the increasing privatisation of healthcare providers has resulted in 
prohibitively high healthcare costs that can only be afforded through remittances. 
Yet, the increase in the fees of medical services in Sudan has not seemed to translate 
into better services; on the contrary. Therefore, those who could afford it would 
often opt to receive treatment abroad, in countries such as Jordan, Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, India, Thailand, Belgium or Germany. Affording healthcare abroad, how-
ever, requires the access and coordination of multiple resources, including money, 
care and housing. In the case of Youssif, for instance, Salim explained to me how his 
father’s operation and treatment, which cost GBP 7000 (EUR 7800 approx.), was 
only possible through the money that mostly he and his siblings had put together. 
The financial costs of the operation were also lessened, thanks to the apartment that 
Youssif’s brother owned in Cairo and where Youssif’s wife could stay during the 
whole medical process.
The socio-cultural obligation to care for the elderly in the family does not only 
apply to the biological parents but also to other elderly relatives (e.g. aunts and 
uncles). This is because often the head of the family and his wife are obliged to 
provide for their own children, as well as their nephews, nieces and cousins (Adam 
3 People like Youssif, who work in the Gulf, are not entitled to receive any state pension even 
though, during their working years in the Gulf, they were bound to pay yearly taxes in Sudan.
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and Yousif 2016). Once these children become adults, they are in turn responsible 
for caring not only for their parents but also for grandparents, aunts and uncles. 
Children become the most available and reliable source of insurance during old age 
(Adam and Yousif 2016; Nauck and Klaus 2007). Investing in the children  – in 
terms of education and family values – is of high importance for families (Serra 
Mingot and Mazzucato 2019; Zickgraf 2017). The role of children as the main old- 
age insurance – in terms of care and income – is deeply rooted in Sudan. Thus, one 
way of ensuring a comfortable old age is often envisaged as providing the family’s 
children – e.g. one’s own children, grandchildren, nieces or nephews – with the best 
possible education so that, in the future, they can have a highly paid job with which 
they can better support their parents (and other elderly relatives). Youssif’s case is 
an example of how education is the main trigger for the family return to Sudan. 
Therefore, it was quite common to find humble families making enormous financial 
sacrifices to send their children to ‘the best’ schools that they could afford.
This understanding of a pension differs from the traditional Western and nation- 
state- centric perspective, where the pension or old-age insurance is mostly under-
stood as the regular payments made by the state – sometimes, to different degrees, 
also the market – to cover the basic needs of its citizens at official retirement age. 
Yet, as illustrated above, in Sudan, like in many other developing countries, the idea 
of the ‘pension’ is much broader and fluid and involves a combination of resources, 
in which often the state is not the most relevant one (Mazzucato 2008; Serra Mingot 
2018). Therefore, research on old age and pensions can no longer be limited to the 
state, since growing old is shaped by migration and transnational practices (King 
et al. 2017). In order to understand how migrants make specific arrangements for 
their and their parents old age, it is important to analyse the ‘pension’ from a trans-
national lens, in order to be able to include elements of pensions here and there and 
to understand the role of such elements in shaping people’s decisions to move.
13.3  Data and Methods
The data presented in this chapter are based on 14 months of ethnographic fieldwork 
conducted in 2015 and 2016 with Sudanese migrants in the Netherlands and the UK 
and their families back in Sudan. Multi-sited and partly matched-sample research 
was conducted using in-depth biographic interviews, informal conversations and 
participant observation with 43 respondents across the Netherlands and the UK and 
with 19 of the migrants’ matched family members (mostly parents and siblings) in 
Sudan. Among the Sudanese respondents in the Netherlands and the UK, the major-
ity were documented migrants, while only a few of them (in the Netherlands) had 
seen their asylum application rejected and become undocumented for several years, 
without access to any type of formal social protection (Serra Mingot and Mazzucato 
2018). Among the documented, most of them had arrived in Europe through the 
asylum system and, after varying periods of time, had become either Dutch or 
British citizens. As such, they were entitled to welfare benefits like any other 
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citizen, including old-age pensions. Several UK respondents had moved from the 
Netherlands and thus, in some cases, matched samples spanned the Netherlands, the 
UK and Sudan, giving us a wider view of how migrants navigate the different social- 
protection systems. A matched-sample methodology is especially suited to studying 
old-age caregiving practices within transnational families, because it allows the 
researcher to sample individuals who are connected across different sites 
(Mazzucato 2009).
I conducted all the interviews and observations in English, Arabic or German, in 
familiar environments for the respondents – mostly in their homes. The interviews 
lasted between 2 and 4  h, while participant observation ranged from attending 
events with the participants (e.g. concerts or family get-togethers) to spending a full 
week living with them in their homes. Most interviews were recorded through note- 
taking, respecting the respondents’ wishes. The in-depth interviews and observa-
tions allowed me to construct the life histories of the different family members and 
to explore how old age was experienced by both the elderly and their adult children.
Research participants were recruited through different gatekeepers and snowball 
sampling with different starting points. The sample included refugees and (un)docu-
mented labour migrants, split between men and women of ages varying between the 
early 20s to the late 50s and including single men, married couples and divorced 
parents with children. The educational backgrounds of the respondents varied, 
though the majority had a tertiary educational degree from Sudan.
13.4  Catering for Old-Age Needs Across Borders 
and Generations
Both in the Netherlands and in the UK, most of my respondents had access to state- 
provided pensions, since most of them had their respective Dutch or British citizen-
ship, which they had obtained through the refugee system. Yet, for most of them, the 
idea of the state-provided old-age pension did not seem to be a major concern. 
Although many of my respondents in Europe were under 50 years old – and there-
fore they had more pressing issues to worry about than their own pension – two 
other factors should be considered. On the one hand, many of them had had to wait 
several years before obtaining refugee status and being allowed to work. For many, 
this long process had resulted in their being able to formally apply for a job for the 
first time in their 40s. In the current competitive labour market, many of these 
migrants struggled to find a job for years and, when they finally managed to, it was 
often in low paid and part-time positions. In the Netherlands, this was especially the 
case for women with children. Thus, they envisaged a rather low pension. On the 
other hand, most respondents, expressed their desire to grow old in Sudan, thus the 
expected returns of the welfare state in terms of pensions greatly lost their meaning 
in that neither Dutch nor British formal state-provided pensions can be transferred 
to Sudan. From this perspective, therefore, migrants for whom mobility is part of 
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their lives and future plans might face difficulties when it comes to securing their 
formal pensions through geographically fixed institutions. It might, then, be safer 
and preferable to invest in and rely on assets that will stay and allow a high degree 
of flexibility, now and in the future – assets such as their children, who are the most 
common old-age insurance in Sudan. This reflects deeply rooted socio-cultural 
norms of the key role of family in informally catering for all old-age needs.
13.4.1  Providing for One’s Parents Pension
As explained above, many elderly people in Sudan survive through the support of 
their children, be it in terms of money, care or both. Yet many of my respondents, 
especially those in the Netherlands, heavily depended on welfare benefits for many 
years, which they often coupled with informal jobs. Although this income was often 
enough for the migrant and their nuclear family (if any) here, many families were 
not able to send substantial monthly remittances to their family members back 
home. Moreover, recurrent unexpected and highly expensive healthcare emergen-
cies – especially for elderly parents, aunts or uncles – put these migrants in the dif-
ficult situation of having a duty to help but not being financially able to do so. As 
previous research has shown, the highly regulated Dutch society, with its strong 
welfare state aimed at helping ‘the weak, the poor and the helpless’ (Ghorashi 2005, 
181), has had the unintended consequence of leaving many people dependent on the 
state for many years. As studies have shown, however, minimum and temporary 
assistance, together with room for interaction in the new society, facilitates and 
speeds up the refugees’ participation in the labour market (Ghorashi 2005). Besides 
the long asylum process, during which asylum-seekers are not allowed to work, 
once refugee status is given, people must usually go on re-training programmes, 
which might take years. As Hanadi (43) and Ensam (44), two of my Dutch-Sudanese 
female respondents in the UK told me, respectively:
In the Netherlands, even if you want to work in a supermarket, you have to go through one 
year of training.
[The Netherlands] was good for providing study but not for providing work.
Even in cases where these refugees had obtained their Masters degree in European 
universities, they also had to repeat all or a great part of these studies. I was particu-
larly able to observe that this was the case when my respondents had obtained their 
certificate in a Eastern European country or in Russia. Due to the close links that 
Sudan had with communist countries in the past, several people had studied for their 
degree in countries such as Poland, Romania or Russia. While some respondents 
had had their Russian certificates almost fully validated in the UK, the Polish certifi-
cate of another respondent was rejected in the Netherlands. For many of these peo-
ple, therefore, moving to the UK was seen as a faster way to access the labour 
market and, therefore, money with which to support their families back home.
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In some cases, being able to provide hands-on care for the parents was the main 
reason for leaving the Netherlands and moving to the UK. It is important to bear in 
mind, though, that, in past decades, migration regulations in the Netherlands and the 
UK have been in constant change. This affects different aspects of migration. For 
instance, the likelihood of being granted asylum or obtaining a visiting/medical visa 
for an elderly parent in the Netherlands or in the UK might vary greatly depending 
on the political agenda on migration at a specific moment in time. Yet, overall, 
obtaining visiting/medical visas seemed to be much more complicated in the 
Netherlands. As several respondents explained, they were not able to bring their 
parents to the Netherlands (INS 2020) for a visit due to the exorbitant financial 
requirements or other arrangements (e.g. living in a house of a minimum size to be 
able to host one or two people) they had to comply with. In comparison, the require-
ments in the UK are less strict.
This was the case for Ensam who, together with the lack of job opportunities in 
the Netherlands, moved to the UK primarily to be able to take care of her mother, 
who had been given a medical visa. In fact, the impossibility of bringing elderly 
parents from Sudan to the Netherlands due to the current immigration legislation 
was also a reason for some families to move to the UK. Sometimes, however, the 
process was quite complicated. This was the situation for one of my respondents in 
the UK, Hind (40). Hind was a Dutch-Sudanese citizen, who had arrived in the 
Netherlands as an asylum-seeker in the late 1990s. In 2005, however, her husband’s 
mother became seriously ill in Sudan. Facing the restrictive migration regulations at 
the time and the resulting impossibility of bringing her mother-in-law to the 
Netherlands, Hind, her husband – also a Sudanese refugee – and two little children 
moved to Sudan to take care of her. Yet, after 2 years in Sudan, Hind realised that 
her children were struggling too much, in terms of both adaptation and educational 
achievements. Concerned for their future, the whole family moved back to Europe. 
Yet, instead of returning to the Netherlands, they moved to the UK, where the British 
regulations at the time allowed Hind to bring over her mother-in-law to receive the 
healthcare she needed, which had not been possible in the Netherlands.
13.4.2  Arranging One’s Own Pension
When asked about their own old-age plans, many Sudanese respondents in Europe 
explained that providing their children with the best education possible was a prior-
ity and a form of old-age insurance. Indeed, throughout my fieldwork in different 
locations I observed how several respondents would invest a lot of resources to pay 
for their children’s after-school lessons in order to have them obtain excellent grades 
and access ‘the best’ universities. As Mohamed (53), a British-Sudanese doctor in 
the UK who was unemployed as his certificate had not yet been validated, put it in 
a very straight-forward way: ‘This is my insurance. I’m investing in them [his chil-
dren] now’.
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Providing their children with the best education and future opportunities was 
also one of the main triggers of ‘onward migration’ from the Netherlands to the UK 
(Ahrens et al. 2016). In the Netherlands, depending on both the end-of-primary- 
education test results (when children are around 12 years old) and, especially, on the 
teacher’s advice, students are transferred into different types of secondary education 
(OECD 2016). As some studies have shown (Klooster et al. n.d.; OECD 2016), such 
advice often underestimates and discriminates against students of migrant back-
ground, hindering their access to tertiary education. This was perceived by many 
respondents as discriminatory and many of the Dutch-Sudanese families I met in the 
UK had actually left the Netherlands, where they had citizenship, for this very rea-
son. Hind, whom we met above, moved to the UK to take care of her mother-in-law; 
she explained that her second reason for moving there was that she felt, based on the 
experiences of other Dutch-Sudanese who had moved to the UK, that the educa-
tional opportunities for her children were better in the UK than in the Netherlands. 
Although Hind held warm memories of her life in the Netherlands and cherished 
many of aspects of the country – such as the feeling of safety or the quality of the 
housing – she was concerned that the Dutch educational system would not give her 
children the same opportunities as the system in the UK.
Yet, despite these investments for the children, several respondents were also 
aware and concerned that their children, born into Western welfare systems, would 
not have the same feeling of ‘duty’ to provide for their ageing parents in the future 
in the way that they, the parents, had envisaged. This concern was tackled in differ-
ent ways, depending on the family possibilities. For example, some families would 
take their children to Sudan for long holiday periods and to take part in family 
events (e.g. weddings, funerals), where they could witness family duties and social 
norms. At other times, migrants’ duty to care for their aging parents was combined 
with socialising their children into it. This was the approach taken by Hind who, 
despite the difficulties of moving to Sudan with two little children to take care of her 
sick and old mother-in-law, was happy that she had brought her children along. As 
she explained to me:
They learn that the parents are the first people they should take care of. As we learnt that 
from our parents, we taught that to our children, so they know how to help us and that they 
should take care of us.
In cases where face-to-face contact was not possible or was very sporadic, the chil-
dren’s socialisation took place digitally and was mostly implemented by their male 
relatives in Sudan or elsewhere, who would constantly call their grandchildren to 
discipline them on what to do and how to behave (Serra Mingot 2020b).
These examples show how the family and the intergenerational bonds of reci-
procity among the different family members are the main pillar of old-age arrange-
ments for transnational families, not only now but also in the future. That is, by 
showing their children how they take care of their own aging parents, these migrants 
are socialising them into the Sudanese socio-cultural norms of reciprocity. Such 
socialisation was, in fact, another reason that led some Dutch-Sudanese families to 
move to the UK. As one of my respondents explained, the Netherlands was often 
E. Serra Mingot
231
perceived as a country with too much freedom and with a relatively small Sudanese 
community. In the UK, however, the Sudanese community was bigger and thus the 
children were more exposed to – and also controlled by – Sudanese Muslim values. 
As one of my Dutch-Sudanese respondents in the UK told me: ‘[In the UK] every-
body is controlling everybody’.
13.5  Conclusions
This chapter has explored the links between the ‘onward movements’ of Sudanese- 
European migrants and the particular social-protection arrangements in the domain 
of old-age pensions. Through different cases, I have analysed the complex mecha-
nisms guiding the decision of Sudanese transnational families to access and circu-
late certain resources in order to cover for the different old-age needs, now and in 
the future. Such mechanisms have been rendered visible through a transnational 
perspective and a multi-sited matched-sample methodology, which allowed me to 
expand the unit of analysis from the individual migrant, as is often done in the 
social-protection literature, to extended family networks, whose members are scat-
tered across different countries. This has shown that old-age needs take place simul-
taneously and across different generations (e.g. migrants providing for their elderly 
parents while making arrangements for their own old age). Moreover, it has high-
lighted the crucial role of mobility and the geographical distribution of individuals 
in orchestrating complex social-protection arrangements, such as old-age pensions.
The multi-sited matched-sample analysis has shown how decisions around old- 
age arrangements entail accessing and organising resources (in terms of people, 
finances and care) over multiple locations. Analysing social protection in general – 
and old-age pensions in particular – through a transnational lens allows us to move 
away from nation states as the main ‘containers of everything’. As the different 
cases presented in this chapter have shown, moving from the Netherlands to the UK 
is not based on assumptions of better state-provided welfare benefits. The analysis 
has shown that one of the main triggers of ‘onward migration’ is in fact the lack of 
possibilities for people to arrange their own and their families’ social protection in 
the way that they envisage to be the best or the most appropriate. In taking into 
consideration the sending context and the sociocultural norms around old-age wel-
fare protection, this chapter has provided evidence that these norms also travel and 
shape the ways in which old-age arrangements are made. Therefore, rather than 
talking about people moving to ‘better welfare states’, it seems more appropriate to 
talk about people moving to countries where specific resources are deemed better to 
cover for specific social-protection needs, such as education or possibilities for 
family- provided care in the UK. In fact, while the Dutch welfare state seems to be 
more generous, it is also more controlling, thus limiting people’s capacity to work, 
bring over visiting relatives or follow a particular study path. In this regard the UK, 
although providing fewer welfare benefits, facilitates people’s access to the labour 
market, access to the studies of their choice or the possibility to bring relatives over 
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for a visit or medical treatment. This flexible character of the UK, however, has to 
be taken with caution. For instance, while access to the labour market (regular or 
irregular) is easier and less controlled, this can lead to the exploitation of people 
who are in need of money (Batnitzky and McDowell 2011; Bloch 2008; Dell’Olio 
2004; McGregor 2007).
Looking at migration and social protection from the perspective of the extended 
family shows that decisions to move or stay in a specific place are based on the 
migrants’ and their families’ needs and how best to fulfil them. In fact, what the 
cases have shown is that, in the current context of geographically fixed welfare sys-
tems and restrictive migration regimes, people with an extensive history of mobility 
or with a widely geographically scattered family face difficulties when it comes to 
safeguarding their social-security benefits like formal pensions because, if they 
moving to another country, such social-security rights might not exist. Therefore, 
the old-age pension is not envisaged in terms of receiving a state pension but in 
terms of having one’s own children as the main providers of income and care. 
Investing in people (e.g., children) and other universal and mobile assets (e.g. edu-
cation) that can move across time and space is therefore often the preferred option 
for these transnational families.
Finally, what this contribution has shown is the importance of looking at TSP not 
only as a translocal process but also as a trans-temporal one. Indeed, what the dif-
ferent cases have shown is that family arrangements are orchestrated to provide not 
only for current old-age needs but also for those occurring in the future. From this 
perspective, therefore, the different generations become involved and have a spe-
cific role to fulfil, which might mean moving to certain places in order to access 
certain resources to cater for particular needs.
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